

RESTORING AMERICAN

# MILITARY POWER

A PROGRESSIVE  
QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

By Lawrence J. Korb,  
Caroline P. Wadhams and Andrew J. Grotto

January 2006



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**JANUARY 2006**

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## FOREWORD

Since 1996, the U.S. Congress has required that every four years the Department of Defense conduct a major defense policy review to examine U.S. defense strategy and submit a report on its findings. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), as this process is known, is intended to generate a forward-looking strategy based on the current and foreseeable threat environment. It must outline a national defense strategy that is consistent with the U.S. national security strategy and define the military force structure, modernization plans, and resource requirements necessary to implement the strategy. The Department of Defense is expected to submit the results of its latest review to Congress in early February 2006.

The devastating impact of the war in Iraq on the military is only one of many developments that demand that the Pentagon adopt a new direction during the next four years. Despite its repeated vows to protect the military, the Bush administration has left the world's greatest fighting force on the brink of disaster. The all-volunteer Army is reaching the breaking point, with U.S. ground forces stretched as never before and widespread equipment shortages. In essence, the Bush administration has made a mockery of Vice President Cheney's pledge at the 2000 Republican National Convention: "Rarely has so much been demanded of our armed forces, and so little given to them in return....And I can promise them now, help is on the way."

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United States weapons systems are not tailored to existing and projected threats, and the Pentagon has more programs on the drawing board than it can afford given the Bush administration's record-setting budget deficits. The U.S. nuclear force posture is outdated, and the administration's interest in new nuclear weapons that do not strengthen the posture has needlessly undermined U.S. efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The Department of Defense (DoD) continues to reject integration with other agencies responsible for intelligence and post-conflict reconstruction and has not yet defined an appropriate role in homeland defense.

This QDR outlines a fiscally realistic strategy that will ensure that the American armed forces have the right number of high-quality people in both the active and reserve components and that these men and women are properly trained, motivated, and equipped to deal with the threats of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

During the next four years, this strategy will produce a military that, above all, makes personnel the top priority and invests heavily in the men and women of America's armed forces. This strategy will lead to a stronger, faster, and more flexible military that is better able to deal with both asymmetric and traditional threats. This strategy redefines the military's role in post-conflict situations, including waging counterinsurgency campaigns and providing the Pentagon with the forces and guidance it needs to work in concert with other agencies. The strategy, which we refer to as "1-1-2-3," calls for a military that gives first priority to protecting the homeland, can fight and win one major regional conflict, can engage in two simultaneous substantial peacekeeping and stabilization missions, and can deter conflicts in three regions. As compared to the Bush administration's "1-4-2-1" defense strategy, our strategy gives more emphasis to developing peacekeeping and stabilization capabilities and somewhat less emphasis to deterring regional contingencies.

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***This strategy will lead to a stronger, faster, and more flexible military that is better able to deal with both asymmetric and traditional threats.***

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This strategy will lead to the development of essential war-fighting technologies while cutting DoD's losses on weapons systems that are either outdated or not cost effective. This strategy offers a realistic, updated assessment of the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. military doctrine. It lays out a comprehensive threat and capabilities strategy and will better integrate the military in critical areas of intelligence and homeland defense.

In both its recommendations and its coverage, this QDR reflects two primary lessons learned specifically from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as more generally from the years that have passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall. First, the strategy takes into account budget realities in an era of unprecedented defense spending and in the wake of a \$500 billion annual deficit created in large part by the war in Iraq and the administration's fiscal policies. The strategy is based on the assumption that defense budgets cannot rise appreciably in the next four years and offers overall cuts and cost savings that provide sufficient funds to cover new necessary expenditures and compensate for recommended changes in current policies and posture.

Second, while this QDR would help build a military that is better able to act when armed force is required, the strategy recognizes that the United States must not rely on the military alone if it wishes to maximize its power to protect people and



influence events. While by its very nature a QDR focuses almost exclusively on the Department of Defense, the recommendations herein reinforce and reflect the national security strategy outlined in *Integrated Power*, by Lawrence Korb and Robert Boorstin of the Center for American Progress.<sup>†</sup> Integrated power requires policymakers to view traditional concepts of “hard” and “soft” power as essential partners rather than as alternatives or competitors. Integrated power means abolishing the artificial policy and budget divides between defense, homeland security, diplomatic, and development assistance policies in U.S. foreign policy.

This QDR focuses only on the most critical threats and challenges that mandate change in U.S. defense strategy and force posture. This strategy does not attempt to cover all aspects of defense policy, leaving aside such important issues as reform of procurement procedures, logistics management, and the Pentagon’s civilian and military bureaucracy. Nor does this strategy claim originality throughout. It draws heavily on previous work of the Center and other organizations, and provides references to studies and concepts that have been advanced elsewhere.

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***This QDR offers a blueprint for action during the next four years that can help build the powerful, properly equipped, well-trained and highly motivated armed forces that can best protect the American people and advance U.S. national interests.***

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Since its inception, the Center for American Progress has focused on providing progressives with new perspectives on national security and presenting realistic, concrete policies that can make a difference. This QDR offers a blueprint for action during the next four years that can help build the powerful, properly equipped, well-trained and highly motivated armed forces that can best protect the American people and advance U.S. national interests. It is intended to provoke the kind of debate and reexamination of priorities that is vital to the health of a strong, democratic country.

*Lawrence J. Korb, Caroline P. Wadhams and Andrew J. Grotto*  
*January 2006*

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<sup>†</sup> For more information, see Lawrence J. Korb and Robert O. Boorstin, *Integrated Power, A National Security Strategy for the 21st Century*, Center for American Progress, June 2005, available at <http://www.americanprogress.org/integratedpower>.



# **RESTORING AMERICAN MILITARY POWER**

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**A PROGRESSIVE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW**



## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The United States enters the 21<sup>st</sup> century with unmatched military power and unprecedented challenges. In order to meet these challenges, the Department of Defense (DoD) must begin a fundamental shift in military doctrine and priorities over the next four years so that this country is better positioned to respond to the threats of a post-Cold War and post-9/11 world and to project power whenever and wherever necessary.

This Quadrennial Defense Review outlines a strategy that gives top priority to protecting the homeland, investing in military personnel, and preventing conflicts. It gives the military the manpower and technology it needs to best combat asymmetric threats from non-state actors such as terrorist groups, to deter and contain traditional enemies, and to fulfill its responsibilities in post-conflict situations. It aims to produce a more powerful, flexible, and agile military force that can best protect the American people and advance U.S. national interests. Implemented over time, it will rebalance forces and weaponry in order to allow the United States to protect the homeland, fight one major regional conflict, engage simultaneously in two substantial post-conflict missions, and contain conflict in three regions.

This strategy is based on the twin principles of realism and integration:

- *Realism* to best respond to the threats the United States faces; to allocate limited financial resources available for defense in a cost-effective manner; and to redefine the military's capabilities and responsibilities after the fighting ends; and
- *Integration* to best unite the efforts of the U.S. armed services and non-military government agencies; to get the most from alliances around the globe; and to rebalance spending to allow the United States to go beyond the military and exercise all the instruments of power.

### Threats

The U.S. military must have the capacity to confront a diverse array of threats. In the short term, these include dealing with violent extremists and terrorists with a global reach, weak and failing states, and extreme regimes. In the long term, the United States will have to deal with the rise of China, new challenges from Russia and across the so-called "arc of crisis" in Central Asia, combustible regions around the globe, competition for scarce resources, the proliferation of nuclear and biological weapons, and the declining reputation of the United States in the world.

As threats evolve, U.S. forces must be able to adapt in order to confront conventional and non-conventional threats alike. The United States' unmatched military technological superiority is no longer enough to guarantee that Americans will be safe and that U.S. forces will prevail in battle and in securing the peace. Nation-states no longer possess a monopoly on the ability to develop and deploy nuclear and biological weapons. In Iraq, suicide bombings and crude explosive devices are claiming more lives of U.S. troops than tanks or enemy troops. New capabilities are required.

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*Nation-states no longer possess a monopoly on the ability to develop and deploy nuclear and biological weapons.*

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In addition, the years since the Cold War and 9/11 have shown the need to better define, and develop capacity to support, the military's role in counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, disaster relief, humanitarian interventions, and stabilization operations. Budgetary and personnel constraints demand that the United States support the growth of regional forces

and help allies' militaries share in the burdens of international security. The U.S. military must always retain the capacity to address threats alone, but the recent historical record demonstrates the need to cooperate with others, particularly in addressing transnational threats such as terrorism, organized crime, proliferation of nuclear and biological weapons, and infectious diseases.

## Goals

The strategy presented in this QDR recognizes that the Department of Defense must consistently pursue core missions, despite a fluid security environment. Acting in concert with other agencies and military forces, the Pentagon's primary goals include the responsibilities to:

- Protect the American people from harm by safeguarding the homeland and projecting power around the globe.
- Deter and defeat aggression against the United States, its people, and its interests.
- Prevent conflict around the world, especially in weak and failing states, which have the potential to become terrorist havens and sources of regional insecurity.
- Forge strategic and tactical alliances with other U.S. agencies, foreign states, and international organizations to build capacity in these other entities to leverage their strengths and enable them to shoulder greater responsibilities.

- Assure allies of the U.S. commitment to their security.
- Shape the strategic goals and calculations of current and potential adversaries.
- Project power to ensure access to energy supplies and protect the flow of trade and communications.

## Strategy

There are nine core elements to the strategy presented in this QDR.

First, this strategy will counter the threats of the 21<sup>st</sup> century by promoting a process of developing forces and equipment that will enable the military to defend the homeland; fight one major regional conflict; engage concurrently in two substantial post-conflict peacekeeping and stabilization missions, including counterinsurgency campaigns; and deter or contain conflicts in three countries or regions. This doctrine is referred to as “1-1-2-3.”

Second, the United States must commit the necessary personnel, both military and civilian, to ensure quick and decisive military victories and a stable peace that enables U.S. military forces to be redeployed to other key areas. The United States should remain committed to the Powell Doctrine, making sure that – regardless of whether it acts unilaterally or with its allies – it employs overwhelming force to win on the battlefield. The United States must also clearly define its military and political objectives and have a concrete post-conflict strategy so that Congress and the American people are aware of the potential costs before risking lives and treasure. Our country’s experiences in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan dictate that we should hope for the best but plan for the worst and take steps to maintain domestic support from the moment American troops are dispatched to the day they come home.

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***Recruitment, training, development, and retention of quality military personnel must be the Pentagon’s top priority.***

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Third, this strategy recognizes that unilateral military action is sometimes necessary to deal with imminent threats. Protecting the American people requires that the United States strike to stop imminent threats. Any country that has credible intelligence that it is about to be attacked has the right under the international legal doctrine of anticipatory self-defense to strike first.

Fourth, the recruitment, training, development, and retention of quality military personnel must be the Pentagon’s top priority. The war in Iraq has placed

excessive burdens on U.S. forces, and the all-volunteer military is seriously strained. In particular, ground forces must be increased by at least 86,000 active-duty troops and receive greater attention in the allocation of limited defense funds.

The military must also devote more resources to, and redefine the role of, the National Guard and Reserve, increasing their responsibilities in homeland defense and avoiding situations like Iraq that have kept them on active duty far longer than the norm.

Fifth, the Department of Defense must direct its resources to areas likely to reap the largest security gains. The administration's current so-called "capabilities approach," which "focuses more on how an adversary might fight than who the adversary might be and where a war might occur," fails to assign levels of risk and importance to the various threats this nation faces.<sup>1</sup> The Pentagon must reintroduce elements of a "threat-based" model that guided its thinking in the immediate post-Cold War period. Weapons procurement policies must also change dramatically so that they are attuned to actual needs rather than political interests. The administration and Congress should eliminate outdated weapons, cut systems that do not work but are kept alive because of political interests, and increase funding for systems that reflect changing threats to U.S. national security. Only through the assignment of risks and priorities can the Pentagon produce programs and budgets that are affordable and cost-effective.

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***The Department of Defense must balance the necessity of maintaining the readiness and capabilities of the existing force with the need to modernize and transform.***

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Sixth, the administration must structure U.S. nuclear forces to deter and defeat catastrophic attacks on the United States and its allies, assure allies of the U.S. commitment to their security, and actively shape the strategic goals and calculations of current and potential adversaries. Our nuclear strategy is based on two fundamental principles: only military targets are legitimate targets, and the collateral damage associated with a nuclear strike must

not exceed the military value of a nuclear strike. Applying these principles to the current and foreseeable security environment, a nuclear force posture of 600 deployed warheads and 400 warheads in "reserve" offers a more than credible deterrent against catastrophic threats. Our strategy advocates the development of technology capable of generating new strategic capabilities in response to new threats. It places a greater reliance on conventional weapons and places a much stronger emphasis on nonproliferation.



Seventh, the Department of Defense must balance the necessity of maintaining the readiness and capabilities of the existing force with the need to modernize and transform, as it did during the 1990s. The administration's excessive focus on the so-called "revolution in military affairs" to transform the armed forces rapidly has threatened the readiness and capabilities of U.S. ground forces. Funds for equipping ground troops have instead been diverted to bring these new transforming technologies into the force much more rapidly than prudent or necessary.

Eighth, while the military's most important mission is to protect the homeland, this administration has never given homeland defense the priority it deserves in doctrine or resources. As the Gulf Coast hurricanes demonstrated, national emergencies at times demand significant involvement by the U.S. military. The administration must establish clear guidelines for the U.S. military in homeland security, including chains of command, roles and responsibilities and timelines for engagement, and ensure that the Department of Defense gives adequate attention and resources to this area.

Finally, the military must work to maintain stability and prevent serious international crises before they erupt into armed conflict. This requires renewed and stronger ties with U.S. allies, including increased funding to help train and equip allied armed forces, as well as with international and civilian agencies, including the U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). On the regional level, the United States must increasingly rely on and support peacekeeping units like those of the African Union in resolving regional conflicts, thus reducing the need to deploy U.S. forces.

### **Increased Integration**

This QDR requires the Department of Defense to adopt new commitments to responsible, realistic policies and pursue greater integration both within the Pentagon and with other government agencies. The strategy will require the Pentagon and Congress to adopt institutional changes that will allow the government to achieve its missions in a more cost-effective manner.

First, this strategy promotes a unified national security budget, in which the budgets of DoD, State, USAID, and other agencies with responsibility for national security and international policy are consolidated and rebalanced.<sup>2</sup> The current budgeting system gives overwhelming power to the Pentagon in determining both the direction and tactics of U.S. foreign policy.

Second, the DoD must increasingly coordinate the activities of its component intelligence agencies with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). The DNI should have actual authority to determine the allocation of the Pentagon's intelligence budget, which accounts for approximately 80 percent of the country's overall intelligence spending.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

### Military Personnel and Readiness

In order to support, strengthen, and protect U.S. armed forces, the following steps must be undertaken:

- *Increase the size of the total Army by at least 86,000 active-duty troops.* The Pentagon should add two division-sized peacekeeping or stabilization units, double the size of the active-duty Special Forces, and add 10,000 military police, civil affairs experts, engineers, and medical personnel to the active-duty force.
- *Maintain the end strength of the Marine Corps at 185,000 active troops and 40,000 selected reserve troops.*
- *Reduce the number of carrier battle groups in the U.S. Navy from 11 to 10 and the number of Air Force tactical fighter wings from 19 to 18.*
- *Amend the “back door draft” policies.* The DoD should reduce the duration of the military service obligation, change stop-loss policy implementation, and issue a new executive order on selected reserve recall.
- *Improve quality of life for military personnel.* The DoD should maintain troop pay and benefits, compensate federal civilian employees in the National Guard and Reserve for lost pay when their units are summoned to active duty, and enable selected reservists and their families to enroll in TRICARE, the military’s healthcare system. This will improve personnel readiness and have a positive impact on retention and reenlistment rates.
- *Repeal the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy.* This will widen the pool from which the military can recruit and retain people with critical skills that are already in short supply.
- *Drop the ban on women in combat.* The armed services should establish standards for every military occupational specialty and allow those who meet the standards to serve, regardless of gender.
- *Continue to invest substantial resources to reset, recapitalize, and modernize the force.* Congress and the DoD must ensure that sufficient

funds are allocated to reset the force even after U.S. forces are withdrawn from Iraq and Afghanistan. They must increase the Army's share of the baseline budget from 24 to 28 percent in order to pay for the additional troops, as well as resetting the force.

## **Conventional Weapons Systems**

The Department of Defense should seek funding for flexible, efficient weapons systems that help combat 21<sup>st</sup> century threats, while stopping development and production of weapons systems that unwisely use scarce resources and/or do not meet performance standards. The DoD should:

- *Maintain funding for the following weapons systems:*

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter to provide cost-effective next-generation air technology to the three branches of the armed services and to U.S. allies.

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to carry out strike missions and provide real-time battlefield imagery and other functions without risking personnel or incurring the costs of manned aircraft.

B-2 heavy bomber to increase the military's ability to deliver large payloads over long distances with minimal risk and decrease reliance on other countries to provide the United States with airbases.

Future Combat Systems (FCS) to enhance the Army's ability to deploy units and increase their firepower and effectiveness.

Stryker Interim Armored Vehicle to provide a relatively light and easily deployable combat vehicle to bridge the gap between today's heavy forces and FCS.

CVN-21 aircraft carrier to provide increased power protection while lowering operational costs.

Littoral Combat Ship to support a cost-effective, multi-use system that can protect forces on shore and launch unmanned aircraft and watercraft.

- *Stop development, and production of the following weapons systems:*

F/A-22 Raptor stealth fighter jet, which is an unnecessary and costly supplement to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

SSN-774 Virginia class submarine, which offers few technological advantages yet substantially higher costs compared to existing submarines.

DD(X) destroyer, which suffers from innumerable technological difficulties and ballooning costs without offering any true advantage compared to the Littoral Combat Ship.

V-22 Osprey, which has caused numerous training deaths and excessive cost overruns and which suffers from unresolved development issues while offering only marginal advantages compared to existing helicopters.

