CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS

PRESS CALL ADVISORY: EXPERTS COMMENT ON COLLECTING EFFECTIVE INTELLIGENCE

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OPERATOR: Good morning. My name is Suzette (sp), and I will be your conference operator today. At this time I would like to welcome everyone to the CAP NSN Press Call on intelligence. All lines have been placed on mute to prevent any background noise.

After the speakers' remarks, there will be a question-and-answer session. (Gives queueing instructions.) Thank you. I now will turn the call over Ms. Anna Soellner. Ma'am, you may begin.

ANNA SOELLNER: Thanks so much, Suzette. Good morning and welcome to the National Security Network and Center for American Progress call on the practices and policies around the use of torture to collect effective intelligence. My name's Anna Soellner. If you need to reach me after the call, you can do so at 202-492-2967. That's 202-492-2967. Let me remind you all that this call is being recorded, so by participating, you're agreeing to being recorded. Audio will be available immediately after the call at americanprogress.org in the press room.

Today we're pleased to be joined by a number of experts in the fields of intelligence and foreign policy. Kicking off our call will be Ken Gude, managing director for the national security at CAP. Next we'll be joined by Matthew Alexander, Air Force officer and interrogator who lead the interrogation team that tracked down the leader of al-Qaida in Iraq. Then we'll be joined by Glenn Carle, the former CIA clandestine services officer and deputy national intelligence officer for transnational threats. And finally, rounding out our call will be Major General, retired, Paul Eaton, national security network senior adviser.

Ken?

KEN GUDE: Thanks, Anna, and good morning. Thank you all for joining us. I want to start by saying that four days later, the glow has definitely not worn off. Still very excited about the news of Sunday night, and I want to congratulate all of the hard-working intelligence and military professionals that have been working on this for 15 years really, stretching back over three administrations, not just this one or the most previous one.

And when we look at the facts of this operation, I think it's very clear that President Obama made a concerted push at the beginning of his administration to place a higher emphasis on tracking down and targeting al-Qaida operatives and especially Osama bin Laden. And what we saw on Sunday night was the culmination of that effort, an effort that stretched across the intelligence community and was really a result of good, hard-working action by intelligence operatives, analysts and practitioners as well as military personnel; and really reflects how successful the effort of reforming our intelligence agencies have been and how well they can work together across the interagency process to really undertake what was the most successful clandestine operation that the United States has had since the invasion of Europe in 1944, which is really quite an amazing feat.

Now, obviously, we are here to not just talk about the death of bin Laden, but how we got there. And I think it's fair to say that, despite the level of certainty that we've heard from people really on all sides of the argument, it's very, very difficult to know definitively just how influential the enhanced interrogation techniques were in this process. It's – we've heard that, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and al-Libi lied to the interrogators. We've heard that they were the ones who provided the most important and (two pieces ?) of intelligence. It's just going to be very hard for us to know the facts.

But I think when we look at the timeline of what has happened, at about the time this information was supposedly emerging from these enhanced interrogations at CIA black sites in Eastern Europe, the Bush administration shut down its bin Laden unit. This was in 2005, and it shifted its resources away from the fight against al-Qaida and towards the operations going – ongoing at that time in Iraq.

And why I think that's critical is because it seems to indicate that the Bush administration itself did not view information that was being produced from those interrogations as in any way decisive or critical in the hunt for bin Laden. Or, if it did, it certainly wouldn't have shut down that operation.

So I think, when we look at that timeline, it says a lot about whatever information was coming out of those interrogations and how valuable it would be in the – in the operation to get bin Laden. And, my last point – and then I'll turn it over to our practitioners here – is that, you know, the mission to get bin Laden, the man most responsible for the September 11th attacks, has now, you know, occurred as we approach the 10th anniversary of that horrible day.

And in some way, and perhaps in an odd way, I think it's actually appropriate that in this mission, in this last phase of this decade-long struggle that we've had to come to terms with the events of September 11th, that it has brought back all of the debates that we've had in the country about just exactly how it is we should go about fighting al-Qaida, just about exactly what policies we should use and what policies are the most effective.

