# CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS

## REMARKS ON THE RELEASE OF LAWRENCE J. KORB'S

## *THE ROAD TO NUCLEAR SECURITY.*

**SPEAKERS:**

**ROBERT MCNAMARA,**
**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,**
**1961 – 1968**

**JOSEPH CIRINCIONE,**
**SENIOR ASSOCIATE AND DIRECTOR OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION PROJECT,**
**CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE**

**LAWRENCE J. KORB,**
**SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS AND SENIOR ADVISOR, CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION**

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LAWRENCE KORB: If you have a cell phone, please turn it off or put it on mute or whatever.

Good morning. My name is Larry Korb. I'm here at the Center for American Progress and I want to welcome you to this discussion on a paper we put out on the *Road to Nuclear Security*. I want to thank first the Fourth Freedom Forum for their generous support of this endeavor, and this is a joint publication between the Center and the Fourth Freedom Forum. For those of you who don't know it, they have a Washington office and their main headquarters are out in South Bend, Indiana, at a small Catholic school there some of you may have heard of: Notre Dame.

I also want to thank Secretary McNamara, who gave me the idea and told me that this is something that needed to be done – that we needed to raise this issue to the level of public debate because for many people and many policymakers it's sort of been under the radar.

I want to thank Joe Cirincione for coming here to comment on the paper. All of you know Joe. He has really been a stalwart and a dynamo in this area. He's now at Carnegie.

I want to thank Peter Ogden, who helped me bring this publication to fruition. Two young interns – law school students who worked on it as well – Jessica Sartorious and Eric Tam. And then last but not least I want to thank Mor Vimmer, who did the design here. She works for us downstairs. She did a terrific job on the design. And to Antoine Morris and his colleagues for doing all of the logistics for this. And I'm pleased to see so many people here to get involved in this debate because we really do think it's important for – to have a public discussion, to have our Congress and the executive branch involved in this debate. And I also want to think Metro for providing free transportation this morning. (Laughter.)

Okay, let me say a few words about what's in the report and some of the recommendations that we've come up with. I think first of all there is really very little understanding of our strategic nuclear policy, the military utility of nuclear weapons, and even their moral and legal implications. Congress votes each year on funding a lot of these programs, but yet they do not have any access to the strategic integrated operations plan, the so-called SIOP, so they're being basically asked to vote $6 billion to $7 billion a year without understanding exactly what's involved.

And of course it is a critical time. The one thing that Senator Kerry and President Bush agreed on in the debate is the greatest danger facing this country is a nuclear weapon falling into the hands of a terrorist, but one of the points that we make in this report – yes, that is an issue, but the issue is much bigger and what you do in terms of

your whole strategic program – whole nuclear program – has a terrific impact on that area.

Let me say a few words about where we are. Right now, the United States has 10,000 strategic nuclear weapons, each of which has 20 times the explosive power of the bombs that were dropped on Hiroshima. And as we point out in the report, 140,000 people died instantly that day, and over the years the toll has gone up to about 250,000 people. We're spending in the 2005 budget $6.8 billion on our strategic nuclear program. We still have 2,000 targets in Russia and recently, as I was working on this paper, I saw that the number of targets for our land-based missiles had increased from 5(00) to 800.

The United States is working on two new nuclear weapons. Everybody has heard the so-called bunker-buster – the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator – and also a smaller nuclear weapon. In the 2004 budget there was very little discussion of this. We basically laid the groundwork for these two new nuclear weapons. But fortunately in the 2005 budget, thanks to a very, very courageous Republican congressman from Ohio, David Hobson, the money for these weapons was taken out of the budget. Those were buried in the omnibus bill that was passed and in our view really didn't get the attention that it should have.

Our nuclear doctrine: basically we have never – the United States has never renounced no-first-use and since September 11th if anything we've moved closer to first use. In fact, that's one of the reasons we're developing the smaller nuclear weapons to make them more usable. The United States has deployed or is attempting to deploy – the test did not go well yesterday – a national missile defense, which is sending signals to the rest of the world about what our intentions are, and we're spending more on the national missile defense than we are on buying up the strategic nuclear weapons and fissile materials in the Soviet Union.

Russia and the United States still have their nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert. With 15 minutes of notice we could be launching nuclear weapons. And while nobody argues that we are targeting each other the way we did in the Cold War, given what's happened in Russia the chances of an accidental launch have increased dramatically.

We do have – the administration's attitude toward nonproliferation basically is making it less likely we'll be able to control those weapons and the fissile materials that could fall into the hands of the terrorists. If you saw Graham Allison's new book, he mentions that if we were to have a bomb explode in Times Square – a nuclear weapon – rather than 2,400 people that were killed, it could be up to a million people, yet the administration has refused to submit the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to the Senate even though the objections that the Senate had last time were worked out by General Shalikashvili. At the last day of the Democratic convention with very little fanfare the administration announced that they would not allow inspections and verification under the Fissile Material Control Treaty.