C-130J transport aircraft, which provides no additional capabilities compared to existing transport aircraft and suffers from severe technological flaws.

Offensive space-based weapons, which are of no use in low-tech asymmetric conflict and are far more expensive than existing technologies without offering many additional strike capabilities.

Further deployment of the National Missile Defense System, which offers unproven technology at exceptionally high costs to defend against a highly unlikely nuclear missile strike against the United States.

## **Nuclear Forces**

In order to structure U.S. nuclear forces more effectively to deter and defeat attacks on the United States and assure allies of the U.S. commitment to their security, the United States must:

- *Field a deployed arsenal of 600 warheads on Minuteman III ICBMs, Trident SSBNs, and B-2 and B-52H strategic bombers, with 400 weapons held in reserve. A generous estimate of the number of military targets in*

China and Russia that would be essential to either country's war fighting abilities (and that only nuclear weapons could effectively hold at risk) is several hundred each. A "600 + 400" arsenal would enable the United States to hold these targets, as well as the very limited number of such targets in extreme regimes, vulnerable with a high degree of certainty.

- *Maintain nuclear forces and prepare "surge capacity."* The DoD and the Energy Department should retain the ability to sustain the technological readiness of the current force and supplement it with additional forces should there be a dramatic shift in the international security environment.
- *Pursue a Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program on four conditions.* An RRW program should lead to ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by guaranteeing the end of U.S. nuclear testing; result in significant long-term cost savings; enable the permanent, irreversible dismantlement of several existing warheads for every new RRW; and not create new missions for nuclear weapons.
- *Revitalize arms control with Russia.* The United States should negotiate a follow-on agreement to the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) with Russia that codifies further reductions, mandates the permanent dismantlement of excess warheads and creates new verification mechanisms, extends existing transparency and verification measures (which are based on START I, a 1991 U.S.-Soviet/Russian arms control agreement) beyond their 2009 expiration, and includes tactical nuclear weapons in arms reduction.
- *Cease research and development of an advanced, earth-penetrating nuclear weapon (the "Bunker Buster").* This gratuitous, destabilizing, and expensive weapons system not only lacks any practical use, but also sends precisely the wrong message about the U.S. commitment to nuclear non-proliferation.

## Homeland Defense

In order to enhance the Department of Defense's role in homeland defense, the following steps must be taken:

- *Integrate the DoD budget with those of other agencies involved in homeland security and defense.* This will allow the president and Congress to make cost-effective trade-offs across agency lines.

- *Increase coordination among the DoD, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and other agencies in order to better complement each other's work.* The military can help instill a joint culture within the intelligence community, drawing from its own experience under Goldwater-Nichols during the past 20 years.
- *Double the funding that the Pentagon allocates to homeland defense from \$10 to \$20 billion.* This would allow the DoD to increase its capabilities to support civil authorities in minimizing the damage and helping in the recovery from chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive attacks on the United States.
- *Reorient the Army National Guard toward protecting the homeland against large-scale disaster.* This restructuring will require the Guard to emphasize light infantry, military police, and combat support functions in Guard units as opposed to such major combat functions as armor and artillery.
- *Strengthen the command structure of the National Guard to reflect its expanding real-time responsibilities.* At least two regional commands should be established between existing state headquarters and the National Guard Bureau to enhance homeland defense/disaster response planning and improve coordination with the U.S. Northern Command.
- *Improve the active-duty response times of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to catastrophic disasters.* Although the U.S. military should not routinely be given lead responsibility for disaster-response planning and execution, it should be prepared to support or relieve the Army National Guard in a national emergency.
- *Prepare at least two active-duty Army divisions and a headquarters unit to bolster the Army National Guard in responding to a catastrophic disaster.* These forces would assist the Guard only if the president declares a national emergency.
- *Add civilian first responders, such as police and firefighters, to the list of critical jobs that are prohibited from joining or remaining in the selected reserve.* The Pentagon cannot continue to allow individuals with civilian jobs that are important to homeland security to join the National Guard and Reserve.

- *Establish in each state a non-deployable homeland security corps of volunteer citizens with skills that are central to responding to catastrophic disasters.* These units would serve as a back up for National Guard units, which will continue to be deployed away from their home states.

## **Intelligence**

In order to develop more robust intelligence capabilities, the following steps must be taken:

- *Improve coordination between the Department of Defense's intelligence agencies and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).* Better coordination will assist in integrating the DoD's intelligence activities with those of other agencies and eliminate duplication.
- *Ensure that the DNI has final budget sign-off on national DoD intelligence programs, as provided under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004.* Under this Act, it is the DNI's responsibility to determine the annual budgets for all national intelligence agencies and offices (including DoD) and to direct how these funds are spent.
- *Implement a human capital plan for DoD intelligence personnel as recommended by the DNI's National Intelligence Strategy.* The DoD must ensure that the right people are recruited and trained for their jobs.
- *Coordinate DoD human intelligence (HUMINT) operations with other Intelligence Community HUMINT operations.* DoD's intelligence operations should form a complementary rather than a competitive or duplicative structure.
- *Ensure that DoD clandestine operations (both domestic and international) comply with U.S. law and regulations.* All databases and intelligence collection activities must be conducted in accordance with U.S. law.



| <b>Table 1: Current and Projected Force</b> |                         |                          |
|---|-------------------------|--------------------------|
|   | <b>Current, 2005</b>    | <b>Recommended Force</b> |
| <b>Army<br/>(Personnel)</b>                 | <b>490,000 active</b>   | <b>575,000 active</b>    |
|   | <b>500,000 reserve</b>  | <b>550,000 reserve</b>   |
| <b>Navy<br/>(Ships)</b>                     | <b>300 ships</b>        | <b>300 ships</b>         |
|   | <b>11 carriers</b>      | <b>10 carriers</b>       |
| <b>Marine Corps<br/>(Personnel)</b>         | <b>185,000 active</b>   | <b>185,000 active</b>    |
|   | <b>40,000 reserve</b>   | <b>40,000 reserve</b>    |
| <b>Air Force<br/>(Fighter Wings)</b>        | <b>12 active</b>        | <b>11 active</b>         |
|   | <b>7 reserve</b>        | <b>7 reserve</b>         |
| <b>Total Uniformed<br/>Personnel</b>        | <b>1,500,000 active</b> | <b>1,550,000 active</b>  |
|   | <b>850,000 reserve</b>  | <b>900,000 reserve</b>   |
| <b>Nuclear<br/>Weapons</b>                  | <b>3,000 active</b>     | <b>600 active</b>        |
|   | <b>1,500 reserve</b>    | <b>400 reserve</b>       |

*Table 1 compares our recommended force structure with the previous defense policy reviews conducted since the end of the Cold War. The internal DoD reviews generally produced few changes aside from matching smaller (but similar) force structures to a defense spending account that declined nearly 30 percent in real terms between 1990 and 1996, leveled off, then increased slightly in real terms in the last four years of the Clinton administration, and increased dramatically between 2001 and 2005.*

Table 2: U.S. Defense Policy Reviews

|  | Army<br>(Divisions) | Navy           | Marine Corps<br>(Personnel) | Air Force<br>(Fighter Wings) | Total Uniformed<br>Personnel |
|--|---------------------|----------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|
| Actual Force   | 19 active*          | 528 ships      | 194,000 active              | 24 active                    | 2,130,000 active             |
|  | 16 reserve**        | 15 carriers*** | 45,000 reserve              | 12 reserve                   | 1,170,000 active             |
| Bush Base Force<br>Review  | 14 active*          | 450 ships      | 159,000 active              | 16 active                    | 1,640,000 active             |
|  | 8 reserve**         | 13 carriers*** | 35,000 reserve              | 10 reserve                   | 920,000 reserve              |
| Bottom-Up<br>Review  | 11 active*          | 346 ships      | 174,000 reserve             | 13 active                    | 1,450,000 active             |
|  | 5+ reserve**        | 12 carriers*** | 42,000 reserve              | 7 reserve                    | 900,000 reserve              |
| Quadrennial<br>Defense<br>Review   | 11 active*          | 300+ ships     | 172,000 active              | 12 active                    | 1,360,000 active             |
|  | 5 reserve**         | 12 carriers*** | 37,800 reserve              | 8 reserve                    | 835,000 reserve              |
| Quadrennial<br>Defense<br>Review   | 10 active*          | 300+ ships     | 173,000 active              | 13 active                    | 1,450,000 active             |
|  | 8 reserve**         | 12 carriers*** | 40,000 reserve              | 7.6 reserve                  | 864,000 reserve              |
| CAP<br>Quadrennial<br>Defense Review   | 12 active*          | 300 ships      | 185,000 active              | 12 active                    | 1,550,000 active             |
|  | 8 reserve**         | 10 carriers*** | 40,000 reserve              | 7 reserve                    | 900,000 reserve              |
| <p>* Accounts for separate brigades and regiments not organized into divisions.</p> <p>** Accounts for separate brigades not organized into divisions but does not include two cadre divisions.</p> <p>*** Includes training career.</p> |                     |                |                             |                              |                              |

*Our recommendations envision having an Army and Marine Corps that, when combined, are larger than the forces recommended by any of the reviews since 1991. (While the 1991 Base Force Review called for a slightly larger Army, it recommended a Marine Corps with some 31,000 fewer troops.) Given the increased capabilities of today's lethal capabilities and ships, we believe that a slightly smaller Navy and Air Force will be sufficient to carry out our "1-1-2-3" strategy.*

## CONTEXT AND STRATEGY

The terrorist attacks of September 11 demonstrated that America's greatest enemies operate without regard for borders and aim to surprise the United States with deadly attacks. The attacks forced the United States to recognize that national security means more than traditional state-on-state warfare. It has required a reconsideration of the sources of conflict, and recognition that conflict can take forms other than traditional major combat operations.

September 11 did not change everything, however, as some like to claim. It should not be seen as an excuse to shift all focus to terrorism or to cast aside tried and true doctrines. States remain the leading actors on the geopolitical stage and still crave security, wealth, and power, just as they did before September 11. Alliances are alive, though ailing. Nuclear weapons remain attractive to both state and non-state actors seeking to assert hegemony or cause mass destruction.

Rather, September 11 changed our perception of strategic reality. We now realize that the greatest danger to the American people is not a single great power or a group of rising powers. The greatest threats are the forces of fragmentation – forces that create and sustain terrorist organizations, dictatorships, and poverty, threatening security around the globe. Countering these forces, and the threats they produce, should define the United States' security agenda for the foreseeable future.

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*The greatest threats are the forces of fragmentation – forces that create and sustain terrorist organizations, dictatorships, and poverty, threatening security around the globe.*

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To counter the forces of fragmentation, the United States must adopt a strategy of *integrated power*. The United States must use all the tools in its arsenal, from diplomacy, foreign aid, and economic policy to coercive means such as military power, to counter these forces and the threats they create and sustain.

The U.S. military has a vital role to play in a strategy of integrated power, though its role has not been adequately defined and therefore its full potential remains untapped. To ensure that the United States is positioned to address immediate threats, prepare for emerging threats, and make appropriate adjustments in the future, it is vital to focus on the threats facing the United States in both the immediate and the long term.

## **Immediate Threats**

While the security landscape will continuously evolve in the next decade, the primary threats to U.S. national security will come from the three forces of fragmentation: violent extremists and terrorists with a global reach, extreme regimes, and weak and failing states.

Each of these entities presents a unique policy challenge, and unlike the great or rising powers that threatened the United States throughout the twentieth century, they cannot be fought using the traditional rules of warfare. With an increased risk for the proliferation of nuclear and biological weapons, porous national boundaries, and world opinion that grows increasingly hostile towards the United States, it remains imperative that we understand and vigorously combat these emerging threats by military force, if necessary.

***Violent Extremists and Terrorists.*** These actors with a global reach are exemplified by, but not limited to, the al Qaeda network that attacked the United States on September 11, 2001. Although these violent extremists operate largely under the banner of Islam, their values and tactics remain wholly at odds with the overwhelming majority of Muslims around the globe. The motivations for members of terrorist groups vary, from concerns about encroaching Western culture to anger regarding U.S. support for Israel and for autocratic regimes in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, scant economic opportunity and the hateful propaganda of some religious schools and leaders continue to encourage young people to take up the extremists' cause. These radicals seek to kill a vast number of U.S. citizens, fundamentally alter the international order, and disrupt the American economy.

***Extreme Regimes.*** These regimes threaten to destabilize critical regions and the global community by pursuing nuclear weapons, harboring terrorist networks, and engaging in other unpredictable behavior. The most dangerous examples of these regimes, North Korea and Iran, continue to develop nuclear weapons capabilities and threaten long-time allies of the United States in critical regions of the world.

***Weak and Failing States.*** These states are not new to the international system. September 11 only illustrated that their instability can now be brought right to America's doorstep to unleash devastating violence on the American people. The United States must assist fragile countries that face overwhelming challenges, including civil wars, declining resources, a youth bulge with few employment opportunities, and economic migration from rural to urban areas. If neglected, these states can serve as safe havens for terrorist networks, as well as places where infectious disease and trafficking in humans, arms, and drugs can flourish.

## Long-Term Challenges

The United States must be prepared to meet six fundamental long-term challenges, including: the growing power of China, new challenges from Russia and Central Asia, the potential eruption of other combustible regions, competition for scarce resources, the declining reputation of the United States in the world, and the proliferation of nuclear and biological weapons, materials, and expertise.

**China.** The United States must meet the geopolitical challenges posed by the rise of China. U.S. relations with China will represent one of the most fundamental challenges for national security policymakers in the decades ahead. The United States will be able to exert some influence on China's strategic development, particularly through economic cooperation and partnerships regarding shared geopolitical concerns, such as instability in the Middle East or the Korean peninsula. But even this limited influence will diminish if the United States continues to be dependent on China to fund its increasingly growing budget and trade deficits. Ultimately, China will pursue its own strategic interests with or without U.S. support, and the United States will need to be prepared for conflict with China if necessary.

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***U.S. relations with China will represent one of the most fundamental challenges for national security policymakers in the decades ahead.***

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Broadly speaking, China faces two alternative paths in the coming decades. One path, integration, would see China become a productive regional leader committed to peace, stability, and economic growth. The other path would find China as a force of fragmentation committed to using its growing military power to achieve its security and economic development objectives. A China that chooses the latter path would have concluded that the core international security and economic institutions that the United States and its allies created after World War II, including the United Nations and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, no longer advance China's interests.

It is likely that China will choose a middle ground. But the path China chooses will largely depend on how well China – and in particular, the Chinese Communist Party – can resolve the myriad internal governance issues that currently plague the country, from rampant corruption to a lack of central control of local provinces to human rights abuses. Although the United States has little influence on these internal matters, it must nevertheless use whatever influence it has.

China's military modernization is aimed at deterring a unilateral declaration of independence by Taiwan by building the capacity to forcibly annex the island if necessary. Any military build-up is worrisome, and the United States must carefully monitor these developments in order to minimize the chances of

misperception or escalation by either party. Nevertheless, the United States needs to recognize that much of China's modernization has long been planned and is consistent with a nation of China's rising economic and diplomatic stature.

***Russia, Central Asia, and the Caspian Sea Basin.*** The United States will need to pay increasing attention to Russia and the countries of the Central Asia region and Caspian Sea basin, extending from the edges of Ukraine in the west to Kazakhstan in the east. The region is rich in natural resources, but it lacks a history of democratic governance and is host to both fledgling democracies and established dictatorships. Since the region sits at a strategic crossroads among China, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East, instability here can affect U.S. interests in neighboring areas. The United States has strong interests in maintaining international access to the region's energy resources, preventing regional conflict, and stifling the arms and drug trades. Increasing Chinese and Russian militarization and influence, however, potentially threaten these interests.

A diversity of energy supplies is an essential U.S. interest. The United States must embrace energy policies that reduce dependence on oil. Nonetheless, Russia and the Caspian Sea basin are vital to current energy needs: by 2010, the United States will be importing up to 13 percent of its oil imports from Russia while the Caspian Sea basin contains a significant quantity of untapped reserves.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, many of these countries provide important energy transit routes to both eastern and western markets.

Russia's uneven transition from authoritarian rule to democracy also remains a source of grave concern for the United States. Russian President Vladimir Putin has clamped down on political freedoms, repressed political opposition, and backtracked on free-market reforms. High oil prices have buoyed Russia's economy, enabling it to devote more resources to the military and skirt difficult economic reforms. Russia faces a host of strategic problems in its neighborhood, including a long-standing violent uprising in the Russian province of Chechnya that has resulted in hundreds of thousands of casualties.

Furthermore, the democratic transition of the former Soviet countries that occupy Central Asia and the Caspian Sea basin remains uncertain. Though countries like Georgia and Ukraine are working to consolidate recent democratic breakthroughs, others like Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are struggling with political instability.

Russia's uneven transition from authoritarian rule to democracy also remains a source of grave concern for the United States. Russian President Vladimir Putin has clamped down on political freedoms and backtracked on free-market reforms. Strong independence movements in Chechnya and in China's western Muslim province of Xinjiang increase regional volatility.

The increasing militarization of the region poses threats to both stability and access to natural resources for the United States and the international community. The solidification of the regional Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001 has increased not only diplomatic dialogue, but military ties between the member states. Furthermore, while Russia already maintains bases in neighboring states, China has reportedly also attempted to gain access to bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

The U.S. military presence in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea basin, in part used to conduct ongoing operations in Afghanistan, has raised the ire of the SCO, which has called on the United States to remove its forces. The unstable nuclear standoff between India and Pakistan on the border of Central Asia and the tenuous historical relationship between India and China also threaten regional peace. Strategic interests and military alliances will increasingly matter in the region as NATO pushes eastward and Central Asia houses U.S., Russian, and potentially Chinese military bases.