And now that we are here, we've arrived at this point, almost 10 years later and with the death of bin Laden, it gives us the best opportunity that we have had to put a coda on this chapter in American history and move beyond these debates that have caused us so much damage internally as an American citizenry, but also internationally and in the eyes of the world. And we can now move beyond this phase of the fight against al-Qaida. We can leave Osama bin Laden in the past, and hopefully we can leave these interrogation practices in the past too, and really turn the page and start a new phase in the fight against al-Qaida. And with that, I'll turn it over to Matthew Alexander.

MATTHEW ALEXANDER: Hello, good morning. I just want to hit a couple brief points. The first being, what we need to do is we need to define what we consider to be success in an interrogation when we start to evaluate these types of methods. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed – if it's true that he gave the nickname of the courier of bin Laden, and that proved useful, what we have to ask ourselves is, why didn't he continue to provide information, such as his real name

and location, and probably a hundred other things that he knew that would have led us – or help lead us to bin Laden.

So if success of (firm ?) interrogation is one thing out of a hundred, then we've set some very low standards for success. Also, I never saw enhanced interrogation techniques work in Iraq; I never saw even harsh techniques work in Iraq. In every case I saw them slow us down, and they were always counterproductive to trying to get people to cooperate.

In going back to the definition of "works," any time we talk about enhanced interrogation techniques, we need to talk about the long-term negative consequences, such as the fact – that I witnessed in Iraq – which was it was al-Qaida's number-one recruiting tool and brought in thousands of foreign fighters who killed American soldiers.

But more than that, I'll say, why are we having a discussion about efficacy? Because torture's wrong, and so it's a moral issue for me. And it's a legal issue; it's unlawful. And we don't apply that same standard to other fields like the infantry who, despite finding – facing some obstacles in battle are not allowed to use chemical weapons which are 100 percent effective.

So I reject the fact that we reduce this to an argument about efficacy, and I'll be the person to go on record and say that we do know that other interrogation techniques would have worked and produced more info definitively. And why do I say that? Because we have Saddam Hussein, who was captured without using them, and we have Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who my team tracked down and killed, without using them. We have an entire generation of interrogators from World War II, Vietnam, Panama, first Gulf War – all who did their jobs without enhanced interrogation techniques. So there's no doubt in my mind that we could have done more without enhanced interrogation techniques.

Thanks.

MS. SOELLNER: Thanks so much. Next we'll hear from Glenn Carle.

GLENN CARLE: Thank you. You know, I'd like to pick up on a point that Mr. Alexander made, and then go from there. Similarly to what he said, just as – it's passing strange to me that we're even having this debate on the efficacy of enhanced interrogation techniques, which is just a euphemism for torture.

No one would accept in the United States that if we knew that there was one guilty party in a room of 20 people, that we would kill all 20 people because that would eliminate the problem. We simply don't do it; it's unacceptable.

Similarly, you might know or believe that an individual has one bit of information or some information that's useful, among a host of other things that he knows that are not relevant. But you wouldn't – you shouldn't torture the person any more than you would kill 20 people to extract one theoretical piece of information. It's just an insane argument that we are actually even having.

When I was asked to – brought in for a time to run the interrogation of the high-value target that I had responsibility for, there were two approaches generally that the agency takes, and I think the whole U.S. government, to interrogation there, with one goal. There are physical measures and psychological measures. Both are not intended solely to cause suffering, but to, quote, "psychologically dislocate the subject." The theory being that by dislocating him psychologically, he becomes more malleable and more willing to share information.

I refused directly, out of hand, that I – myself – using any physical measures at the time. But I had been trained from the get-go – I'd been trained that psychological measures worked. This is disorienting someone's diurnal – disrupting diurnal rhythms, things of that nature. I found, however, that the guidance manual that goes back to the famous KUBARK or KUBARK Manual that goes back to the Korean War in the early '60s was quite prescient. I found it, actually, very, very good, and it says these measures will increase resentment and will not increase a willingness of the person or the likelihood that the person will share information.

That was exactly my experience, and I just found it appalling, frankly, that we would use them. And then I did a little research, and the origin of the program – the American techniques – come from two sources: the GI experience in the Korean War with the North Koreans and the Soviets' intelligence service, the NKVD, in the 1930s with the show trials. The objectives of each of those times was to extract a confession, to break a person to sign a piece of paper, not to obtain intelligence. And through a strange transformation somehow our government decided that, or some experts decided that these were effective means of obtaining information.