To the administration's credit, there is a Strategic Reduction Treaty, the so-called SOR Treaty, which by the end of this decade will reduce the number of strategic offensive weapons on alert to between 1,700 to 2,200, but we just take the weapons off alert. We don't have to get rid of them. And by the time this treaty expires, the United States will still have 5,000 strategic nuclear weapons in its inventory.

The administration has pushed, to its credit, the Proliferation Security Initiative, which allows some 15 nations to interdict weapons of mass destruction on the high seas, but they've made it difficult for a lot of nations to join us because they have not ratified the Law of the Sea Convention, which would give legality to those stops on the high seas.

The president did get the G8 to pledge money to dry up the fissile material – to get rid of the fissile materials in the former Soviet Union, but if you looks closely we did not pledge any new money, nor did the Europeans pledge any new money, so really we're not moving at the rate that we should.

And where are we now? I mean, if you look we've got 358 sites in some 58 countries that have uranium. Over 40 percent of that is in Russia. And this is not a new problem. You can go back – Bill Richardson, when he was secretary of energy, appointed a committee headed by Ambassador and former Senator Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler, which basically said that this was the greatest threat to the United States and this was reported before September 11th.

So basically let me very quickly read some of the recommendations that we came up with to deal with this situation. First of all, we think it's important that the president in the beginning of his second administration initiate a National Security Council review of the SIOP and should report those findings to the Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Intelligence Committees so Congress can get involved in this debate.

As you may know, Senator Robert Kerrey – Bob Kerrey from Nebraska – wrote to then Secretary of Defense Cohen asking about this and basically did not receive an answer to the letter. We've got to expand and accelerate the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. We spent more on one year of national missile defense than we have on a decade for spending there. We've got to improve inspections and monitoring for all nuclear weapons and materials worldwide, and account for, secure, and destroy all excess nuclear materials.

The G8 partnership should be invigorated. It should really be. That is a great forum for getting the rest of the world working on that, and we need to ensure that the pledge money is spent and even increase it if we have to. The combination of us and the G8 – they're talking about $20 billion; it's $30 billion just to clear up materials in Russia alone. Both the CTBT and the Fissile Material Control Treaty should be enacted as quickly as possible and the United States should certainly take the lead.

We hope that the administration heeds Congressman Hobson's advice and does not send money up next year to develop the mini-nuke and the bunker-buster because that

exact sends the wrong signal to the rest of the world that we're trying to eliminate nuclear weapons, or control them, are developing new weapons and basically having an aggressive strategy for using them sends the wrong signal. I think that national missile defense should – we should continue to test it, but not rush ahead with the deployment.

And then finally the United States needs to take the lead in negotiating a grand bargain with North Korea and Iran. Certainly we can't stand on the sidelines and let those two countries continue to develop their nuclear weapons without the United States being involved.

That basically summarizes what's in the paper. Now I'm going to ask Joe Cirincione to talk about the whole Nonproliferation Treaty and what we need to do in that area.

JOSEPH CIRINCIONE: Thank you very much, Larry. And thank you to the Center for American Progress and for the Fourth Freedom Foundation for hosting this event. These are beautiful new offices. I am very, very jealous. Carnegie's not too shabby, but this is really nice. It's a pleasure to be down here and it's an honor to be on the same podium and the same stage as former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.

I'm going to keep my remarks fairly brief because we have a lot of expertise in the audience and I think we could benefit from a group discussion of this excellent new report. I want to thank you, Larry, for reviving the debate on these issues. I think this is coming at exactly the right time. You start off in the beginning of your report talking about how there's been a nuclear revival in the – in this – in the Bush administration and I completely agree.

This administration came in with an already organized set of policy recommendations and a strategic vision that had been hammered out in think tanks in Washington in the years of exile that the Republicans suffered during the eight years of the Clinton administration. They came in with a very clear view of what they wanted to do. They hit the ground running. The kind of studies that Keith Payne, for example, had produced over at the National Institute for Public Policy actually became the Nuclear Posture Review. That's a lesson for all of us. That's a lesson for all of us on how to do this.

The importance of this study is that, number one, it provides a very good reality check for the current administration and should be able to help inform them as they continue in their deliberations. I think there's a number of recommendations in here that the second Bush administration could well adopt; for example, increasing funding and political attention to efforts to secure loose nukes and loose nuclear materials in the states of the former Soviet Union, but if they do not accept the well-considered recommendations of this report, this report could serve as the basis for the development of an alternative policy – one that the next administration could bring in. And as everyone knows, the campaign for the presidency begins the day after the previous campaign has ended. So this kind of discussion I think is vitally needed. I think this is

an excellent start to the discussion we have to have for the rest of the year and, indeed, for the rest of the four years.