***Regional Instability.*** While numerous countries and regions do not directly threaten the United States now, in the long term the seeds of instability may grow into conflict. From the re-emergence of economic populism in South America to corrupt governments in Africa to bitter popular discontent with globalization among people in the Middle East to nuclear arms races in South Asia, there are numerous countries – and indeed entire regions – in various states of political transition. A toxic mix of anti-American ideology, high unemployment, acquisition of nuclear and biological weapons, and erratic leaders will have serious implications for U.S. national security.

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As the only country able to project power anywhere in the world, the U.S. military is likely to be drawn into a variety of contingencies, whether they are peacekeeping or combat operations. For example, if fundamentalists in the



Pakistan military were to overthrow President Pervez Musharraf and make their nuclear weapons available to a network like al Qaeda, the United States would be compelled to act. Likewise, if Israel and the Palestinians move forward in a two-state settlement, the United States will have to assist in the transition.

***Resource Scarcity.*** A scarcity of critical resources can also breed instability by forcing states into direct conflict or prompting destabilizing population migrations both internally and across borders. Significant changes in the environment – such as those brought on by global climate change – will have a profound impact on the availability of two of the most crucial of these resources: cropland and freshwater. Resource scarcity has already become a major flashpoint in the Middle East, and many countries – including China and Japan – have unresolved disputes over territories that have oil and natural gas. As demand for these scarce resources grows in the global marketplace, particularly from rising powers like China and India, so does the potential for military conflict. Such a conflict might eventually involve U.S. military forces.

***Declining Reputation.*** The United States is facing a precipitous decline in its reputation around the world. This limits the country’s ability to persuade other states and international organizations to join with it to address global security threats, thereby placing undue financial and military burdens on the United States

to handle these issues alone. Where the United States has enjoyed the support of other countries, as in Afghanistan, they have provided financial and military assistance. In Iraq, however, the United States has had to bear the military and financial burdens largely alone. Beyond financial assistance, other countries provide skills and expertise that the United States lacks, most notably in peacekeeping and stabilization operations, as well as in languages and cultural awareness.

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***The continued spread of nuclear and biological weapons, materials, and expertise could give rogue states and even individuals the means to threaten the United States.***

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***Proliferation of Nuclear and Biological Weapons.*** The continued spread of nuclear and biological weapons, materials, and expertise could give rogue states and even individuals the means to threaten the United States and its interests with catastrophe. Global efforts to secure and/or eliminate stockpiles of weapons-usable plutonium and highly-enriched uranium – the “gunpowder” responsible for

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<sup>†</sup> For more information, see Brian Finlay & Andrew Grotto, *The Race to Secure Russia’s Loose Nukes: Progress Since 9/11*, 2005, available at <http://www.americanprogress.org/nukes.pdf>.



a nuclear explosion – have not picked up appreciably since 9/11.<sup>†</sup> Renewed global interest in nuclear energy as an alternative to fossil fuels could result in further proliferation of the materials, technology, and expertise needed to fabricate nuclear weapons. Finally, the same biotechnological advances that have improved our health care and fueled our economy could also be used to engineer and spread new deadly diseases.<sup>†</sup>

## Defense Strategy

The threats posed by the forces of fragmentation are constantly evolving. The United States' unmatched technological military superiority is not enough to guarantee that U.S. forces will prevail in battle and in securing the peace. Enemies will confront the United States in ways that play to their strengths, especially by using asymmetric tactics like improvised explosive devices, suicide bombers, and even nuclear and biological weapons.

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*The United States' unmatched technological military superiority is not enough to guarantee that U.S. forces will prevail in battle and in securing the peace.*

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The U.S. military must be able to combat enemies that employ everything from small arms to sophisticated weapons. The military must be flexible, agile, and mobile with the ability to fight traditional conventional battles as well as to engage in non-conventional counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, disaster relief, humanitarian intervention, and stabilization operations.

The United States is the only nation that has the potential to project substantial military power anywhere in the world. Thus, U.S. forces will be called upon frequently to assist in combustible areas around the world. While the United States needs to build capacity in regional forces and in its allies' militaries to share the burdens of international security, it must also ensure that the U.S. military has the capacity to address these threats by itself, if necessary.

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<sup>†</sup> For more information, see Andrew Grotto & Jonathan Tucker, "Achieving Biosecurity: A Progressive Action Plan," Spring 2006 (forthcoming).

## Mission of Defense Strategy

U.S. defense strategy should advance the national security strategy identified in *Integrated Power*, released by the Center for American Progress in 2005.<sup>†</sup> Accordingly, the most important priorities for a U.S. defense strategy are to:

- Protect the American people from harm by safeguarding the homeland and projecting power around the globe.
- Deter and defeat aggression against the United States, its people, and its interests.
- Prevent conflict around the world, especially in weak and failing states, which have the potential to become terrorist havens and sources of regional insecurity.
- Forge strategic and tactical alliances with other U.S. agencies, foreign states, and international organizations to build capacity in these other entities to leverage their strengths and enable them to shoulder greater responsibilities.
- Assure allies of the U.S. commitment to their security.
- Shape the strategic goals and calculations of current and potential adversaries.
- Project power to ensure access to energy supplies and protect the flow of trade and communications.

## A New Strategy

The United States needs to reorient its defense strategy to reflect current threats, fiscal constraints, and fundamental American principles. An altered U.S. defense strategy should recognize that, while unilateral military action is sometimes necessary to deal with imminent threats, war should never be the first or only resort. It remains committed to the Powell doctrine: when military action is used, it should be overwhelming. The neglect of this fundamental military doctrine has led the United States to wage war on the cheap, which not only has failed to save U.S. resources, but has allowed insecurity to flourish in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

The strategy presented here integrates both threat-based and capabilities-based approaches, as opposed to the administration's practice of focusing excessively on capabilities without assessing risk. Our strategy reflects an understanding of the need for transformation while maintaining current military readiness and capabilities, as opposed to the administration's practice of making transformation

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<sup>†</sup> For more information, see Lawrence J. Korb and Robert O. Boorstin, *Integrated Power, A National Security Strategy for the 21st Century*, Center for American Progress, June 2005, available at <http://www.americanprogress.org/integratedpower>.

**Bush Administration Defense Strategy**

The Bush administration's first QDR, released on September 30, 2001, laid out a defense strategy that has largely defined the United States' force posture during the last five years. It had three main components. First, the 2001 QDR established a strategy of "1-4-2-1," which called for maintaining forces capable of defending the homeland first (1), operating effectively in four critical theaters (4), with the ability to swiftly defeat two aggressors at the same time (2) while preserving the option for one major offensive to occupy an aggressor's capital and if necessary, to replace the government (1).

Second, to confront a world marked by surprise and substantial uncertainty, the Department of Defense shifted its planning from the "threat-based" model that had guided much Pentagon thinking in the immediate post-Cold War period to a "capabilities-based" model. According to the Pentagon, while the United States has little sense of who will attack, or when or how they might attack, the country does have a sense of capabilities that can be built to provide advantages against a diverse set of enemies.

Third, this capabilities-based approach placed greater emphasis on accelerating the ongoing transformation of the U.S. forces. Transformation, as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has said, "is about an awful lot more than bombs and bullets and dollars and cents; it's about new approaches, it's about culture, it's about mindset and ways of thinking of things."

Despite this rhetoric, however, there was little change in the Pentagon's weapons system acquisition programs and its conventional and nuclear force posture compared to the first QDR which was completed in 1997.

an end in itself. It moves beyond the administration's "1-4-2-1" paradigm, which gives too much emphasis to warfighting and not enough to peacekeeping and stabilization. The new defense strategy includes these elements:

**1-1-2-3.** The military's first priority must be, as always, to protect the homeland. But strategy must change to reflect the threats of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. An analysis of current and likely future threats is vital to ensuring that the United States directs its resources where they are likely to reap the largest security gains. This

strategy begins a process of developing forces and equipment that will enable the military to defend the homeland, fight one major regional conflict, engage in two substantial post-conflict missions aimed at peacekeeping and stabilization, and deter or contain conflict in three countries or regions ("1-1-2-3"). It alters the administration's strategy of "1-4-2-1" that places an excessive emphasis on fighting regional contingencies and removing regimes, and not enough emphasis on creating the forces necessary to stabilize and reconstruct an area after the removal of a regime.

***Use of Force Doctrine.*** The United States must commit the necessary personnel, both military and civilian, to ensure quick and decisive military victories and a stable peace. The United States should remain committed to the doctrine that it will employ overwhelming force to win on the battlefield, regardless of whether acting unilaterally or with allies. It must clearly define its military and political objectives and a concrete post-conflict strategy so that Congress and the American people are aware of the potential costs before risking lives and treasure. Our country's experiences in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan dictate that we should hope for the best but plan for the worst and take steps to maintain domestic support from the moment American troops are dispatched to the day they come home.

***Unilateral Action.*** Protecting the American people will at times require that the United States take unilateral military action. The United States must strike to stop imminent threats. Any country that has credible intelligence that it is about to be attacked has the right under the international legal doctrine of anticipatory self-defense to strike first or launch a preemptive attack. Preemption, however, must not be confused with the preventive war doctrine embraced by the administration.

***Importance of Personnel.*** The recruitment, training, development, and retention of skilled military personnel must be a top priority for the Pentagon. It cannot take a backseat to transformation. The war in Iraq has placed excessive burdens on overextended forces, and the all-volunteer military is seriously strained. In particular, ground forces must be increased by at least 86,000 active-duty troops and receive greater attention in the allocation of limited defense funds. The military must also redefine the role of the National Guard and Reserve, increasing their role in homeland defense and providing them with the resources to do that job.

***Flexibility and Transformation.*** The Department of Defense must balance the necessity of maintaining the readiness and capabilities of the existing force with the need to modernize and transform as it did during the 1990s. The excessive focus by this administration on exploiting the so-called "revolution in military affairs" to transform the armed forces rapidly has threatened the readiness and capabilities of American ground forces. They have diverted funds from military personnel and their equipment to new transforming technologies, which are not yet ready. Since military weapon systems last so long and since the nature of the international system is dynamic, the United States must continue to invest in and exploit new technologies to ensure that its forces remain on the cutting edge. Reshaping or transforming the military to take advantage of these new technologies, however, must be done in an evolutionary way to avoid diminishing the current capabilities and readiness of our troops. The adoption of new technologies has been done this way since the end of the Cold War.

***Capabilities and Threats-Based Approach.*** The Department of Defense must direct its resources to areas likely to reap the largest security gains. The current so-called “capabilities approach” fails to assign levels of risk and importance to the various threats this nation faces. The Pentagon must reintroduce elements of the “threat-based” model that guided its thinking in the immediate post-Cold War period. Only through a thoughtful assignment of risks and priorities can the Pentagon produce

programs and budgets that are both affordable and effective – unlike the current approach, which has made National Missile Defense the single largest program in the defense budget even though it deals with the least likely threat.

***Nuclear Posture.*** U.S. nuclear strategic forces must adopt a new posture. This posture should deter and, if necessary, defeat a range of catastrophic attacks on the United States and its allies; assure allies of the U.S. government’s commitment to their security; and actively shape the strategic goals and calculations of current and potential adversaries. This strategy is based on two fundamental principles: first, only military targets are legitimate targets; and second, the collateral damage associated with a nuclear strike must not exceed the military value of a nuclear strike. Based on these principles and the current and foreseeable security environment, a nuclear force posture of 600 deployed warheads and 400 warheads “in reserve” offers more than a credible deterrent against catastrophic threats. This approach runs counter to the current administration’s Cold War mindset that insists on keeping several thousand nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert, maintaining several hundred in Europe, and continuously seeking to develop new nuclear weapons, an approach that undermines nonproliferation efforts.

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***The military must play its proper role in maintaining global stability and preventing serious international crises before they erupt into armed conflict.***

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***Conflict Prevention.*** The military must play its proper role in maintaining global stability and preventing serious international crises before they erupt into armed conflict. This requires that the Pentagon have much stronger ties with other governmental agencies and U.S. allies in order to combat the proliferation of nuclear and biological weapons and to help train and equip allied armed forces. On the regional level, there must also be increased reliance on peacekeeping units like those of the African Union in order to solve regional conflicts, thus reducing the need to deploy U.S. forces.

## Addressing Specific Threats

To implement the national security strategy laid out in *Integrated Power*, U.S. military forces must be structured to deal with the threats posed by violent extremists and terrorists, extreme regimes, and weak and failing states.<sup>†</sup> If the United States does not have sufficient forces properly equipped to deal with these immediate existential threats to the nation, its national security will be imperiled.

***Violent Extremists and Terrorists.*** Combating violent extremists will require the United States to protect the homeland against future attacks as well as to maintain the capability to prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear and biological weapons and to hunt them down and destroy them wherever they might be. Deterrence and containment will not work as they do with established states. There must be policies in place to discipline states that aid and support violent extremists, including removing regimes in extreme cases such as Afghanistan.

Therefore, the highest priority in the U.S. force structure must be given to funding those military capabilities that protect the homeland and manage the aftermath of another attack; that can destroy these violent extremists wherever they may be; and, if other options like diplomatic, military and economic actions do not succeed, can bring about regime change in states that support these radicals. This involves not only removing the regime, but also ensuring that the United States assist in bringing peace and stability to the area after the regime is toppled. Just as combat operations require advance planning and a significant commitment of money and manpower, so does the post-combat or stabilization and reconstruction phase.

The military will need to establish genuine partnerships with the intelligence and law enforcement communities to identify terrorists, disrupt operations, and prevent extremists from getting their hands on nuclear or biological weapons. In order to be successful, the military will need to make a series of changes in its priorities and structure. These will include expanding special operations forces that have language, cultural and other specialized skills; training conventional ground forces with similar skills; increasing the military's ability to deploy

rapidly; developing the capability to wage counterinsurgency campaigns; and expanding programs to train foreign forces in order to bolster capacity in other countries. The recently announced National Security Language Initiative – which will provide “crash courses” in basic language skills to deploying troops, as well

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<sup>†</sup> For more information, see Lawrence J. Korb and Robert O. Boorstin, *Integrated Power: A National Security Strategy for the 21st Century*, Center for American Progress, June 2005, available at <http://www.americanprogress.org/integratedpower>.

as establish a civilian reserve corps of critical language experts – represents a small step in the right direction.<sup>2</sup>

***Extreme Regimes.*** Extreme regimes like North Korea and Iran threaten to destabilize critical regions and the global community by pursuing nuclear weapons, harboring terrorist networks, and engaging in other dangerous and unpredictable behaviors. Unlike terrorists and violent extremists, however,

extreme regimes can often be contained and deterred because their rulers, even the most despicable ones, want to stay in power. Therefore, the United States must have sufficient conventional and nuclear forces both to deter these countries from acquiring nuclear and biological weapons and to respond to these countries with military force when they clearly threaten U.S. national security interests.

***Weak and Failing States.*** Weak and failing states can create instability in the world by breeding violence, enabling the proliferation of nuclear and biological weapons, increasing drug trafficking, supporting international crime, and/or becoming havens for violent extremists. Unlike extreme regimes, governments in these countries are either weak or non-existent. They cannot provide basic services to their citizens, such as protection from internal and external threats, healthcare,

or education. The United Nations and regional organizations will not be able to restore order in all of these states. Therefore, the United States must have the capability to deploy military forces, by itself or with its allies, to stabilize weak and failing states and prevent them from becoming havens for terrorists with a global reach. This will require developing and sustaining an early warning system that is available to all relevant government agencies, and is linked to an interagency response capability. The military must also create a “surge capacity” that allows it to intervene rapidly in at least two weak or failing states simultaneously.

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***The United States must have the capability to deploy military forces, by itself or with its allies, to stabilize weak and failing states and prevent them from becoming havens for terrorists with a global reach.***

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***Traditional Threats.*** The tragic events of September 11 did not mark a complete change in the international system. The possibility of traditional conventional warfare between nation-states still exists. Therefore, the U.S. military must maintain sufficient heavy ground forces and the capability to project sufficient air and naval power to deal with traditional forms of warfare that could erupt in places like the Korean peninsula or the Taiwan Strait. These forces must be



sufficient to ensure a favorable outcome if North Korea attacks South Korea. The U.S. military must also be able to respond in the Taiwan Strait if China takes military action against Taiwan, or in the Persian Gulf if Iran strikes out at its neighbors in response to the international community's actions against its nuclear program. These forces must be sufficient to ensure a favorable outcome if deterrence fails. The numerous hotspots around the world require a flexible and agile military that can assist in combating war and securing peace.



## CURRENT CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

America's men and women in uniform continue to make us proud. They have fought bravely around the world and have made great sacrifices. Nevertheless, the U.S. military – and the all-volunteer Army in particular – is in danger of being broken as a result of poor planning and weak leadership by the Bush administration, pork-barrel decision making in Congress, and insufficient congressional oversight. That it has held together this long is a tribute to the personal sacrifice of the active-duty and reserve personnel.

The following sections assess the current challenges to implementing the appropriate U.S. defense strategy and make recommendations for each category. They include:

- Solving the current budget crisis
- Reducing the strain of the all-volunteer Army
- Eliminating equipment shortages
- Rectifying the mismatch of weapons systems and threats
- Reforming the flawed nuclear force posture
- Making homeland defense a priority
- Reinvesting in human intelligence



## THE BUDGETARY SITUATION

Under the five-year plan submitted to Congress in early 2005, regular defense spending for the fiscal years 2006-2011 period would be reduced by \$30 billion. It is likely that the Pentagon will be asked to trim another \$15-\$32 billion from its next \$2.8 trillion five-year plan. While the defense budget increased by 41 percent during the period of the last QDR, the upcoming four-year period will see a decline in the budget. Ryan Henry, the Pentagon's principal deputy undersecretary for policy, noted in late 2005 that the Pentagon spending binge of the last several years cannot be sustained. James Albaugh, chief executive of Boeing's \$30 billion military division, was even more blunt: "[It] has been a great ride for the last five years, but it's over. There will be a flattening of the defense budget."<sup>1</sup>

It is clear that the regular defense program budget will need to decrease. Even counting the Social Security surplus, the federal government is running annual deficits of more than \$500 billion. The fiscal situation is so precarious that the head of the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office (CBO) admitted to being "terrified" about the budget deficit.<sup>2</sup>

The war in Iraq continues to cost \$6 billion per month, while the damage caused by

Hurricanes Rita and Katrina could cost \$100 billion. Moreover, while the defense budget consumes only 20 percent of the total federal budget, it represents more than half of federal discretionary spending.