Nothing could be further from the truth. It didn't work, it had the opposite effect, and my personal experience of making a person more likely to cooperate, all it did was increase resentment and misery, but not make someone more likely to share information.

MS. SOELLNER: Thanks so much, Glenn. Next we'll hear from Major General Paul Eaton.

MAJOR GENERAL (RET.) PAUL D. EATON: Good morning, all. Thank you all very much. I'll go to two points: the good order and discipline of the armed forces of the United States and the tactical vice strategic gain on techniques used. My task in Iraq in 2003-2004 was to develop the Iraqi army. The greatest challenge was to get after the moral component of the Iraqi soldier.

So, first the good order and discipline. Enhanced interrogation techniques has a corrosive effect on the good order and discipline to the point where the commanding general at the time, General Petraeus, had to issue a letter that set a higher standard for the conduct of the American soldier than was set by the president and the vice president and secretary of defense of the United States.

So the real problem that Petraeus was getting after was point of capture and the handling of the detainee en route to ultimate dismissal or imprisonment. So what Petraeus was doing was enforcing what we train each soldier to do, the five S-es: And the third S – it's seize, secure,

safeguard, silence and speed – (unintelligible). Safeguard is a fine point, but that we need to hammer home.

Ticking time bomb. Every staff sergeant on patrol in Iraq is faced with the ticking time bomb scenario, and you want every American soldier to be applying enhanced interrogation techniques, the corrosive effect on the discipline of the armed forces and the corrosive impact that that behavior has on the individual American citizen. We like to say that we bring good people into the Army; we send them back better.

Second point, tactical versus strategic. When I get in arguments with those who endorse enhanced interrogation techniques, they say, I'll do anything I need to do to achieve a tactical gain, while dismissing the strategic problem associated with dehumanizing – which is what happens when we use these EITs; you're dehumanizing the subject that you're detaining.

When we look at WWII and the hundreds of thousands of Germans and Italian prisoners who gave up to American military power to the thousands upon thousands of Iraqis who gave up, who surrendered during Gulf War I, these are men that we did not have to kill. They knew that they would be better treated by the American soldier than their own forces would treat prisoners. So they surrendered.

Abu Ghraib was informed by Guantanamo: The standards set at Guantanamo by the president, vice president, secretary of defense, clearly set the stage for Abu Ghraib and its impact on my personal mission to develop the moral component of the Iraqi soldier. I lost considerable moral high ground when that happened. This is a war of ideas and I will not allow the Taliban to set the moral standard for America.

Thanks.

MS. SOELLNER: Thanks so much. Now, we're ready for questions, Suzette.

OPERATOR: (Gives queueing instructions.)

And your first question comes from Dan Froomkin with the Huffington Post.

Q: Hi, everybody. I had a question for Glenn Carle in particular. I was wondering if you shared Matthew Alexander's view that what this demonstrates is – what we know now is that actually there was more information left, you know, undiscovered because of torture rather than discovered because of torture.

MR. CARLE: Yes, thank you. The answer to that is yes, that I'm convinced that that's the case from personal, first-hand experience. I argued throughout my involvement with the specific individual and operation that I was responsible for that the critical component – that I found somewhat amazing, actually, since I was not a professional interrogator; no one in the CIA is, or was – is the rapport that you develop. It's the same with the detainees. It's the same job calling for the same approaches and skills, fundamentally, as being an operations officer in the field is what I did for my career.

Perverse and imbalanced as the relationship is between interrogator and detainee, it's nonetheless a human relationship, and building upon that, manipulating the person, dealing straight with the person, simply coming to understand the person and vice versa, one can move forward. I argued that strongly and I argued that if we put the person under enhanced interrogation techniques, it would regress just as the manual had cautioned and as I assessed, and that's exactly what happened. So I do agree with Mr. Alexander, yes.

Q: And can you tell me a little more about what your personal experience was with this? How you described this particular person that you were dealing with?

MR. CARLE: I had a little trouble understanding the question. Can I tell you more about what?