Even if the Pentagon were to receive all of the funds allocated in the plan presented to Congress in January 2005, it still would not be able to fund all planned weapons systems. The military's 26 largest acquisition programs are, on average, 40 percent above planned costs and 20 percent behind schedule.<sup>3</sup> As a result, the procurement account could be short by as much as \$35 billion in fiscal year (FY) 2011 alone.<sup>4</sup> In addition, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan will continue to push the costs of personnel, operations, and maintenance beyond projected levels. The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis estimates that the administration's defense budget projections may understate costs by \$800 billion over the next decade.<sup>5</sup>

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the budget deficit.*

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## Recommendations

The following steps should be taken:

- *Create a unified national security budget for the U.S. government.*<sup>6</sup>  
Under a unified budget, the president and Congress will finally be able to make cost-effective trade-offs across agency lines, determining whether to put a marginal dollar into deploying national missile defense interceptors or building Coast Guard cutters. This type of trade-off cannot currently be made because missile defense is funded in the Pentagon budget while the Coast Guard is funded in the Department of Homeland Security budget.
- *Revamp the congressional committee structure in order to better monitor the entire national security budget.* This would allow Congress to determine the appropriate balance in offensive, defensive, and preventive components of this nation's security expenditures.

| <b>Table 3A: Proposed Savings</b><br><b>Estimated total budgetary savings</b><br><b>over five years (in billions USD)</b> |                      |
|---|----------------------|
| Initiatives   | Savings              |
| <b>Eliminate unnecessary weapons systems</b>  |                      |
| F/A-22 Raptor   | 12 <sup>†</sup>      |
| SSN-774 Virginia Class Submarine  | 11                   |
| DD(X) Destroyer   | 8                    |
| V-22 Osprey   | 30 <sup>‡</sup>      |
| C-130J Transport Aircraft   | 5                    |
| Space-Based Weapons   | 50 <sup>‡</sup>      |
| Nuclear Forces  | 40 <sup>‡</sup>      |
| Ballistic Missile Defense System  | 30                   |
| <b>Slow down development of selected weapons systems</b>  |                      |
| F-35 Joint Strike Fighter   | 5                    |
| Future Combat Systems   | 10                   |
| <b>Total Savings</b>  | <b>\$201 Billion</b> |
| <sup>†</sup> Four-year estimate. <sup>‡</sup> Derived from halved ten-year estimate.                                      |                      |

**Table 3B: Proposed Recommendations**  
**Estimated total budgetary savings**  
**over five years (in billions USD)**

| Initiatives  | Savings              |
|--|----------------------|
| <b>Expand the Army by 86,000</b>   |                      |
| Double the size of the Special Forces (50,000)   | 35                   |
| Add two peacekeeping divisions (26,000)  | 18                   |
| Add civil affairs personnel, MPs, and engineers (10,000)                                 | 7                    |
| <b>Improve the quality of life for military personnel</b>                                |                      |
| Compensate reservists who are activated from federal civilian employment for lost income | 1                    |
| Offer TRICARE benefits to selected reservists  | 5                    |
| <b>Reset the force</b>   |                      |
| Invest in replacing and maintaining essential field equipment                            | 25                   |
| <b>Increase support for homeland defense missions</b>                                    |                      |
| Double the DoD's homeland defense budget   | 50                   |
| Create a homeland security corps in each state   | 1                    |
| <b>Invest in useful weapons systems</b>  |                      |
| Purchase three new B-2 bombers per year  | 12                   |
| <b>Total cost Increases</b>  | <b>\$154 Billion</b> |
| <b>Net savings</b>   | <b>\$47 Billion</b>  |

## MILITARY PERSONNEL AND READINESS

The ability of the United States military to perform its missions depends on smart people more than on smart bombs. As the Marine Corps manual on war fighting states: “Any doctrine which attempts to reduce warfare to ratios of forces, weapons, and equipment neglects the impact of the human will on the conduct of war and is therefore inherently flawed.”<sup>1</sup> As Melvin Laird, Richard Nixon’s secretary of defense and the architect of the all-volunteer Army, put it: “People, not hardware, must be our highest priority.”<sup>2</sup>

However, the priority given to the men and women of America’s armed forces today – especially those in the Army – has diminished. The Bush administration’s overextension and overuse of the Army, as well as inattention to quality-of-life issues, has severely strained the troops on the ground. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have revealed deeply troubling cracks in the organization and structure of the million-

strong total Army. The Bush administration’s mishandling of the active-duty and reserve components since September 11, combined with the current challenges of the international security environment, have exacerbated these problems. As a result, the all-volunteer Army is closer to being broken today than at any time in its 33-year history.

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*As Melvin Laird, Richard Nixon’s  
secretary of defense and the architect  
of the all-volunteer Army, put it:  
“People, not hardware, must be our  
highest priority.”*

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The Bush administration has made a mockery of Vice President Cheney’s pledge at the 2000 Republican National Convention: “Rarely has so much been demanded of our armed forces, and so little given to them in return.... I have seen our military at its finest, with the best equipment, the best training, and the best leadership.... And I can promise them now, help is on the way. Soon, our men and women in uniform will once again have a commander-in-chief they can respect, one who understands their mission and restores their morale.”<sup>3</sup>

Since September 11, the all-volunteer Army has been called to assume greater responsibilities than ever before without being given the tools it needs. U.S. troops – both active-duty and reserve – are being asked to battle terrorism around the globe, protect the American homeland, and engage in peacekeeping, stabilization, and nation-building operations. Few imagined that the all-volunteer Army would be used in such a manner when it was designed 30 years ago, and the Bush administration has failed to make the appropriate structural changes necessary for success in these new missions. Today, the active-duty Army is

neither large enough nor does it have the right mix of skills necessary to meet current needs. Moreover, the reserve component is being used at unsustainable levels. This threatens not only the quality and readiness of the all-volunteer Army, but also its ability to recruit and retain troops with the right skills and aptitude.

***Ability to Respond to Other Threats is Reduced.*** The overstretching of the U.S. Army in Iraq means that the United States has few forces remaining to respond to other crises around the world. In fact, the Army is not even currently able to deploy enough ground troops to Afghanistan. Failure to adequately stabilize Afghanistan may well result in the country returning to its pre-9/11 weakness, which created a breeding ground for terrorists. Indeed, shortly before retiring in September 2005, General Richard B. Myers – then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff – warned Congress that the concentration of U.S. troops and weapons in Afghanistan and Iraq had limited the Defense Department’s capacity to prepare for other conflicts.<sup>4</sup>

***Domestic Protection Capability Diminished.*** Many of the reservists who have been called up without appropriate notice and kept on duty too long are police officers, firefighters, and paramedics in their civilian lives – first responders who are vital to the safety of their local communities.<sup>5</sup>

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***The massive deployment of National Guard units overseas has undermined the ability of states to deal with natural disasters or potential terrorist attacks.***

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In addition, the massive deployment of National Guard units overseas has undermined the ability of states to deal with potential natural disasters and terrorist attacks. The aftermath of Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that the deployment of National Guard units to Iraq proved detrimental to immediate recovery efforts, as state officials

in Louisiana and Mississippi struggled to overcome the absence of some 8,000 National Guard members from their states.<sup>6</sup> An even bigger problem during the Katrina recovery efforts was equipment shortages: an October 2005 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report concluded that, on average, non-deployed National Guard units in the United States have only 34 percent of their essential equipment in stock, down from 74 percent in 2001. These units are running particularly low on trucks, generators, and radios because much of that equipment has been sent to Iraq.<sup>7</sup> It will cost anywhere from \$7 to \$20 billion to re-acquire the equipment necessary to fully prepare the National Guard for future domestic disasters and terrorist attacks.<sup>8</sup>



### ARMY STRUCTURE

**Total Army:** The Army is composed of more than one million volunteers. About half of these men and women are on fulltime active duty. The other half is in the reserve component, which is composed of the *selected reserve* and the *individual ready reserve* (IRR). These three groups comprise the total Army.

**Selected Reserve:** The selected reserve, sometimes known as the drilling reserve, consists of people who belong to organized units that train or drill one weekend a month and spend at least two weeks a year on active duty. The Army's selected reserve has two branches: the *Army National Guard* and the *Army Reserve*. Both components serve as back-ups to the active-duty Army.

**Army National Guard:** National Guard units, which are in all 50 states, can be used by the states as a militia for natural disasters or civil disorders when they have not been mobilized by the federal government, which pays for more than 90 percent of their costs and thus has first call on their services. It is comprised of combat and combat support units like civil affairs, transportation, and military police.

**Army Reserve:** Army Reserve units are under the control of the Department of the Army and can be mobilized by the secretary of the Army. It is composed mainly of combat support units.

**Individual Ready Reserve (IRR):** The IRR is composed of individuals who have completed their active-duty service and have not joined a selected reserve unit, but who still have time left on their eight-year military service obligation, which, by law, they incurred when they joined the Army. For example, a person who enlisted in the Army for four years in 1998 would have been released from active duty in 2002, but would remain in the IRR until 2006. Members of the IRR receive no pay, training, or benefits. Currently there are about 118,000 people in the IRR.

**Special Operations Forces:** These elite or commando units from the Army, Navy, and Air Force are trained to perform clandestine missions behind enemy lines. Currently, there are about 50,000 personnel in these units. About 8,000 special operations forces are deployed in 54 countries.

**Army Organization:** The active Army is organized into ten divisions and the Army National Guard into eight. Each division has between 10,000 and 18,000 people organized into at least three brigades or regiments composed of 3,000 to 5,000 people. These brigades, in turn, consist of battalions of between 500 and 800 people each.

At a July 2005 meeting of the National Governors Association, several governors expressed concern that the extended deployment of Guardsmen to Iraq has depleted resources at home.<sup>9</sup> Governors of western states were particularly worried because National Guard equipment and personnel have traditionally been used to combat wildfires.<sup>10</sup> Although the National Guard Bureau has promised to keep at least half of each state's guard troops at home and available for domestic missions, Governor Dirk Kempthorne of Idaho noted at the meeting that more than half of his state's Guard had been called up to active duty by the Pentagon.<sup>11</sup>

***Army Overstretched.*** As of October 2005, the Army has 251,000 soldiers serving in some 120 countries around the globe.<sup>12</sup> The bulk of these troops are in Iraq, Afghanistan, South Korea, and the Balkans, with 19 brigades (12 active and 7 Guard) currently forward deployed in these locations.<sup>13</sup> Every available combat brigade from the active Army has already been to Afghanistan or Iraq at least once for a 12-month tour, and many are now in their second and even third tours of duty after barely a year at home.

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***The military does not have sufficient ground forces for the nation's current war and peacekeeping demands.***

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At the end of 2005, nearly 40 percent of the 160,000 troops in Iraq were from the Army National Guard or Army Reserves, as were almost all of the U.S. troops in the Balkans.<sup>14</sup> Seven of the combat brigades in Iraq come from the Army National Guard alone, well

beyond the limit of what is sustainable given the standard that Guard units should only be deployed abroad for one out of every six to eight years.<sup>15</sup>

According to a Defense Science Board study commissioned by the DoD and presented to Secretary Rumsfeld in August 2004, the military does not have sufficient ground forces for the nation's current war and peacekeeping demands.<sup>16</sup> A Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report stated that the United States could sustain 123,000 troops in Iraq, far below current levels, only if it increased deployments and decreased time at home, as well as reduced U.S. troops from Bosnia and East Asia.<sup>17</sup> Yet, the CBO recognized that these changes were probably not sustainable in the long run.

Furthermore, as National Guard and Army reservists conclude their tours in Iraq and return home, combat commanders in Iraq have begun running "perilously low" on soldiers who can fill critical support jobs like military police, civil affairs officers, and truck drivers – positions that have historically been assigned to the reserve component. The Army has begun "reaching the bottom of the barrel," admitted retired Army General Barry McCaffrey after visiting Iraq in the summer of 2005.<sup>18</sup>

Indeed, the percentage of military functions allocated to the reserves is substantially the same as it was in 1973 – an arrangement that better represents the challenges of that era than of the present one. Before restructuring began in 2004, the reserves accounted for 97 percent of the Army’s civil affairs units, 70 percent of its engineering units, 66 percent of its military police, and 50 percent of its combat forces.<sup>19</sup> As the number of Army National Guard and Reserve brigades in Iraq is reduced from seven to two later this year (2006), the strain on the active component can be expected to increase.<sup>20</sup>

This overstretching leaves the United States potentially vulnerable in places like South Korea as well as at home, where members of the Army National Guard support first responders during man-made and natural disasters. In fact, one of the two Army brigades stationed in South Korea has already been sent to Iraq.

Although the active Army exceeded its overall targets for troop retention and reenlistment in FY 2005, it is experiencing shortages in some of the most vital combat positions and in first-term reenlistments. Meeting these aggregate reenlistment goals has been costly. In 2005, spending on selective reenlistment bonuses in the active-duty Army was \$505 million, triple the amount spent in 2004 and almost five times the 2003 level.<sup>21</sup>

Moreover, the military’s experience during the last 30 years has demonstrated that aggregate retention rates will sharply decline if the Army continues to keep soldiers away from home for more than one year out of three, especially among mid-career personnel like Army captains, senior non-commissioned officers, and seasoned warrant officers, most of whom have not made a lifetime commitment to the Army.<sup>22</sup> This overextension is what broke the career Army in Vietnam.<sup>23</sup> As one indication of potential difficulties, the active-duty Army missed its retention goals by about 7 percent, or 1,000 soldiers, in the first two months of FY 2006.<sup>24</sup>

***National Guard and Reserve Misused.*** Since September 11, more than 400,000 reservists have been called to active duty, including the largest activation of the National Guard for overseas missions since World War II.<sup>25</sup> The Bush administration has used the National Guard and Reserve not as a backup as it was originally conceived, but as an extension of the active component. Currently, approximately 112,300 members of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve are mobilized in support of the global war on terror.<sup>26</sup> Although this reflects a decline from the peak of 220,000 Reserve and Guard troops on domestic and overseas missions in the spring of 2003, several units have been kept on active duty for longer than anticipated, sent overseas to Iraq and Afghanistan without effective training, and mobilized without reasonable notice.<sup>27</sup> This last practice not

only undermines the readiness of the reserve soldiers to carry out their tasks, but it also puts an unfair burden on reservists' families and employers by leaving them with very little time to prepare for the soldiers' absence. Members of the Michigan National Guard, for example, were sent to Iraq with only 48 hours notice.<sup>28</sup>

Short-notice deployments have occurred despite the fact that Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, the commander of the Army Reserve, stated in 2003 that a reserve soldier should be given at least a 30-day notice before being mobilized.<sup>29</sup> Furthermore, despite Lt. Gen. Helmly's statement that reserve soldiers would not be kept on duty for more than nine to 12 months in a five-year period, the Maryland National Guard's 115<sup>th</sup> Military Police Battalion has been deployed three times since September 11, with some of these soldiers serving on active duty for more than two years.<sup>30</sup> More and more of these "citizen-soldiers" are becoming full-time warriors against their wishes and contrary to the Reserve's intended purpose. In early 2005, Lt. Gen. Helmly publicly acknowledged that the Army Reserve is "rapidly degenerating into a 'broken' force" with "hamstrung" management.<sup>31</sup>

Another major strain on the reserve component has resulted from the Army's use of the individual ready reserve (IRR) to fill personnel shortages in Iraq. The IRR comprises 118,000 men and women who have completed their active-duty service and have not joined a Guard or Reserve unit, but who still have time left on their eight-year military service obligation.<sup>32</sup> These former soldiers can be mobilized to fill vacancies for a legal maximum of two years. Since the war in Iraq began in 2002, the Army has called more than 5,700 such reservists back to active duty.<sup>33</sup> When only 3,950 reported to duty, the Army was forced to suspend the program in November 2005.

***Operational and Personnel Readiness Levels in Decline.*** The current system has led to a decline in the overall readiness of the active Army – that is in its ability to carry out missions effectively.

Although 75 percent of the Army's active-duty soldiers today have combat experience, making the Army more experienced than it was a few years ago, readiness is arguably still declining because of such things as equipment shortages and low morale.<sup>34</sup> According to the GAO, operational readiness rates for selected equipment have been declining since 1999 across all of the services, with the slide occurring most markedly in FYs 2003 and 2004.<sup>35</sup> This decline has hit the Army the hardest as it bears the brunt of current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

A 2005 report by the Army Surgeon General's Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT-II) revealed that, although morale improved from 2004, more than half

of U.S. soldiers in Iraq reported that their unit morale was low or very low.<sup>36</sup> At least 10 percent of soldiers demonstrated symptoms of acute or post-traumatic stress disorders.<sup>37</sup>


***Major Difficulties with Recruiting.*** Recruiting new qualified enlistees has also become increasingly difficult. The Army currently aims to sign up 165,000 new soldiers each year – 80,000 for the active-duty Army and 85,000 in the National Guard and Reserve.<sup>38</sup> In 2005, the active-duty Army missed its annual recruiting goal by 6,627 soldiers, falling short of its target for the first time in six years while significantly drawing down its “banked” pool of delayed entry program enlistees. Moreover, this recruiting gap – 8 percent – is the largest shortfall in two decades.<sup>39</sup>

These recent shortfalls have occurred even as the Army has dramatically increased the resources devoted to recruiting. In the past year, the Army has added 1,300 recruiters and sharply increased its recruiting budget.<sup>40</sup> It is estimated that \$639.5 million was spent for recruiting for FY 2005 and that \$726.2 million will be spent in FY 2006.<sup>41</sup> The Army currently offers enlistment bonuses of up to \$40,000 plus \$70,000 in college assistance while considering plans to double this figure for recruits with desired specialties.<sup>42</sup> Recruiters are also offering shorter enlistments: the new minimum service is 15 months, down from two years.<sup>43</sup> The Pentagon also increased the maximum age of enlistees to 42 from the current ceiling of 35 for active-duty troops and 39 for the Reserves and National Guard.<sup>44</sup>

These recruiting struggles are even more troubling because the Army has simultaneously been lowering its standards. In FY 2005, the Army took its least qualified recruits in a decade as measured by educational level and test results.<sup>45</sup> The percentage of new recruits in the Army without a high school diploma has risen to 13 percent, up from 8 percent last year.<sup>46</sup>

The Army is also accepting more “Category 4” applicants, the designation given to those who score lowest (between 16 and 30 out of a possible 99 points) on the Army’s Vocational Aptitude Battery test. In 2005, these low scorers made up 3.9 percent of the force, up from 0.6 percent in 2004. By doing so, the Army abolished the 2 percent ceiling for Category 4 applicants that it had maintained since 1990.<sup>47</sup> In October 2005, the first month of FY 2006, a shortage of well-qualified enlistees forced the Army to take in 12 percent of its recruits from Category 4 – the largest number of below-average recruits it has accepted in more than 20 years.<sup>48</sup> According to David Segal of the Center for Research on Military Organization, “[t]he overall quality of the force today is lower than it was a year ago,” in large part because of this less qualified entering class.<sup>49</sup>

**Table 4: Percent Attainment of Yearly Recruiting Goals,  
U.S. Army (all components)**



The experience and capability level of the Army has also been hurt by the discharge of thousands of gay men and women pursuant to the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy. A number of those discharged were soldiers with critical skills such as Arabic language abilities.<sup>50</sup>

***Quality of Life Undermined.*** In wartime, every citizen should expect some sacrifices, and this is particularly true for soldiers. However, the Bush administration has exacerbated personnel problems by attempting to cut back benefits needed by members of the military and their families. The timing of these cuts has fueled perceptions of disregard for the well-being of the same troops that the administration relies on to defend the country. For example, the administration proposed cutting imminent danger combat pay by one-third for U.S. troops in the war zones in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2003. It also proposed cutting family separation allowances by nearly two-thirds for those troops away from their home base.<sup>51</sup> Public pressure ultimately forced Congress to reject these White House proposals.

The administration is also not allocating enough resources to the more than 17,000 U.S. soldiers injured in Iraq and Afghanistan.<sup>52</sup> Fewer than 10 percent of applicants to the military's disability compensation system receive long-term disability payments at the requested level. The majority of those receiving disability pay leave the military with a one-time, lump-sum payment that is inadequate to make up for the losses suffered.<sup>53</sup> To its credit, the administration – after first threatening to veto the proposal – worked with Congress in 2004 to ensure that retired veterans with moderate to severe disabilities are able to collect disability payments in addition to their normal pensions. Previously, such “concurrent receipt” had been prohibited.<sup>54</sup>

Finally, the Bush administration also requested a 14 percent cut in assistance to public schools on military bases and other federal property.<sup>55</sup> In what one Army commander called an act of betrayal, the civilian leadership at the Pentagon has considered closing or transferring control of the 58 schools it operates on 14 military installations.<sup>56</sup> These decisions threaten not only the quality of education for the children of soldiers, but also the morale and support of military families. Ultimately, these actions threaten the long-term viability of the all-volunteer force.

## Recommendations

The United States must take the following five steps: 1) increase the size of the total Army; 2) amend the “back door draft” policies; 3) improve quality of life for military personnel; 4) repeal the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy; and 5) drop the ban on women in combat.

These steps must be undertaken in order to ensure U.S. capabilities to defend the homeland, fight and win one major regional conflict, engage in two simultaneous substantial peacekeeping and stabilization missions, and deter conflicts in three regions (“1-1-2-3”). They are also essential in order to treat the men and women of the military fairly and in a way that encourages them to join and remain in the all-volunteer Army.

While some of these steps require increasing the Army’s budget, these funds can be reallocated from other parts of the overall baseline defense budget.<sup>57</sup> As discussed elsewhere in this document, programs that can be reduced without undermining U.S. national security include the National Missile Defense Program, new nuclear weapons research programs, and Cold War-type programs like the F/A-22 fighter and Virginia class submarine.

The cost of adding funds to the Army budget can also be offset by reducing the number of people on active duty in the Navy and Air Force by cutting one fighter wing from the Air Force and one Navy carrier battle group from their current configuration. This would leave the Navy with ten carrier battle groups and the Air Force with 18 tactical fighter wings. Given the increasing capabilities of these forces, such minor reductions will not increase the risk to national security. As Secretary Rumsfeld noted, it is capabilities, not numbers, that count.<sup>58</sup> Furthermore, the end strength of the U.S. Marine Corps should be maintained at 185,000 active troops and 40,000 selected reserve.

We must acknowledge that even if money is available to implement these steps, there is no guarantee that they can save the all-volunteer Army. This administration has ignored the problem for too long.



***Increase the Size of the Total Army.*** The Army is overstretched and does not have sufficient numbers of active-duty troops trained for non-traditional duties such as nation-building. While we support the Army's effort to attain "modularity" by increasing the number of active-duty brigades from 37 to 42, this will not increase the number of soldiers on active duty.<sup>59</sup> Furthermore, while these new modular brigades will be more agile and lethal, the war in Iraq has demonstrated that boots on the ground are far more important than firepower for securing the country.

Over the next five years, the end strength of the active-duty Army should be increased by 86,000 troops while maintaining the current strength of the reserve component. This change could give us the option to sustain a large presence in Iraq and Afghanistan without breaking the force, as well as enhance the Army's ability to meet the country's long-term strategic objectives. These additional troops should be in addition to the increases in end strength already authorized by Congress.<sup>60</sup>

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***Over the next five years, the end strength of the active-duty Army should be increased by 86,000 troops while maintaining the current strength of the reserve component.***

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Additionally, new recruits should meet the same standards of quality that the Army has achieved for the past five years, namely that at least 90 percent of all recruits have a high school diploma, and 98 percent score average or above average on the Armed Forces Qualification Test. Due to the disastrous policies of the Bush administration, it will be difficult to increase the size and quality of the Army. However, there is a chance that these steps can succeed with proper leadership and realistic policies. In any case, we must try if we are to protect our security without breaking the all-volunteer Army. New troops should be added as follows:

- ***Add two division-sized peacekeeping or stabilization units.*** Because stability operations are now a core military mission equal in importance to full-scale combat, the Army should recruit, train and equip two division-sized units of 13,000 people each that receive training in helping convert a battlefield victory into a political one.<sup>61</sup> In addition to having sufficient combat power, these units should have a greater number of personnel trained in policing, civil affairs, engineering, and medicine than are in the current Army divisions.

**Table 5: Recommended Increases in the Active-Duty Army**



Special Forces (50,000)



Peacekeeping and Stabilization (26,000)



Civil Affairs (10,000)

 = 5,000 Personnel

- Double the size of the active-duty Special Forces.* The president should request and Congress should provide sufficient funds to recruit, train, and equip the 50,000 personnel necessary to double the size of the active-duty Special Forces to 101,000.<sup>62</sup> The secretary of defense must also give higher priority to these elite soldiers within the defense budget by expanding their share from \$6.6 billion to at least \$10 billion per year, enabling them to lead the military's counterterrorism missions more effectively.<sup>63</sup> These steps will have the added benefits of allowing the Pentagon to reduce the number of private contractors in combat areas and enabling the administration to implement the 9/11 Commission's recommendation to transfer control of covert operations from the CIA to the Pentagon.<sup>64</sup>
- Add 10,000 military police, civil affairs experts, engineers, and medical personnel to the active-duty force.* The president should direct the secretary of defense to bolster the Army's capacity for peacekeeping, stabilization and nation-building duties and request sufficient funds in the Army budget to recruit, train, and equip at least 10,000 military police, civil affairs experts, engineers, and medical personnel for the active-duty force. Such capacity is desperately needed because most of these critical personnel are currently in the reserve.

- *Follow through with current plans to grow the Army's "operational" branch.* The Army currently plans to increase its operational component over a three-year period by trimming its institutional and administrative positions and reducing the number of people assigned to training at any one time. The Army's leadership has projected that it will add 40,000 soldiers to the operational force by 2007.<sup>65</sup> This plan should continue.

***Amend the "Back Door Draft" Policies.*** Because the active Army is too small to meet its responsibilities, the Bush administration has been forced to employ a number of unfair policies that amount to a back door draft. These policies should be modified as follows:

- *Reduce the duration of the military service obligation.* To accomplish this, Congress should pass legislation to reduce the length of the military service obligation – which by law lasts eight years from the date of initial enlistment – to six years after enlistment or four years of active duty, whichever comes first. This change would prevent the men and women of the individual ready reserve (IRR), who have already served their country, from having their lives interrupted after already completing a substantial period of active-duty service. Not only is this change desirable as a matter of equity, but it would also increase the willingness of people to join the active-duty Army for a four-year enlistment. Moreover, it would have little negative impact on military readiness, since members of the IRR do not receive any training and therefore have limited military usefulness.
- *Change stop-loss policy implementation.* The president should direct the secretary of defense to change stop-loss policy implementation so that no person is subject to stop-loss on more than one occasion without his or her consent. Furthermore, enlisted people who are affected by stop-loss or whose tours in Iraq or Afghanistan are extended beyond one year should receive a bonus of \$2,000 per month for the duration of their extra service.
- *Issue a new executive order on selected reserve recall.* The president should issue an executive order that directs the secretary of defense not to recall a selected reserve unit to active duty for more than one year out of every six unless the president has declared a national emergency. The current executive order allows the Pentagon to keep a selected reservist on active duty for up to two years, and does not limit the number of times an individual can be recalled. Activating the Guard and Reserve more than once every six years will have a severe impact on retention as well as on the willingness of individuals to join the Guard and Reserve after leaving active duty.

***Improve the Quality of Life for Military Personnel.*** Ameliorating troops' worries about pay and benefits would have a positive impact on morale as well as on retention and reenlistment rates. Moreover, given the sacrifices that American troops are making to protect their country, ensuring a high quality of life for soldiers and their families is the right thing to do. The following steps should be taken:

- *Maintain troop pay and benefits.* The administration should make sure that imminent danger and family separation allowances are adjusted for inflation. The president should direct the secretary of defense to maintain

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***Given the sacrifices that American troops are making to protect their country, ensuring a high quality of life for soldiers and their families is the right thing to do.***

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quality of life benefits such as special pay, commissaries, and schools on military bases and not institute a back door cut in pay by trimming medical benefits for active-duty personnel, selected reservists, or military retirees. He should also call a moratorium on studies about closing commissaries and schools on military bases, at least as long as the U.S. military is fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan.

- *Enable all selected reservists and their families to enroll in TRICARE.* Congress should pass legislation that would allow members of the selected reserve to enroll themselves and their families in the military's healthcare system, TRICARE. This coverage should be available regardless of whether or not their units are currently deployed, rather than limiting access to deployed reservists or cutting off coverage eight years after the end of any deployment. Enrollment in the TRICARE system would prevent reservists and their families from having to change healthcare plans when they are activated.<sup>66</sup> Moreover, those selected reservists who do not have health insurance would be able to maintain their medical fitness for service without having to pay for it themselves. Expanded access to the TRICARE system, which is much less costly than most private healthcare plans, would have a positive impact on both recruiting and retention for the Guard and Reserve. In 2003, the CBO estimated that the cost of this benefit, if phased in progressively, would be about \$454 million in the first year and up to \$1.8 billion by the fourth year.<sup>67</sup>
- *Compensate federal civilian employees in the National Guard and Reserve for lost pay when their units are summoned to active duty.* The federal government – the single largest employer of reservists – should pay the differential for its 127,000 civilian employees who serve in the National

Guard and Reserve and who would otherwise face pay cuts when their units are activated.<sup>68</sup> Many leading private-sector employers, as well as state and local governments, already provide this benefit.

These changes will obviously not be without additional costs. Adding 86,000 troops to the Army will mean an additional expenditure of about \$12 billion a year while the TRICARE benefit will mean an average cost of \$1 billion a year over the next five years.<sup>69</sup> Finally, compensating federal civilian employees for lost income when their Guard units are activated could cost up to \$200 million per year.

***Repeal the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Policy.*** The “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy is counterproductive to military readiness. As Rear Admiral John D. Hutson, who retired as Navy Judge Advocate General in 2000, noted, “‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ is virtually unworkable in the military – legally, administratively, and socially. Rather than preserving cohesion, it fosters divisiveness.”<sup>70</sup> More than 10,000 people have been discharged because of the policy during the past ten years, including nearly 800 with skills deemed “mission critical,” including pilots, combat engineers, and linguists.<sup>71</sup> These are the very job functions in which the military has had personnel shortfalls and been forced to activate individuals from the IRR.<sup>72</sup> The economic costs of the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy during the previous decade have been almost \$320 million.<sup>73</sup> Congress should:

- *Pass the Military Readiness Enhancement Act (H.R. 1059).* This act would repeal the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy that prohibits openly gay men and women from serving in the armed forces. The Uniform Code of Military Justice is more than adequate to prevent and sanction inappropriate behavior by members of the armed forces, no matter what their sexual orientation. While the issue of gays in the military was certainly very divisive 12 years ago, the opinions of many military personnel have since evolved.<sup>74</sup> Public opinion has also turned decidedly against “don’t ask, don’t tell,” as 79 percent of Americans today support a policy that allows gays to serve openly in the military. Even more importantly, 76 percent of potential recruits reported that repealing the ban would have “no effect” on their decision to enlist.<sup>75</sup>

The change should not be a difficult one: an internal Ministry of Defense report from Britain, whose military was forced by the European Court of Human Rights to allow openly gay people to serve even in places like submarines, found that the

policy change was a “solid achievement ... with fewer problems than might have been expected.”<sup>76</sup> Indeed, beginning in December 2005, gay personnel will be eligible for married housing on British military bases.<sup>77</sup> Some estimates predict that as many as 41,000 new recruits could result from the repeal of “don’t ask, don’t tell” in the United States.<sup>78</sup>

***Drop the Ban on Women in Combat.*** Currently, the Army prohibits women from serving in infantry, field artillery, and Special Forces units that directly engage the enemy on the ground. However, soldiers in combat support units are in just as much danger as front-line or direct combat units, as the war in Iraq has demonstrated. For example, women soldiers in a support battalion of a Brigade Combat team in the Elite 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division work shoulder to shoulder with infantry soldiers on raids and missions in Iraq. Two female soldiers in the battalion have been nominated for the Combat Action badge, an award given to those who engage or are engaged by the enemy during combat operations.<sup>79</sup> The armed services should:

- *Establish standards for every military occupational specialty and allow those who meet the standards to qualify regardless of gender.* This would allow the Army to increase the pool of potential recruits for hard-to-fill combat slots. Women already make up around 10 percent of all U.S. troops serving in Iraq, the highest percentage of women in any war to date.<sup>80</sup>

## EQUIPMENT SHORTAGES

The ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have created a series of problems for the U.S. military's equipment inventory. First, equipment has worn out much more rapidly than projected due to the harsh topography and climate in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the fast-paced tempo of U.S. operations. The Department of Defense (DoD) has found that equipment is being used at two to eight times peacetime rates in Iraq and Afghanistan.<sup>1</sup> As a result, the Pentagon has had to borrow or re-deploy equipment from other areas in order to meet emerging shortfalls in the war zone, drawing down equipment stocks worldwide in the process. These systemic equipment shortages undermine the readiness of the U.S. military to meet current threats both at home and abroad, as well as to deal with future contingencies. Furthermore, DoD procurement processes have not kept up with increased equipment requests, especially for unanticipated needs like body armor.

In order to reset the force to desired levels of capacity, billions of dollars will need to be added to the Pentagon's procurement account. While several supplemental appropriations bills during the past four years have provided funds for repairing and refurbishing equipment worn down in Afghanistan and Iraq, the total cost of resetting the force will both outweigh and outlast the funding available from supplementals. To remedy this problem, the Pentagon will need to dedicate a much larger percentage of its baseline budget toward recapitalizing the force.

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Even before operations in Iraq and Afghanistan began, equipment age was a major problem. Some pieces were more than 20 years old, including the Navy's LPD-4 Amphibious Transport Dock Ship and the Air Force's KC-135 Stratotanker aircraft.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, there is now a shortage of spare parts for many of these older systems. This is a major problem because some systems are so complex that a single malfunction in one component can paralyze the entire machine.

The GAO warned that equipment overuse and shortages could threaten the ability of the U.S. military to achieve its core mission requirements. A October 2005 GAO review of 30 equipment items across all branches of the armed services found that readiness rates for most of the 30 items had declined between FYs 1999 and 2004 (and most markedly in 2003 and 2004) due to the heavy



use of equipment in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as ongoing difficulties with maintaining complex and aging equipment.<sup>3</sup>

While the Army and Marine Corps have felt the greatest strains, the Air Force and Navy have also been affected. For example, the heavy use of Air Force planes have shortened their projected lifespans. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has estimated that equipment depreciation in the Air Force could cost between \$1.5 and \$2.1 billion for 2005 and in each successive year if operations continue at current rates.<sup>4</sup> The Navy's costs resulting from equipment wear and tear – the smallest costs among all the services – will still reach approximately \$150 million a year.<sup>5</sup>

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***Altogether, the Army's equipment is being utilized at five to six times the normal peacetime levels.***

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These equipment shortages are already affecting missions outside of Iraq and Afghanistan and have the potential to create immediate operational risks should another major military conflict emerge. After redirecting substantial flows of maintenance money and hardware to its operations in

the Middle East and South Asia, the U.S. military has been left with only 50 to 80 percent of normal levels of heavy weapons and other fighting gear in South Korea, jeopardizing the ability of the United States to respond in the event of hostilities with North Korea or another East Asian nation.<sup>6</sup> These shortages also hindered the response effort of the National Guard during Hurricane Katrina.