Q: The person that you were dealing with? The high-value –

MR. CARLE: Yeah, I can only say he was considered one of the top handful of al-Qaida members, officers – to the extent that they had a leadership. He was viewed as influential that way among them. I found – and this is somewhat secondary to the direct subject we're discussing – that, in fact, our assessment was fundamentally wrong about the individual. That's – that is another subject. That's how he was presented.

And through the interrogation process I came to the assessment that he was – was not what he had been billed, but more to the point of the discussion, the methods that I was urged to embrace, I found first hand, as we've all said here – putting aside the moral and legal issues, which we really cannot put aside, as General Eaton eloquently describes, both from a practical and a – a tactical and a strategic sense and a moral and legal one – the methods are counterproductive.

And "counterproductive" is a euphemism. They do not work; they are – they cause retrograde motion from what you're seeking to accomplish. They increase resentment, not cooperation. They increase the difficulty in assessing what information you do hear is valid. They increase the likelihood that you will be given disinformation and have opposition from the person that you're interrogating, across the board. Not a good thing.

Q: Thank you.

MS. SOELLNER: Suzette, we're ready for our next question.

OPERATOR: OK. Your next question comes from Oren Dorell with USA Today.

Q: Hi, so I kind of want to put the torture – I mean, you guys were talking a lot about torture, but there's a lot more to the Bush-era intelligence gathering, detainee program than torture, and I'm wondering if, you know – I kind of want to ask all of you whether there's information that's being lost because detainees, you know, are not being gathered and questioned like they were under the Bush administration.

MR. GUDE: I'll take that first. This is Ken Gude. I think one thing we have to keep in mind is that starting in 2006 at the – when they transferred the 14 high-value detainees to Guantanamo in September of that year, that was the last significant detainee operation in the Bush administration. So for the last two-and-a-half years of the Bush administration, they really did not capture any detainees and hold them in the kind of military detention that we have down in Guantanamo.

And the Obama administration, when it took office, essentially continued that same type of policy of not putting individuals that were captured in military detention, and has placed a higher emphasis on using our criminal justice system or using the criminal justice systems of our partners, our partners and allies.

And I think if you look at the history, even the recent history since September 11, of the criminal justice system, it has by far proven to be the most effective means of obtaining intelligence information on suspected terrorists: If you look at what we got from Najibullah Zazi; what we got from even Abdulmutallab, probably one of the most controversial instances when we have used the criminal justice system – Abdulmutallab gave us significant amounts of information about al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula that have already been acted upon; Daniel (sic) Headley, who was involved in the Mumbai attacks, has provided information that rolled up a specific terrorist plot in Denmark.

So when you look at what it is that actually produces the results, and when you listen to what Glenn and what Matthew have been saying about the types of information that were gathered from the interrogations that they participated in, it's clear that the record shows the use of – the policies that the Obama administration has pursued has produced more actionable and better intelligence information than anything that we were able to get during the Bush administration.

MAJ. GEN. EATON: With respect to alliance support, when the Bush administration enhanced interrogation techniques became known, we lost a lot of support from our alliance –

Q: Who is the – I'm sorry, who is this speaking?

MAJ. GEN. EATON: Oh, this is Paul Eaton. And my contact with our allies in Iraq at that time – again, a very negative effect on the willingness of our allies to cooperate with a government that would mistreat detainees.

Q: But was that because of the enhanced interrogation techniques, or because of the system that they had in place to gather these people and question them to get – you know, to get them – to try to get information out of them?

MAJ. GEN. EATON: As reported to me by some senior folks in the British army, it was in particular – the Brits' reaction to enhanced interrogation techniques caused them to defer turnover of suspects to U.S. custody and continued efforts to find out what they could provide.

Q: So they were interrogating them on their own, but not handing them over to the Americans?

MAJ. GEN. EATON: Correct.

Q: Yeah. I'd like to hear from the former CIA people as well.

MR. CARLE: On the – this is Glenn Carle speaking. On the effect that learning about enhanced interrogation techniques used by Americans had on relations with liaison?