***The U.S. Army and Marines.*** Not surprisingly, the U.S. Army, which furnishes the majority of the boots on the ground in Iraq, has experienced the most severe problems with equipment shortages. Over the past three years, the active Army has deployed more than 40 percent of its equipment to either Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.<sup>7</sup> Altogether, the Army's equipment is being utilized at five to six times the normal peacetime levels.<sup>8</sup> Trucks from the Army and the Marines are being driven approximately ten times as many miles per year as usual.<sup>9</sup>

Operational constraints and the constant state of combat in Iraq provide little time for the basic upkeep of equipment, and even significantly worn-down equipment is sometimes transferred from one unit to the next without replacement or maintenance. The shortage of maintenance personnel and the advanced age of much of the equipment has further exacerbated the strain on the Army. Hundreds of thousands of pieces are in need of repair or replacement. Additionally, the Army's "modularity" initiative, which will increase the number of active brigades



from 33 to 42 while making existing brigades more lethal, will also increase the amount of required equipment substantially.<sup>10</sup>

As has been widely reported, the Army and Marines have not had enough body armor for their ground troops or armor for their vehicles. These shortages have been caused by poor planning and a lack of urgency in the procurement process. In response, some families have bought body armor for their sons and daughters in Iraq.<sup>11</sup> Reports emerged in January 2006 of a secret Pentagon study that found that as many as 80 percent of Marines killed in Iraq from wounds to the upper body might have survived if they had had extra body armor.<sup>12</sup> In 2004, a similar scandal erupted when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld fielded a question from a National Guardsman contending that ground troops faced chronic and serious shortages of vehicle armor, needlessly exposing them to greater peril.<sup>13</sup>

The Marines have also experienced shortages in areas other than armor. The Marine Corps Inspector General reported in June 2005 that Marines in Iraq do not have “enough weapons, communication gear, or properly outfitted vehicles.”<sup>14</sup> General Michael W. Hagee, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee in June 2005 that the high operational rate of deployment was wearing out equipment at a very high rate, affecting both equipment availability and unit readiness.<sup>15</sup> As one example, Gen. Hagee noted that the Corps’ HMMWVs (high mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles or “Humvees”), which normally last 13 years, needed replacing in Iraq after just two.<sup>16</sup> More than 5,300 major pieces of Marine equipment – including critical transport vehicles like helicopters and trucks – have been either destroyed or degraded to the point that they must be rebuilt or replaced entirely.<sup>17</sup> This pattern of heavy use drives up maintenance costs and strains procurement budgets.

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Gen. Hagee also noted that the Corps does not have enough equipment to use in training because most of the Marines’ equipment has been deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. Current readiness rates for the Marines’ ground equipment in the United States average only 81 percent. The Army lacks sufficient equipment at home as well.<sup>18</sup> Such shortages undermine the long-term readiness of the armed forces by keeping personnel from undertaking the necessary training for future operations.

***Army Reserve and National Guard.*** Equipment shortages are also undermining the ability of the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard to train new personnel and to support operations overseas. Given their historical role as a secondary, follow-on force, the National Guard and Reserve are not normally 100 percent equipped for overseas missions. Thus, prior to deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan, reserve commanders assumed they would have sufficient time to obtain additional equipment.

Since September 11, however, this administration has used the National Guard and Reserve as an extension to the active-duty, rather than a follow-on force. Theater commanders have deployed units on short timetables with as little as 90 percent of their necessary equipment. These orders have required enormous transfers of equipment from non-deployed to deployed units.<sup>19</sup> As of July 2005, the Army National Guard had transferred more than 101,000 equipment items to units deploying overseas, depleting their inventory of key items like radios, generators, and armored Humvees.<sup>20</sup> From September 2001 to April 2005, the Army Reserve also transferred 235,900 pieces of equipment worth \$765 million from non-mobilized to mobilized units.<sup>21</sup> Like the Marines and the active-duty Army, both the Guard and Reserve have been left without sufficient equipment for training.

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In summer 2005, the GAO estimated that non-deployed National Guard units only have about 34 percent of their essential equipment, while the Army Reserve reported in February 2005 that it had only 76 percent of required equipment.<sup>22</sup> However, the Reserve's figure was significantly overstated because it included very old equipment that is essentially incompatible with that of the active component.<sup>23</sup>

Equipment problems in the Guard and the Reserve have been aggravated by several other factors.

First, reserve equipment used in Iraq has deteriorated much more rapidly than anticipated due to the harsh operational environment and high tempo, as in the active force.

Second, both the Reserves and National Guard often inherit the active Army's older equipment rather than receiving new equipment, and some of this older equipment cannot actually be used in combat because the Army can no longer provide logistical support for older items.

Third, both the Guard and the Reserve do not have enough full-time maintenance personnel or staff that can train such personnel. Given funding constraints, the Reserve has been authorized to hire only 68 percent of the staff required to perform necessary training and maintenance.<sup>24</sup>

Finally, Guard and Reserve units returning from Iraq have often been required to leave their equipment in theater, further diminishing equipment inventories among non-deployed units. The Guard has estimated that it has left more than 64,000 items (worth approximately \$1.2 billion) overseas since 2003.<sup>25</sup> Even if this equipment is eventually returned, much of it will be significantly worn down.

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***One of the most dangerous effects of equipment shortages is that they compromise the National Guard's ability to carry out its homeland security and disaster response missions.***

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One of the most dangerous effects of equipment shortages is that they compromise the National Guard's ability to carry out its homeland security and disaster response missions. This was demonstrated in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, where Guard officials admitted that their response capacity was diminished because they lacked essential equipment like radios, trucks, helicopters, night-vision goggles, and satellite-based communications devices, all of which had been deployed to Iraq.<sup>26</sup>

***Budgetary Implications.*** Experts agree that the costs of resetting the force will be enormous. It has been estimated that rehabilitating the Army equipment used in overseas operations will require spending more than \$20 billion over the next four years. The CBO concluded that the total cost of equipment wear and tear across all services was approximately \$8 billion for 2005 alone, not including a combined backlog of \$13 to \$18 billion in accrued expenses resulting from past equipment stress and loss.<sup>27</sup> Senior Marine officials admitted in late 2005 that, even if the war in Iraq ended the next day, it would still cost nearly \$13 billion to reequip their units with the vehicles and gear lost in combat and through wear and tear.<sup>28</sup>

Such maintenance and replacement costs have not been incorporated into the Pentagon's baseline budget, and many observers predict that it will take two years of supplemental appropriations following the completion of operations in Iraq to fully reset the force. If these supplementals cease once the United States withdraws from Iraq, the U.S. military – and the Army in particular – will face a major budget crisis, because the costs of resetting the force will have to compete with other priorities both within the DoD (e.g., transformation) and throughout the entire federal government.

## Recommendations

The following steps should be taken:

- *Allocate substantial resources to reset, recapitalize, and modernize the force.* The administration and Congress must ensure that funding for resetting the force will continue following the termination of the U.S. presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, and they should increase the Army's share of the baseline budget from 24 to 28 percent in order to pay for the additional troops and reset the force. These needs should be funded in the baseline defense budget.
- *Develop an equipment supply plan.* The Pentagon must specify how the DoD will maintain operational readiness through long-term maintenance and selected replacement of equipment that has been worn down in Iraq and Afghanistan.
- *Ensure that the troops in the field have the proper equipment.* The Pentagon must give much higher priority to this objective, which will require significant improvements to DoD planning and procurement processes.

## WEAPONS SYSTEMS MISMATCH

**W**eapons systems must match the missions that the U.S. military is most likely to undertake over the next decade. Unfortunately, the weapons system acquisition program of the Department of Defense is broken. Four years after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Pentagon's military and civilian leaders continue to be locked in a Cold War mindset that views a Soviet-era conventional military as the country's greatest threat. Instead, America's enemies engage in new forms of warfare: insurgencies using small arms, suicide bombing, and the Internet to recruit and train terrorists that threaten Americans.

The Pentagon must also seek weapons systems that fit within the fiscal constraints the country is likely to experience for the remainder of this decade. The Pentagon procurement plans assume incorrectly that the regular defense budget will continue to increase by about 5 percent per year – in real terms – just as it has for the past four years.<sup>1</sup> According to the latest Selected Acquisition Reports, the Pentagon has \$1.5 trillion worth of weapons systems in various stages of development.<sup>2</sup> Even if there is no additional cost growth in these weapons programs, the Pentagon cannot afford the 80 weapons systems on the drawing board. Furthermore, given the fact that, in the last four years alone, the projected cost of its five major weapons systems has risen by 85 percent, it is likely that they will only grow more expensive.<sup>3</sup>

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
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In order to replace aging systems and to meet new threats, the following seven new weapons systems are essential: the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), the B-2 heavy bomber, Future Combat Systems (FCS), the Stryker Interim Armored Vehicle, and naval vessels such as the CVN-21 aircraft carrier and the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).

At the same time, there are at least seven major weapons systems currently under development that deal with threats from a bygone era or are an unwise use of scarce resources. These obsolete or fiscally imprudent systems include the F/A-22 Raptor stealth fighter jet, the SSN-774 Virginia class submarine, the DD(X) destroyer, the V-22 Osprey, the C-130J transport aircraft, offensive space-based weapons, and the deployment of National Missile Defense.

## Essential Weapons Systems

***F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.*** The F-35 is an ambitious program to build three related, but slightly different, aircraft for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. Current plans call for building 2,458 planes at a cost of \$256 billion, or about \$100 million per plane.<sup>4</sup>



This aircraft should be built. It is more cost effective to produce the new JSF platform than to buy the F/A-22 or additional F/A-18s to upgrade older systems, which by 2010 will need to be replaced. Moreover, since these variants use common parts and are manufactured on the same production line, it is more affordable than allowing each of the services to develop its own unique aircraft. Finally, since so many other countries are willing to purchase the fighter, the Joint Strike Fighter will improve the ability of the United States to use military power in conjunction with allied forces and will lower the unit cost of these fighter jets for the U.S. military.<sup>5</sup>

To date, the Pentagon has spent \$25.6 billion developing the plane and will spend \$5 billion more in FY 2006. If the program remains on schedule, the Air Force and Navy will spend about \$100 billion more over the next decade. This program should not be rushed due to the technological challenges of trying to build three different planes from one design. To prevent excess aging in the current aircraft fleet before the arrival of the new Joint Strike Fighter, the Pentagon should buy upgraded Block 60 version F-16s. About \$3 billion of this \$15.3 billion could be allocated to purchasing 100 upgraded F-16s, resulting in a net savings of at least \$12.3 billion over four years.<sup>6</sup> This country's overwhelming numerical and qualitative advantages in tactical aircraft will not soon be challenged.

**Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).** Up until the war in Afghanistan, many military leaders from the Air Force and Navy resisted full-scale development of unmanned aerial vehicles, like the Predator and Global Hawk, because they saw these vehicles as a threat to their manned aircraft.<sup>7</sup> In fact, the majority of the Predators – which were so effective in helping the United States remove the Taliban from power – were CIA aircraft.<sup>8</sup> Both UAVs continue to be used in Iraq and Afghanistan.<sup>9</sup>



The Pentagon currently has seven different UAV programs in various stages of development. These include two Air Force Programs (Predator and Global Hawk), one Navy program (Fire Scout), one Army program (Shadow), and one joint program (Joint Unmanned Air Combat System or J-UCAS).<sup>10</sup> These UAVs can do everything from providing real time imagery of the battlefield to carrying out strike missions.<sup>11</sup> They vary in cost from \$4.5 million for the Predator to \$130 million for the Global Hawk.<sup>12</sup> The total budget for UAVs in FY 2006 is \$1.5 billion, a fraction of the cost of the budget for manned combat aircraft, which in FY 2006 amounted to more than \$12 billion.<sup>13</sup>

**B-2 heavy bomber.** The 1997 National Defense Panel and 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review both concluded that greater emphasis should be placed on long-range precision strike capabilities. This conclusion, combined with the important role played by bombers in the conflict in Afghanistan, argues for expanding by 15 the existing fleet of 21 B-2s until a new long-range bomber can be developed.



The B-2 plays a vital role in the current security environment. It is able to deliver large payloads (both conventional and nuclear munitions) over long distances because it can fly directly from bases in the United States and rapidly destroy targets halfway across the globe without depending on aircraft carriers, foreign bases, or fighter escorts because of its stealth character.<sup>14</sup> These aircraft reduce the need to establish American military bases abroad or obtain access to foreign bases, which has become an increasingly difficult and dangerous task, especially in the Middle East and Central Asia. This, in turn, can lessen perceptions of American occupation and eliminate the need to partner with undemocratic regimes in order to use their military bases and deliver a payload to a distant target.



Additional bombers can be procured for approximately \$820 million each.<sup>15</sup> We recommend buying three of these new bombers per year over the next five years. These would give the Air Force a total of 36 B-2 bombers and would cost about \$12 billion over the next five years.

***Future Combat Systems (FCS).*** The FCS is the Army's modernization program to build a group of 18 combat vehicles and other systems, including unmanned aerial vehicles and sensors, and link them together into an integrated and complex system. A soldier linked to this system has access to data that enhances situational awareness.<sup>16</sup> The Army intends to begin equipping its first units with the FCS in 2011 and eventually one-third of its troops will utilize the FCS at a cost of about \$160 billion.<sup>17</sup>

The FCS program is necessary for the Army because it will make its units more deployable, lethal, and survivable. However, its current schedule is far too ambitious given the complexity of the program. Of the network of 53 crucial technologies, 52 have not been tested sufficiently to show that they will work in a combat environment.<sup>18</sup>


***Stryker Interim Armored Vehicle.*** The Stryker is intended to provide a relatively light and easily deployable combat vehicle to bridge the gap between today's lethal but relatively heavy forces, and the more capable and deployable systems being developed under the FCS program.<sup>19</sup> It is needed now. In fact, a brigade of Strykers has already been rushed to Iraq.<sup>20</sup> This interim armored vehicle is not only cheaper to operate and maintain than the M-113 A3 armored personnel carrier, but it also provides better protection for the soldiers than the M-113 A3.<sup>21</sup> The Army plans to purchase 2,449 of these units for approximately \$10 billion.<sup>22</sup>





**Naval vessels.** As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan indicate, the primary role of the Navy in the 21<sup>st</sup> century will be to project power ashore. It can accomplish this strategically by launching air strikes from its carriers and tactically by providing fire support in crowded, closed-in coastal areas for the troops ashore. It must give priority to building those weapons that perform these functions, as opposed to building ships like the DD(X) destroyer for waging open ocean warfare against another major naval power.

**CVN-21 aircraft carrier.** Aircraft carriers last approximately 30 years. If the Navy is to maintain a force of at least ten aircraft carriers in the near future – as we recommend – it must begin building a new generation of carriers over the next decade. The Navy plans to buy at least three new aircraft carriers to replace those carriers that will reach the end of their useful life in that timeframe. The lead ship of this new class will be designated the CVN-21. It will cost about \$12 billion, which is almost half the cost (in inflation-adjusted dollars) than the Nimitz carriers that were built during the last two decades.<sup>23</sup> However, it will be cheaper to operate and will be more capable than the Nimitz Class. Since the CVN-21 will require between 500 and 800 fewer sailors to operate, it will save at least \$500 million a year in personnel costs.<sup>24</sup> Finally, CVN-21 will incorporate next generation technologies and have the capacity to launch Navy and Marine Corps tactical fighters and special operations aircraft.<sup>25</sup>



**Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).** The LCS is a new surface combatant intended to focus on performing missions in coastal waters.<sup>26</sup> At about 3,000 tons, it is approximately the size of a frigate.<sup>27</sup> The Navy plans to buy at least 60 of the littoral combat ships for \$12 billion or \$200 million per ship, about 5 percent of the cost of the DD(X). Not only can these versatile ships project firepower ashore, but they can also launch unmanned aircraft and watercraft under certain conditions and have the capacity to attain speeds of 48 knots.<sup>28</sup>

## Unnecessary Programs

***F/A-22 Raptor.*** For FY 2006, the Pentagon requested and received \$4.3 billion to purchase 24 more F/A-22 Raptor fighter jets.<sup>29</sup> It was originally designed to achieve air superiority over Soviet fighter jets that were never built.<sup>30</sup> In 1985, the Air Force claimed it could build about 750 of these stealth fighter jets for \$35 million each, at a total cost of \$26 billion.<sup>31</sup> During the last 20 years, however, the cost of the total program has continued to grow even as the number of planes to be purchased has declined. Just a year ago, the Air Force said it could purchase 279 Raptors for \$72 billion, or about \$258 million per aircraft.<sup>32</sup> At present, the Pentagon says it can buy 181 planes for \$61 billion.<sup>33</sup> Assuming no further cost growth, this will mean spending about \$337 million for each unnecessary plane, almost an \$80 million increase in the unit cost in just one year.




The Raptor is arguably the most unnecessary weapon system currently being built by the Pentagon. The performance of the current generation of Air Force fighters in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as during the first Persian Gulf War, makes it clear that the Air Force already has the capability to achieve air superiority easily and quickly against any enemy or nation. Recognizing this strategic reality, the Air Force has added a ground attack or bombing mission to the Raptor. However, using the world's most expensive fighter for attacking ground targets is neither cost-effective nor technically feasible given that the jet travels at twice the speed of sound.<sup>34</sup>

In the summer of 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld understood this logic and moved to cancel the plane, backing off only when Secretary of the Air Force James Roche threatened to resign.<sup>35</sup> To date, the Air Force has spent \$40 billion on the program.<sup>36</sup> Canceling it now would save \$15.3 billion in anticipated future costs and would leave the Air Force with about 100 of these planes or about four squadrons – more than enough to deal with a future competitor like China who might develop a significant air-to-air capability.<sup>37</sup>


***SSN-774 Virginia class submarine.***

The Virginia class submarine was originally intended to combat the next generation of Soviet submarines, vessels that will never be built.<sup>38</sup> The Navy plans to buy 30 of these subs to replace the SSN-688 Los Angeles class submarines at an estimated cost of \$94 billion, or more than \$3 billion per submarine.<sup>39</sup> To date, the Navy has spent about \$22 billion developing the SSN-774.<sup>40</sup> For 2006, the Navy is asking Congress to appropriate approximately \$2.6 billion for one boat, and it plans to build one vessel per year through 2011 and two per year beginning in 2012.<sup>41</sup>



As these Virginia class submarines are commissioned, the Navy plans to retire some existing Los Angeles class submarines early – that is, before their normal service life is reached.<sup>42</sup> However, not only is the Virginia class submarine cost ineffective, but it also fails to provide significant new capabilities beyond those of the Los Angeles class. Canceling the Virginia class and refueling the reactors of the Los Angeles class at a cost of \$200 million per vessel can save \$2.3 billion in FY 2006 and \$65 billion over the next 15 years.<sup>43</sup>

***DD(X) destroyer.*** The proposed DD(X) is a new class of surface combatant that is substantially larger than any existing surface ship, such as the cruiser or destroyer, and is sized more for open ocean warfare against another naval superpower than for its stated mission of providing fire support in crowded, dangerous coastal areas for forces ashore.<sup>44</sup> The program, which began in 1996, has been beset by technological and cost difficulties and will not be ready before 2015. The House Armed Services Committee, alarmed by the ballooning costs of the DD(X), has considered capping its authorized spending for the DD(X) at \$1.7 billion per ship, but costs have already risen to \$3.3 billion each.<sup>45</sup> However, canceling the program altogether would save \$1 billion in 2006 alone and at least \$8 billion over the next five years.<sup>46</sup> Moreover, as discussed above, the Navy's Littoral Combat Ship, which is already under development and will cost about \$200 million per vessel, is better suited for providing fire support for actual operations ashore.<sup>47</sup>



**V-22 Osprey.** From its inception, the Osprey has been beset by safety, technical, and cost problems. The Pentagon began development of the Osprey, which takes off and lands like a helicopter and once airborne flies like a plane, in the mid-1980s.<sup>48</sup> It was originally supposed to be a joint service program, but the Army dropped support for the program in the late 1980s. In 1991, Dick Cheney (then secretary of defense) canceled the program because of cost concerns and continuing technical problems.<sup>49</sup>



Cheney's decision was overridden by Congress, and with the support of Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush, the Department of Defense has now spent \$18 billion on the program.<sup>50</sup> Yet, the Osprey is still in a test phase and will not be ready for operational deployment until sometime in 2007. Moreover, four accidents, three of which resulted in fatalities, have occurred during this time.<sup>50</sup> Finally, the estimated cost of the program has risen from approximately \$30 to \$50 billion.<sup>51</sup>

Under current plans, the Pentagon intends to buy 458 Ospreys at a cost of more than \$110 million for each aircraft.<sup>52</sup> This assumes that the Pentagon can get costs under control and solve the technical problems. Even if this unlikely scenario comes to pass, the Osprey will only be marginally more capable than existing helicopters in terms of speed range and payload, yet cost at least five times as much.<sup>53</sup> Canceling the V-22 Osprey and buying an equivalent number of existing helicopters (like the MH-60S Knighthawk) will save \$1.4 billion in 2006 and \$30 billion over a decade.<sup>54</sup>


**C-130J transport aircraft.** The Pentagon has already spent \$2.6 billion to purchase 50 C-130J's, but none of these planes has met commercial contract specifications.<sup>55</sup> The C-130J has 168 deficiencies that could cause severe injury or even death to those flying or on board.<sup>56</sup> Consequently, the C-130J cannot perform its intended mission of transporting troops and equipment into combat zones – it can only be used for training. These limitations have prompted concerns for Secretary



Rumsfeld, who previously moved to cancel the program.<sup>57</sup> Moreover, the older C-130 Hercules model aircraft enjoy an excellent reputation as an aircraft capable of performing missions similar to those assigned to the C-130J.<sup>58</sup>

During the 1990s, when Congress appropriated more funds for the aircraft than the Pentagon requested, the Air Force contended it did not need the planes. Yet, in 2006, Congress allocated approximately \$1 billion to buy 12 more of these aircraft, and the Air Force now contends that it needs the plane. If the Air Force, with the support of Congress, has its way, it would like to purchase 100 planes at a total cost of \$16.4 billion or about \$164 million per plane.<sup>59</sup> Canceling the C-130J now will save \$5 billion over the next five years.<sup>60</sup>

***Offensive space-based weapons.*** The U.S. military already relies heavily on space to conduct its operations. It uses satellites to gather data, speed communications, and conduct electronic eavesdropping. The use of space by the military has been, until now, considered defensive. However, the Pentagon now wants the president to sign a new national security directive to enable the military to establish and maintain space superiority. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld wants the United States to pursue the option to weaponize space – that is, to launch offensive weapons from space. Under his leadership, the Pentagon has pushed ahead with a multibillion-dollar space weapons program and is developing plans for deployment in the near term.<sup>61</sup>



Five space-based offensive weapons are currently being developed by the Pentagon, including:

- killer satellites that would destroy or disrupt an enemy satellite in space;
- the Common Aero Vehicle, or hypersonic aircraft, which can be launched in mid-air and swoop in from space to hit targets up to 3,000 miles away;
- the Hypervelocity Rod Bundle (known as “rods from God”), consisting of tungsten bars weighing 100 kg or more, deployed from a permanently orbiting platform and able to hit terrestrial targets at 120 miles a minute (or 7,200 miles an hour) with the force of a small nuclear weapon;
- the Space-based Laser, or “Eagle,” which employs space-based relay mirrors to direct rays against ground targets; and
- a program that uses intense radio waves from space to disable enemy communications.<sup>62</sup>



However tempting such expanded strike capabilities might appear at first glance, in reality such weapons would not only represent an enormous misallocation of defense resources, but would actually serve to undermine national security.

Space-based offensive weapons would not significantly expand U.S. military superiority. American conventional and nuclear weapons are already capable of destroying any of the ground targets that space-based weapons would, and they can do it at a fraction of the cost. For instance, existing intercontinental ballistic missiles can match the destructive force of the proposed “rods from God” space weapons program. Richard Garwin, a dean of America’s national security scientist corps who played a major role in the development of the hydrogen bomb, has calculated that the cost per target of a space-based laser would be \$100 million, a 166-fold cost increase over the Tomahawk cruise missile which costs only \$600,000.<sup>63</sup>

Land, sea, and air-based forces can be repositioned, concealed, or hardened to reduce their vulnerability.<sup>64</sup> In addition, space-based weapons, because of their predictable orbits, literally have nowhere to hide and can be easily disrupted. New space-based weapons also have a distinct disadvantage when it comes to dictating the timing of an attack. A space-based laser attack, for instance, would be restricted to the period when the weapon is above enemy territory; thus, after the first orbit, an enemy would know precisely when such an attack would be possible and when it would not.


Finally, deploying space-based weapons is an ineffective way of maintaining the military advantage that the United States currently derives from its space assets given the cost. Enemies are not likely to allow themselves to be drawn into an expensive, high-tech space-based weapons race that the United States would surely win. Rather, they will more than likely take a page out of the Iraqi insurgents’ playbook and fight the United States with far more cost effective, low-tech, and asymmetric tactics.

Asymmetric battles in space could be fought by enemies using two simple tools: space mines or ICBMs carrying nuclear weapons. A nuclear weapon is capable of wreaking havoc on all assets in low-Earth orbit by littering space with dangerous debris. It could also disrupt satellite operations with its electromagnetic pulse and radiation. Space mines, meanwhile, will be able to neutralize satellites in more distant orbits by simply releasing pellet clouds into a flight path.<sup>65</sup>

Because these offensive programs are financed in the classified or “black” budget, it is impossible to tell precisely how much the Pentagon has already spent on them.

The best guess is that the Bush administration has already spent at least \$20 billion and is requesting \$5 billion more in the 2006 budget.<sup>66</sup> Canceling these weapons would save \$5 billion this year and at least \$50 billion over the next decade.

***Ballistic missile defense.*** Since President Bush's campaign promise in 2000 to deploy National Missile Defense (NMD) before the end of his first term of office, the Bush administration has spent more than \$40 billion in attempts to fulfill that pledge.<sup>67</sup> Indeed, one of President Bush's first acts upon assuming office in 2001 was to double the size of the ballistic missile defense budget from \$5 billion to \$10 billion.<sup>68</sup> Later the same year, President Bush withdrew the United States from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty because the agreement's provisions stood in the way of plans to develop and deploy an effective missile defense.<sup>69</sup>



For FY 2006, the administration requested another \$7.8 billion from Congress for its NMD program.<sup>70</sup> Using funds already allocated in previous years, the Bush administration has placed at least ten ground-based missile interceptors at launch sites in Alaska and California with plans to deploy more over the next two years.<sup>71</sup> Eventually, the Bush administration would like to deploy a large layered system that will include space-based interceptors. The total cost of the Bush plan over the next 20 years will exceed \$200 billion.<sup>72</sup>

The Bush administration's approach represents a misuse of limited resources. For a ballistic missile threat to be credible and for NMD to be a viable defense, two conditions must be met: an adversary with ballistic missiles must be undeterred by U.S. conventional and nuclear superiority; and the real-world national security benefits of NMD must justify the enormous expense of the program.

NMD scores poorly on meeting both conditions. Other than the United States, only two states – China and Russia – have an active, proven ability to launch land-based ICBMs outfitted with nuclear weapons.<sup>73</sup> China and Russia's comparatively large ballistic missile forces could easily overwhelm any foreseeable missile defense.

North Korea is frequently cited as the animating concern behind the ballistic missile threat. If the six-party talks fail, North Korea's ICBM and nuclear weapons programs could eventually pose a direct threat to the U.S. homeland.

If and when North Korea acquires a credible nuclear weapons delivery capability, the prospects for deterring North Korean nuclear aggression are very strong. Knowing that a nuclear strike against the United States would spell the end of the ruling regime, North Korea would be extremely unlikely to use nuclear weapons unless the survival of the regime was imminently threatened. If the regime were so threatened, the United States should expect North Korea to use any nuclear weapons capability it may have. An effective NMD would, in theory, give the president the option of threatening North Korea with regime change without risking a nuclear strike against the U.S. homeland.

Unfortunately, however, there is no convincing, independent evidence that NMD will ever offer a credible hedge against even a limited nuclear strike. The system has not successfully intercepted a target in any of the three highly scripted tests that have taken place during the past three years. For NMD ever to have an appreciable impact on a U.S. president's decision to put American cities at risk of a nuclear strike, the stakes would have to be enormously high and NMD would have to offer close to 100 percent reliability. No American president would or should bet an American city on anything less.

No other weapons program has cost so much but delivered so little. By contrast, the United States spends only \$1 billion per year on preventing the diversion of nuclear weapons, materials, and expertise by locking them down at their source and \$1 billion a year on buying new ships and planes for the Coast Guard. President Bush is right when he observes that a nuclear weapon in the hands of a terrorist enemy is the greatest threat to U.S. national security.<sup>74</sup> However, a terrorist would be more likely to attempt a strike by smuggling the weapon or its components into the United States, and not via ballistic missile. Due to the relative ease with which nuclear materials can be shielded from detection, terrorists who have acquired nuclear weapons or materials have a high probability of carrying out a successful attack.

The entire Ballistic Missile Defense program can be reduced in 2007 from \$8 billion to \$3 billion, and from \$45 billion to \$15 billion over the next five years.<sup>75</sup> This would allow the Pentagon to continue testing NMD and provide sufficient funding for such Theater Missile Defense programs as the Patriot (PAC-3) program, which protects the troops in the field.

*(Please refer to Tables 3A and 3B: Recommendations Balance Sheet on pages 33-34 for proposed savings from eliminating and slowing down the development of weapons systems.)*



## THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The U.S. nuclear posture is one element of a broader strategic posture that includes U.S. nuclear and conventional strike forces, defenses, preventive measures such as nonproliferation, and a technical base capable of developing new strategic capabilities in response to unforeseen developments. The U.S. strategic force posture contributes to the national defense by protecting the homeland against nuclear and other threats, deterring conflict, assuring allies of the U.S. commitment to their security, and actively shaping the strategic goals and calculations of current and potential adversaries. The strategic forces posture must be based on a realistic assessment of current and foreseeable threats, in light of the capabilities a current or potential enemy may use to attack the United States or its interests.

The Cold War mission for nuclear weapons – deterring massive nuclear weapons strikes or conventional assaults by aggressive major powers – has disappeared. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States has faced no geopolitical rival with both the

*intention* and the *capability* to threaten the national existence of the United States as the USSR once did. Instead, the United States faces a diverse range of lesser contingencies and a future that is marked by no small degree of uncertainty.

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***The strategic forces posture must be based on a realistic assessment of current and foreseeable threats.***

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Nuclear weapons are the ultimate insurance policy against existential threats. Though the United States currently does not face any existential threats and is very unlikely to do so in the future, as long as there is some possibility that a new existential threat will emerge, U.S. nuclear forces will continue to have an important role in the overall U.S. strategic posture.

Nuclear weapons also provide the United States with a hedge against sudden, tectonic shifts in the geopolitical environment – specifically, a Russia or China that rejects the path of global economic integration and turns to military force to achieve its strategic objectives. This hedging mission is the only remaining mission for which nuclear weapons are really suited because existing and potential threats – such as nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists or North Korea – can be far more effectively addressed through diplomatic or conventional military means.

The decision to use nuclear weapons rests with the president alone. There is no formula at the president's disposal for determining whether a nuclear strike is appropriate. Instead, the president would have to make a decision based on two judgments: a strategic judgment about the military and related costs and benefits of a nuclear strike, and a moral judgment about whether the military stakes justify the tens of thousands, and possibly millions, of civilian casualties that nearly any foreseeable use of nuclear weapons would cause. The president would have to make the call during a period that is likely to be characterized by significant uncertainty and enormous stress, with time being of the essence.

In order to connect nuclear strategy to real-life decision making and ensure that the president has realistic strategic options, the artificial firewall between the moral and strategic dimensions of nuclear strategy must come down. The interaction of the moral and strategic dimensions of nuclear strategy should be elaborated and fully integrated into nuclear planning in advance as much as possible, with the benefit of sober thought and due consideration, and not deferred to a time of crisis when stress is high and time is short.

There are two fundamental principles that as a moral matter should, and as a practical matter would, guide any American president's decision on whether to use

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***Uncertainty is and always will be a defining characteristic of the international environment. The United States should use its power to reduce, not amplify it.***

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nuclear weapons: a counterforce principle, according to which the United States does not intentionally target civilians; and a proportionality principle, which requires that the military value of destroying a target exceed collateral damage. These principles define the basic parameters of nuclear strategy and anchor the posture in American values, strengthening U.S. and allied confidence in the posture and amplifying the posture's credibility in the eyes of U.S. adversaries.

The United States has an unmatched and unprecedented ability to shape strategic reality. Uncertainty is and always will be a defining characteristic of the international environment. The United States should use its power to reduce, not amplify it. It must also adopt measures to reduce its vulnerability to strategic surprise by developing weapons, defenses, and infrastructure to nullify the capabilities that any adversary could bring to bear on the United States. Accomplishing these goals requires that U.S. nuclear forces planning be fully integrated with conventional military, diplomatic, and economic efforts to advance both short-term and long-term national security objectives, from

detering conflict and defeating adversaries to shaping the strategic development of China and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The United States should

strive to stabilize other states' expectations, reduce the chances that major powers clash, and make the consequences of aggression clear to extreme regimes while it is the sole military superpower.

However, as our defense strategy notes, stability is only one goal of U.S. strategic policy. The United States must be willing and able to take military action against states that harbor terrorists plotting attacks against the United States or its interests, threaten U.S. allies and other interests, and commit atrocities against their people.

In the current security environment, there is no realistic role for nuclear weapons against these threats because conventional weapons offer the United States a broad array of options to defeat these targets and because of the enormous collateral damage that nuclear weapons cause.

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***The United States spends more today  
on nuclear deterrence than it did  
during the Cold War.***

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An analysis of current and likely future threats is vital to ensuring that the United States directs resources to where they are likely to reap the largest security gains. A capabilities approach on its own, however, does not distinguish capabilities that an adversary is more likely to use against us from those that an adversary is less likely to use. Getting this calculation right is an essential component of rational defense planning. Despite the fact that the Soviet Union collapsed more than 15 years ago – and with it the real and present danger of total nuclear war – the United States spends more today on nuclear deterrence than it did during the Cold War.

In FY 2006, the Bush administration proposed spending nearly \$18 billion on its strategic and tactical nuclear forces: \$7 billion on nuclear weapons and activities and \$11 billion on delivery vehicles.<sup>1</sup> If one adds the \$7.8 billion that the Pentagon wants to spend on ballistic missile defense in FY 2006, it means that the United States will spend nearly \$26 billion a year on nuclear defense and deterrence.<sup>2</sup>

The United States faces two broad categories of contingencies that are relevant to determining the specific dimensions of the U.S. nuclear posture: immediate and remote. The use of these categories makes planning for U.S. nuclear forces more concrete by tying capabilities to specific threats, enabling clearer judgments about the trade-offs among different policy choices and plausible roles for nuclear and non-nuclear weapons in managing these contingencies.

***Immediate contingencies.*** Immediate contingencies are recognized present dangers that could involve the use of nuclear weapons against the United States or its interests. They include the acquisition of nuclear weapons or materials by a terrorist; a North Korean transfer of nuclear weapons or materials to terrorists and a North Korean invasion of South Korea; Iranian success at completing a nuclear fuel cycle; an Islamist revolution in Pakistan that results in religious extremists gaining custody of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal; a Chinese invasion of Taiwan following a Taiwanese declaration of independence; and efforts by other regional powers to use chemical or biological weapons as an instrument for asserting regional hegemony and threatening U.S. interests.