Q: No. No, I'm asking about whether the system that existed – that was created under the Bush administration to gather detainees and get information out of them – I'm not really talking about enhanced interrogation techniques. But you know, the whole idea of getting people and interrogating them and getting information out of them – you know, now, it seems like the new policy is more to have targeted assassinations and kill people. And we lose all that information. And there aren't really these black sites anymore to hold people and get information out of them – whether we're losing – whether we're losing intelligence that we need because of that.

MR. CARLE: In an intelligence service, we'll always want to try to obtain information rather than to cut off an operation or to kill someone first. I mean, that's just sort of standard and sensible approach. I think that transcends any administration; that's just how the intelligence service will try to do its business.

So whether it was the Bush administration or the Obama administration, the CIA and other intelligence services in the U.S. and everywhere will want to either clandestinely obtain information, or obtain it through interrogation if we have to take someone off the street because he starts to be a danger. And how you interrogate the person is what we've been talking about.

But wishing to continue to obtain information is, was and will remain an important – or a critical role to pursue. I'm not sure that there's a decision – I can't speak firsthand, and I'm not sure I would agree with the characterization that there's been a decision to replace interrogating people with targeted killings. I think that there are different decisions made on specific cases in that regard. If we can't get into some place where you know someone is dangerous, it's a different equation than if you can obtain someone – a source clandestinely, or, in rare instances, have to decide that he's safer in custody than continuing to operate freely.

MS. SOELLNER: Thanks so much. Suzette, we're ready for our next question.

OPERATOR: Thank you. Your next question comes from Josh Meyer with National Security.

Q: Hi, can you hear me?

MS. SOELLNER: We can.

Q: I wasn't sure if the mute thing was on. Yeah, this is for Glenn too. Glenn, I was at the Los Angeles Times for 20 years, and I wrote a lot about this. My title is sort of disjointed there – it's the National Security Journalism Initiative.

But I wanted to follow up on some of the earlier questions about this. I mean, I'm – always been intrigued by how the interrogation of these high-value detainees worked in 2002 and on. And you know, some of the information you provided, that I guess you have in your book too, gives a fuller picture than what's been said before. I mean, before, we were told it was sort of contract interrogators from the CIA, and then you had the interrogators from the FBI.

But to what degree were there also people such as yourself from the CIA who weren't the contract interrogators, who were able to provide some sort of, you know, extra perspective here? And I don't know if that – how much sense that makes, but I mean, how did this work with the contract interrogators, with people that were CIA operations officers, and so forth?

You said in an interview the other day that the course of techniques that didn't provide useful, meaningful, trustworthy information – and I'm wondering if you could go into more detail about that.

As somebody asked you earlier, did we lose information about plots and , you know, other operatives – if you were doing this in 2002, for instance – that was before KSM was captured – you know, did that delay the capture of KSM, for instance, because we weren't getting the right kind of information?

MR. CARLE: A lot of questions there. On the contractor issue, I never had any firsthand experience or even second-hand knowledge of contractors doing anything with CIA operations. High-value targets, they're really for us who are – no one will believe it, but – resource-poor, and certainly labor-poor – a hugely intensive resource operation to do it right. So there are whole different – qualitatively different approach taken with an HVT than with sort of the AK-47-toting Guantanamo detainee picked up in the battlefield.

It was only staff employees with whom I worked, but a large team – do I think information was lost? Well – or KSM's capture was delayed? I can't say that. By making a person – a detainee less likely to provide information, and making the information he does provide harder to evaluate, they hindered what we were – what we needed to accomplish.

The way we did it was, since the agency is not in the business – it hadn't been in the business of capturing and interrogating people until post-9/11, you looked for professional staff officers with some relevant, substantive skills. And then, like everything in the directorate of operations, you tell them to work it out. Everything is a field expedient, and you go from there.

And the agency scrambled, and to its credit worked very hard, to professionalize how to go about doing what was a new function. I think they fell back on unfortunate methods, which was the KUBARK manual, basically – or KUBARK, depending on how you want to pronounce it. But that's how you—how the agency would approach it; you'd find a professional staff person, and they go from there.

Now, while I was doing it, I was there – the relatively brief time I was involved was quite early days. And the efforts to institutionalize, to professionalize the processes, occurred as I was doing it and after I left. So it was a more ad hoc thing when I was involved.