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***The United States has the potential to threaten most adversaries with overwhelming conventional force without having to rely on nuclear weapons to make the threat credible.***

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U.S. nuclear forces should have only a marginal role to play in addressing immediate contingencies because of the decisive strategic advantage afforded by U.S. superiority in conventional weapons. The United States has the potential to threaten most adversaries with overwhelming conventional force without having to rely on nuclear weapons to make the threat credible. Moreover, the United States would only use nuclear

weapons against military targets that are so critical to the enemy's ability to harm the United States or its interests that the benefits of a nuclear strike exceed the considerable collateral damage that any nuclear strike would likely cause. Few targets in these countries meet these stringent criteria.

U.S. conventional forces, once reconstituted and revitalized, will serve as an effective deterrent against the use of nuclear and other unconventional weapons against the United States by a wide array of actors. Nonproliferation and related defensive measures – such as strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to prevent states from pursuing nuclear weapons programs under the guise of civilian nuclear energy programs – are essential to neutralize immediate contingencies and contain plausible contingencies. Political, economic, and other non-military measures are also vital.

***Remote contingencies.*** These type of contingencies are extremely unlikely to materialize, but would be so grave that planning must account for the possibility that they may materialize. The rise of a militant, aggressive China or Russia that is hostile to the United States or our interests and willing to use violence to achieve its objectives fall in this category.

If these remote contingencies were to evolve into immediate contingencies, U.S. nuclear forces may play a critical role in deterring aggression. China and Russia are in periods of political and economic transition, and their future courses are uncertain. While it is unlikely that either country will adopt a militant course, the prospect cannot be ruled out. The United States must therefore retain a credible nuclear deterrent and sustain a technical and manufacturing capacity to make adjustments in nuclear forces should the security environment dictate. Due to the existing superiority and readiness of U.S. nuclear forces, however, any such adjustments are likely to be very minor.

At the same time, the United States must work to avoid letting its nuclear superiority cast a shadow over its relationships with these countries. The United States must continue to promote the economic and political integration of these regimes into global institutions. Cooperation on nonproliferation, arms control, and military-to-military exchanges is also critical.

A strong conventional force enables the United States to credibly deter, contain, and defeat threats and assure allies of the U.S. commitment to their security. Nuclear forces nevertheless serve an important role in U.S. defense strategy by giving the United States the ultimate insurance policy against the re-emergence of an existential or other catastrophic threat. The strategy should follow two principles: military targets are the only legitimate target for nuclear weapons; and any use of nuclear weapons must be proportionate to the threat. It should also strive to reduce strategic uncertainty to minimize surprising developments and the chances of an arms race.

## Recommendations

The United States should take the following steps:

- *Field a deployed arsenal of 600 warheads on Minuteman III ICBMs, Trident SSBNs, and B-2 and B-52H strategic bombers, with 400 weapons held in reserve.* A generous estimate of the number of critical military targets in China and Russia that only nuclear weapons could effectively hold at risk is several hundred each. A “600 + 400” arsenal would enable the United States to hold these targets, as well as the very limited number of such targets in extreme regimes, vulnerable with a high degree of certainty. An arsenal of this size would save nearly \$5 billion in 2006 and approximately \$40 billion throughout the next decade.
- *Maintain nuclear forces and prepare “surge capacity.”* The DoD and the Energy Department should retain the ability to sustain the technological readiness of the current force, and supplement it with additional forces should there be a dramatic shift in the international security environment.
- *Pursue a Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program on four conditions.* An RRW program should lead to ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by guaranteeing the end of U.S. nuclear testing; result in significant long-term cost savings; enable the permanent, irreversible dismantlement of several existing warheads for every new RRW; and not create new missions for nuclear weapons.
- *Make reducing strategic uncertainty a top goal of U.S. strategic policy towards Russia and China.* The greatest threats and challenges the United States faces – terrorism, proliferation, international crime, and other global issues – demand close cooperation in highly sensitive areas, such as intelligence sharing and nuclear weapons policy. A relationship defined at least in part by nuclear deterrence and mutual assured destruction breeds suspicion and acrimony, and creates unnecessary barriers to the sort of cooperation that countering 21<sup>st</sup> century threats requires.
- *Revitalize arms control with Russia.* The United States should negotiate a follow-on agreement to the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) with Russia that codifies further reductions, mandates the permanent dismantlement of excess warheads and creates new verification mechanisms, extends existing transparency and verification measures

(which are based on START I, a 1991 U.S.-Soviet/Russian arms control agreement) beyond their 2009 expiration, and includes tactical nuclear weapons in arms reduction.

- *Cease research and development of an advanced, earth-penetrating nuclear weapon (the “Bunker Buster”).* This gratuitous, destabilizing, and expensive weapons system not only lacks any practical use, but also sends precisely the wrong message about the U.S. commitment to nuclear non-proliferation.





## HOMELAND DEFENSE

Projecting power abroad to defend the homeland is a vital part of protecting the American people, but it is not sufficient. As the bombings in London and Madrid demonstrate, it is not enough to simply say, “We will continue to hunt down terrorists abroad, so we do not have to face them here at home,” as President Bush states.<sup>1</sup> Enemies, particularly violent extremists, must be confronted in the United States as well. The Department of Defense has a vital role in protecting the homeland, and it must recognize that homeland defense is one of its core missions.

U.S. homeland defense strategy has three primary components: detecting and disrupting potential terrorist attacks while safeguarding civil liberties; protecting critical infrastructure; and improving emergency planning, response, and recovery.<sup>2</sup> The Department of Defense has an important role to play in intercepting and

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*Projecting power abroad to defend the homeland is a vital part of protecting the American people, but it is not sufficient.*

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defeating the threat before it comes to American shores and assisting in times of overwhelming national crises, as in Katrina or the attacks of September 11.

### Recommendations

The following steps should be taken:

- *Integrate the DoD budget with those of other agencies involved in homeland security and defense.* This will allow the president and Congress to make cost-effective trade-offs across agency lines. It will enable the federal government to see that it is spending far too much money (\$8 billion) on developing an unproven National Missile Defense system and far too little on Coast Guard modernization (\$1 billion), given that a weapon of mass destruction is far more likely to be smuggled into the country in a seaborne container by stateless terrorists than launched in a ballistic missile by a foreign government.
- *Increase coordination among the DoD, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and other agencies in order to better complement each other's work.* As the 9/11 Commission and others have argued, the United States must move immediately to improve its domestic intelligence agencies, upgrade detection and warning systems, and improve border security. The military can help instill a joint culture

within the intelligence community, drawing from its own experience under Goldwater-Nichols during the past 20 years. The DoD must also be more willing to use its unique capabilities to enhance other security priorities, such as expanding its use of unmanned aerial vehicles, improving intelligence gathering and border security, and providing assistance in conducting planning and exercises.

- *Double the funding that the Pentagon allocates to homeland defense from \$10 to \$20 billion.* This would allow the DoD to increase its capabilities to support civil authorities in minimizing the damage and helping in the recovery from chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive attacks on the United States. The additional funds will also provide the National Guard with the equipment and training it needs to serve as first responders in an attack on the homeland.
- *Reorient the Army National Guard toward protecting the homeland against large-scale disaster.* This restructuring will require the Guard to emphasize such units as light infantry and military police as opposed to units with major combat functions such as armor and artillery. Enlarging the size of the active-duty Army, as recommended earlier in the document, will make this change possible by reducing the Army's dependency on the National Guard as a strategic reserve. In essence, the Guard should return to its core mission – a mission that it is good at and was created to do.
- *Strengthen the command structure of the National Guard to reflect its expanding real-time responsibilities.* At least two regional commands should be established between existing state headquarters and the National Guard Bureau to enhance homeland defense/disaster response planning and improve coordination with the U.S. Northern Command and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regions. Placing the National Guard in command of the existing 1<sup>st</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Army headquarters is one way to accomplish this.
- *Improve the active-duty response times of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to catastrophic disasters.* The military should not routinely be given lead responsibility for disaster planning and execution. When the president decides that the scale of a disaster exceeds the capacity of state and local governments to respond, however, NORTHCOM should be ready to act. This assistance should be provided in support of civil authorities, and continuity of civilian government in a crisis should be preserved whenever possible.

- *Prepare at least two active-duty Army divisions and a headquarters unit to bolster the Army National Guard in responding to a catastrophic disaster.* These forces would assist the Guard only at the direction of the president if the latter declares a national emergency. This collateral duty means that the active divisions and the headquarters' unit must conduct training and participate in homeland security exercises on a regular basis.
- *Add civilian first responders, such as police and firefighters, to the list of critical jobs that are currently prohibited from joining or remaining in the selected reserve.* Given the ongoing threat to the U.S. homeland, the Pentagon cannot continue to allow individuals with civilian jobs that are important to homeland security to join the National Guard and Reserve. Homeland defense is as integral to national security as combating terrorists abroad, and it requires dedicated personnel who cannot be called to extended duty away from their own communities.
- *Establish in each state a non-deployable homeland security corps of volunteer citizens with skills that are central to responding to catastrophic disasters.* Such volunteers would include doctors, nurses, construction workers, firefighters, police officers, communications experts, city planners, engineers, and social workers, among others. These units would serve as a back up for National Guard units, which will continue to be deployed away from their home states. Congress should increase the DHS budget by \$1 billion to pay for such a program.



## INTELLIGENCE

**T**imely, accurate intelligence is vital to the national defense. Together with command, control, communications, and surveillance, intelligence enables the United States to stay ahead of its enemies and tailor its military operations to combat the country's greatest threats.

The demands of ongoing military operations and the current international threat environment require the Department of Defense (DoD) to develop much more robust intelligence capabilities. In intelligence, as in other areas, the military is flush with hardware but lacks enough critical-skills personnel to undertake vital human intelligence operations.<sup>†</sup> Moreover, the DoD has no clear strategy to identify, train, and retain its human intelligence professionals.

The Intelligence Community is undergoing a massive transformation to adapt to the post-9/11 world. Acting on the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission,<sup>1</sup> Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which created the Office of Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to better coordinate the activities of the 15 agencies of the Intelligence Community, several of which are in the DoD.<sup>2</sup>

Barely a year into this transformation, intelligence reform has produced mixed results. Internecine squabbles – notably between the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) regarding covert operations, and between the Pentagon and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence on budget authority – have hindered progress. Consequently, the United States has yet to achieve the full potential of its intelligence gathering and analytic capabilities.

The Department of Defense must better coordinate its intelligence functions with the DNI. In addition, since approximately 80 percent of the U.S. intelligence budget is allocated to the DoD, it is imperative that the DNI maintain final budgetary sign-off on DoD programs that support the DNI, including the National Security Agency (NSA) and the National Reconnaissance Office.<sup>3</sup>

A newly created Strategy Support Branch, operating out of the Special Operations Command, is designed to develop new intelligence capabilities beyond battlefield preparations and other traditional military intelligence functions. These clandestine and covert operations would provide the DoD with more responsive

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<sup>†</sup> For more information, see “Better Spies, Better Intelligence: A Progressive Strategy for Creating a Professional Intelligence Corps,” *Progressive Priorities: An Action Agenda for America*, Center for American Progress, December 2005, available at <http://images1.americanprogress.org/il80web20037/cap/PPP.pdf>.

human intelligence capacity, including operations more commonly performed by the CIA like recruiting, training, and managing networks of intelligence assets.

The expansion of human intelligence operations will inevitably bring the Pentagon into new and perhaps unfamiliar operational areas. Thus, it is vitally important that the Pentagon operates under clear legal authority to conduct such operations, and that the DoD fully informs congressional intelligence committees of all clandestine actions as required by the National Security Act of 1947 (as amended in 2004). However, under this Act, for certain covert actions and with presidential certification, a briefing can be limited to just the majority and minority leaders of both houses of Congress and the chair and ranking members of each intelligence committees – the so-called “Gang of Eight.” Nevertheless, even in these cases, the full committees must eventually be briefed and a full explanation must be provided for the delay.

This requirement is particularly relevant given the president’s decision to brief only the “Gang of Eight” on the NSA’s warrantless domestic surveillance activities. Although that program was classified, it does not meet the definition of covert action – an action designed to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad without revealing the participation of the U.S. government – and therefore the full intelligence committees should have been informed. Additionally, as Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) has suggested in this instance, overly aggressive interpretations of legal authority could backfire on the Pentagon, resulting in congressional action to clarify and in some cases diminish the executive branch’s authority to respond to our enemies.<sup>4</sup>

DoD intelligence collection efforts must not – and need not – come at undue cost to the privacy rights of Americans. While the DoD must be provided with sufficient authority to investigate threats to military installations in the United States and abroad, any data collected in the course of its operations – including the database maintained by the Counterintelligence Field Activity, which contains information on American citizens regarding “threats” from within the country’s borders – must still comply with the Constitution and laws of the United States.<sup>5</sup>

## Recommendations

The following steps must be taken:

- *Improve coordination between the Department of Defense's intelligence agencies and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).* Better coordination will assist in integrating the DoD's intelligence activities with those of other agencies and eliminate duplication. The 9/11 Public Discourse Project, formerly the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (9/11 Commission), argues that information sharing among the intelligence agencies has not dramatically improved since the attacks of September 11. They state that the DNI must "exercise his authorities boldly to smash stereotypes, drive reform, and create a unity of effort — and act soon."<sup>6</sup>
- *Ensure that the DNI has final budget sign-off on national DoD intelligence programs, as provided under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004.* Under this Act, it is the DNI's responsibility to determine the annual budgets for all national intelligence agencies and offices (including the DoD) and to direct how these funds are spent.<sup>7</sup>
- *Implement a human capital plan for DoD intelligence personnel as recommended by the DNI's National Intelligence Strategy.*<sup>8</sup> A human capital plan can help managers identify resource needs and develop programs to recruit, train, and reward personnel with critical skills; align individual performance with agency goals by rewarding employees and units for achieving organizational goals; and improve coordination between DoD intelligence agencies and other agencies in the Intelligence Community. Such a plan would maximize the performance of intelligence personnel and ensure that the right people are recruited and trained for these crucial positions.
- *Coordinate DoD human intelligence (HUMINT) operations with other Intelligence Community HUMINT operations to form a complementary, not competitive or duplicative structure.* The president has designated the CIA as leader of HUMINT for the Intelligence Community, and the national human intelligence manager is a CIA official working out of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.<sup>9</sup> The Special Support Branch of the Special Operations Command must coordinate its clandestine operations with the chief human intelligence manager. The deputy director of national intelligence has indicated that the

Secretary of Defense and the CIA Director has signed a Memorandum of Understanding that seeks to prevent conflicts and overlap between DoD and CIA intelligence activities. DoD HUMINT operations should be limited to current or near-future military requirements. The CIA should retain control of HUMINT operations on all other threats.

- *Ensure that DoD clandestine operations (both domestic and international) comply with U.S. law and regulations.* The Foreign Intelligence Act of 1978 and the Criminal Wiretap Statute (known as Title III) are the exclusive means by which electronic eavesdropping can be conducted in the United States. Regardless of whether the president authorized the NSA to conduct warrantless domestic surveillance, the law and the Constitution are clear: it is illegal.<sup>†</sup> The extra-legal surveillance undermines the effectiveness of counterterrorism investigations because of the risk that courts will not allow the use of tainted evidence. The program must end immediately. The DoD must conduct regular briefings of the full intelligence committees in the House and the Senate to report on all intelligence operations. It is not sufficient to provide briefings only to the selected Members of Congress that make up the “Gang of Eight.” Necessary and proper oversight requires more. The absence of oversight is a detriment, not a benefit, to our national security. Collection activities about threats to domestic military installations must be conducted in accordance with U.S. law and the maintenance of any databases must comply with the Privacy Act.

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## **GLOSSARY OF TERMS**

**Civil Affairs Units:** Units whose job it is to administer an area that has been conquered until a new civilian government can be established. These units have people with skills in civilian areas such as law, public administration, engineering, and health.

**Delayed Entry Pool:** Men and women who have enlisted in the military but who will not report for basic training until some time in the future. Normally the service has about 35 percent of its enlistees in this pool at any given time.

**Family Separation Allowance:** A pay supplement received by military families to help pay for expenses while troops are away from home. Currently about \$250 per month.

**Imminent Danger Pay:** A pay supplement received by troops in combat zones. Currently about \$225 per month.

**Military Police:** Individuals whose military specialty is performing police functions in a combat environment, for example, arresting and guarding prisoners, stopping lootings, etc.

**Military Service Obligation:** An individual enlisting in the armed forces incurs an eight-year obligation to the service, regardless of how long he or she agrees to serve on active duty.

**Modularity:** The “modularity” initiative is a plan to radically transform the Army in order to address the rapidly changing realities of 21<sup>st</sup> century warfare. This restructuring – the Army’s largest shakeup in fifty years – encompasses both the active and reserve components of the force. The initiative re-organizes ground troops into individually deployable (“modular”) combat brigade teams of around 3,000-4,000 personnel, making them smaller and more flexible than the divisions they replace. Furthermore, by restructuring the force into brigades rather than divisions, the active Army will increase its total number of units of action available for deployment from 10 divisions to 42-48 combat brigades. Achieving modularity will require major changes, including new training programs, equipment, and facilities, as well as a recalibration of the mix of skills and occupational functions among the Army’s personnel.

**Recapitalizing the force:** Recapitalization is a long-term maintenance activity that invests in the future readiness of the Army by completely rebuilding used systems and returning them to a like-new, zero-miles standard. Recapitalization is also used to introduce selected upgrades to the current fleet.

**Resetting the force:** According to the Army, “resetting the force” means restoring a unit’s equipment to the desired level of combat capability for use in the unit’s next rotation or for other, unknown future contingencies. These actions include repairing existing equipment, replacing lost equipment, and recapitalizing equipment that needs extensive refurbishment.

**Stop-Loss:** The policy that prohibits a person in the service from leaving his or her unit to return to civilian life even though his or her term of enlistment has expired. This policy has been invoked for people in units that have received notification of being sent to Iraq or Afghanistan or are already in one of those countries.

**Term of Enlistment:** An individual joining the armed forces agrees to serve on active duty for a certain term, normally four years.



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