Q: Right. Just a brief – you said that there was – that this was a very labor-intensive – I forget the words you used, but almost like saying that it wasn't worth it? Is that my understanding –

MR. CARLE: No, no. I don't mean to – I don't imply that at all; not at all. No, I mean, these were important cases, and individuals who might well have the keys to the kingdom. There's nothing frivolous whatsoever about the people we targeted or the people we captured or what we were seeking to achieve.

I was making a factual statement: It takes – to do this correctly is for – is a hugely labor-intensive operation. It's not just, go in, Carle, or John Smith or something, who goes and talks to somebody. He has the support of the entire intelligence and national security establishment to directly – as relevant to the case in question. And that's for us a big investment of our resources. And it's a valid one to make, but not sustainable for large numbers of people for an open-ended period of time.

Q: Sure, sure. Thanks.

MS. SOELLNER: Thanks, Josh. Next question, please?

OPERATOR: Thank you. Your next question comes from Jen Steele with San Diego Union-Tribune.

Q: Hi, this is Jen Steele from the Union-Tribune in San Diego. This question is for Mr. Carle; it's a tiny bit off the topic, but it's what I'm writing about today. I'm curious: Is the success of the CIA special ops raid on bin Laden – is going to mean that we're going to see more of these kinds of operations used against terrorist threats as opposed to conventional troops? So is this the model that we're going to see going forward focusing on terrorism, as opposed to more conventional troops being used for this kind of work?

MR. CARLE: Well, you know, I retired three-and-a-half years ago, or whatever it is, four years ago, almost, now. So I'm an observer like everybody else, at least on this call. So these things – no firsthand – (chuckles) – knowledge of how to answer your question.

But long before 9/11, the U.S. had as part of its array of capabilities the kind of thing that happened to bin Laden. Our special forces with whom I've worked, some are unbelievably impressive, talented and dedicated people. The agency has similarly dedicated and competent – they're capable people in our Special Activities Division and more straightforward line operations officers, as I was.

And when the president or relevant senior officials decide that it's better to have a special forces and/or intelligence operation rather than using a conventional military approach, then I'm sure as was decided previously and was with bin Laden, and will be again – and my personal view is that it certainly makes more sense to have a small footprint and achieve the direct objective rather than to use 110,000 soldiers to go after one man who's not in the country where you are.

MR. GUDE: Jen, this is Ken Gude here at CAP. And I may just jump in here, if you don't mind. You know, I think it's hopefully going to be the new model. I mean, when we look at this mission, a relative handful of troops were able to accomplish what is quite clearly the biggest victory in the war on terrorism, when just across the Pakistani border into Afghanistan you have more than 100,000 U.S. soldiers and a total allied force of close to 150,000.

And when you add to the – add to that the multiple hundreds of thousands of troops who have served in the Iraq campaign, and when we look at what these major successes in the fight against terrorists have usually come from, it's the small ground troops, small units of special forces soldiers, or small units of FBI officials or small units of cops on the street. You know, these are the types of operations that have proved to be the most successful in the fight against terrorists.

And hopefully now, we can move beyond this model of large ground invasions to go after a relatively small – in terms of numbers – opposing force of terrorists, and use the smaller unit model more effectively in the future.

MR. CARLE: Ken, may I just add one thing. I mean, this gets into policy issues, and the agency people don't make policy. But I was asked the question here – there's a distinction that seems to have been lost for many, and maybe we didn't have a choice policy-wise in the end, but between counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. They are not the same thing whatsoever.

Q: Can I ask a follow-up question?

OPERATOR: Sure, if it's quick. We have one last – we have time for one last question, so this needs to be –

Q: Sure, sure. I just wondered – if you think this is the new model going forward, is there any downside? I mean, if it works well, that seems to, you know, speak well for it. But is there any downside? And I'm specifically thinking about, are our efforts against terrorism going to be less transparent if it's these special ops forces working with the CIA? You know, these people never talk about what they do, as opposed to conventional troops – are a little bit more transparent.

Do you think that's a downside, if you think that's the case?

MR. GUDE: No.

MS. SOELLNER: OK, Suzette. I think we have time for one last question.

OPERATOR: OK. And your next question is from Gail Harris with Foreign Policy Association.

Q: Yeah, thank you. I was wondering – if I'm understanding and hearing correctly, there was historical precedence as well as proof as we continued on with these enhanced interrogation techniques that they weren't working, and in fact, were counterproductive. I was wondering how and why did the government make that decision? Did they not – were there no dissenting voices, or did they choose to ignore them? And the question could be for any of the panel members.

MR. GUDE: This is Ken. I'll jump in. You know, I think that the answer is that they chose to ignore them. I think that the lessons of history are quite clear, and especially when you identify where the techniques that were used at the CIA black sites were derived from, which was the training of U.S. special forces soldiers, special forces operatives that was based on interrogation practices that were used against them in Korea that were developed by the Chinese and the Soviets largely to extract false confessions.

This, as Glenn mentioned before, the CIA's KUBARK manual basically describes what not to do as an interrogator if you want to produce reliable and valuable intelligence information. But in the wake of September 11th, just in those few, first months caught up in that moment, all of that history was cast aside. And unfortunately we had to re-learn it at great pain and great cost to the United States.

MR. CARLE: Ken, may I jump in? This is Glenn Carle again. And I try – you know, I do my best to address your question in my book. But there was a vigorous – "debate" is not the word, but opposition and turmoil concerning these practices inside the various relevant agencies of the national security establishment while they were being evolved and done.

Jack Goldsmith, I think, is his name – was a Justice Department official, a Republican appointee, actually. And he opposed this, and eventually resigned over it. Jane Mayer, in her book, I think, details these things quite a bit. I think Ron Suskind in "One Percent Doctrine" or "One Percent Solution (ph) –" doctrine – touches upon these. I try to in my book.

But the dilemma was, as I – in my personal case, but this was – I was just one person among an infinite number. I was brought into a case that was considered to be – presented to me as a critical success and very important; it possibly could lead us to bin Laden, so this is a high honor. And I'm very excited; and they said, you will do whatever it takes to obtain the information that we need. Do you understand? To which I responded, we don't do that. And the answer was, we do now. And I said, well, we would need at least a presidential finding, direct authorization from the president if something is of grave national security concern, signed off and approved by the relevant agencies and parties in the government.

And the answer was, well, we have it. The "it" was the infamous torture memo written by John Yoo, which when I finally saw the thing – I'm not a lawyer, but I studied Constitutional law, and I know my oath – it was a bit of hack work – I mean, clearly not in concert with the

history of the United States, of habeus corpus, the Magna Carta, the whole thing that founds America and gives meaning to our flag.

And so then I was confronted with a situation of, OK, the president, the attorney general, the Department of Justice, the director of the CIA, the head of the Counterterrorism Center and the head of the unit that I was reporting to have all formally authorized this. And who are you, Glenn Carle, having been readied on this case for five minutes, to challenge the full, legal, authorized weight and orders of the United States government? Do you execute your orders or not? It's a very acute dilemma.

That's what happened.

Q: Thank you very much. Just a quick follow-on: To the best of your knowledge, have we, under the Obama administration, ceased those enhanced interrogation practices totally in favor – I know you've mentioned – it was mentioned that they're using criminal justice more, but are we still doing some of that, or have we ceased the enhanced interrogation?

MR. CARLE: This is Glenn Carle. If it's to me, I left the – I retired before the change of administration so I only know – (inaudible) – speak – (inaudible) – some of my colleagues, but they are, happily, very professional and don't tell me what they're doing.

So far as I understand, they have been – their use has been stopped. And many of the measures have been repudiated formally, and some others have been suspended.

Q: Thank you.

MS. SOELLNER: Great. I think we're ready to wrap up. I appreciate everyone's attendance on the call. Again, audio will be posted at americanprogress.org in the Press Room. If you need to reach me for follow-up questions, or to reach the speakers separately, my cellphone number is 202-492-2967. That's 202-492-2967.

Again, thank you so much to our colleagues at the National Security Network, and thank you again to our speakers.

OPERATOR: Thank you. This concludes today's conference call. You may now disconnect. All presenters, please hold.

(END)