Let me just comment briefly on some of the aspects of this report. Are these mikes okay? Can you hear me okay? It's kind of fading in and out a little bit. I agree with the basic way Larry has structured the argument. I see it very similarly. From my standpoint the United States faces nuclear threats coming at us from four directions. The first is the nuclear terrorist threat, and in my mind this is the greatest challenge we face. I think this is actually – if we are going to see a nuclear weapon exploded in the next 10 years I believe it will be exploded by a nuclear terrorist or by a terrorist group. The risk is we now have groups that are intent on causing mass destruction and there is the increasing availability of these materials.

We have not done the job in Russia. It's going too slowly. It's still incomplete. The people who are doing it are beginning to lose faith in the effort. People will tell you who were close to this that many of the U.S. and Russian officials are tired. They don't feel that they're getting pushed from their leadership. I think we're at risk of seeing these programs not only fail to make more progress, but actually slide backwards. The current estimates are that it would take us at least 13 years to finish the job, but that's if everything keeps going at its current pace. There's a great need to accelerate these programs and get the job done while we have this window of opportunity, before conditions change either in Russia or in the United States.

But it's not just Russia we have to worry about. My greatest fear actually is Pakistan, a country where we believe that nuclear materials are currently well safeguarded, but the political situation in that country is so tenuous that if President Musharraf's motorcade is just 10 seconds slower next time we could see that country plunge into chaos. If the government were to fall for whatever reason – if the Army were to split – very serious and troubling questions about who would get the weapons, who would get the materials, who would get the scientists and technicians who know how to build those weapons.

Most countries in the world do not share the U.S. perception that nuclear terrorism is a serious and growing danger. I think that's changing somewhat. Colleagues who have recently come back from Russia report that after the Chechen terrorist attacks in Beslan there's a new appreciation of the threat. The Chechen terrorists have done things that in some ways are more horrible than what al Qaeda has done to us. My number one terrorist risk right now is actually the Chechens. They're closer to the materials. They clearly are intent on causing large casualties. We know that before the Chechen seizure of the Moscow opera house, for example, they considered taking over a Russian nuclear facility outside Moscow. I'd be very worried about the nuclear terrorist threat hitting not us, but the Russians first.

The other threat that's coming at us is the threat of new nuclear weapons states, particularly North Korea, which as Larry points out may have enough material for up to nine nuclear bombs, and of course Iran, who is on a determined course to acquire the

capabilities to build nuclear materials. As the report points out, and we sort of elaborate this in the Carnegie study, Universal Compliance, in order to address the issue of Iran you can't just deal with this as an Iran-specific problem.

It raises the issue of whether any new nation should be allowed to acquire the capabilities to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium; technologies that are necessary for producing and reprocessing nuclear fuel, but can also be used to make nuclear bombs. If you're going to solve the Iran problem, you have to solve the Brazil problem. No one believes that Brazil is on a path to develop a nuclear weapon, but they do want to open up a new uranium enrichment capability. It is extremely difficult to tell Iran that they can't have it, but tell Brazil or South Korea that they can have it. There has to be one universal standard and it has to apply to all enrichment capabilities. It's untenable to think that you can just have a new double standard. In addition to some states being able to have nuclear weapons and others not, you cannot now have a standard that says some countries can enrich uranium and others cannot. This is the greatest single challenge, I think, facing the nonproliferation regime: reforming the nuclear fuel cycle.

The third nuclear threat is something that this report helps bring great attention to and that's the danger from existing arsenals. We have been lulled into a false sense of complacency. It's really astonishing to read one of the opening sentences of this report and realize that we have the same nuclear posture now as we did during the height of the Cold War. The only thing that's different is that we have fewer weapons deployed and we've actually detargeted these weapons. That is, we're maybe 60 seconds away from being able to target these weapons on former Russian sites, and they 60 seconds away from being able to target them back on us.

The danger still remains and my fear is that we sort of – you know, we live in the present and we sort of assume that tomorrow's going to be pretty much like today and we just extend that idea forward and we think, well, Russia 10 years from now is going to be pretty much like Russia is today. Maybe not. Maybe not, either in its attitude towards the United States or in its nuclear capabilities.

As Larry points out in the report, Russia's approach to the U.S. maintaining high levels of existing nuclear arsenals is to try to extend the life of their SS-18s and SS-19s. This is a high risk operation. I cannot believe that we're not going to see a nuclear accident in Russian strategic forces over the next 10 years if they continue to try and stretch the operational lifetime of those nuclear systems. It just increases the chance of a nuclear accident, of an unintentional launch, of confusion that might lead to an unauthorized nuclear launch.

Finally, the fourth danger I see is the collapse of the nonproliferation regime. And for our European colleagues this is actually their number one danger. This is actually what they worry about the most. The fear that the U.S. is withdrawing its support from this 50-year effort of Republicans and Democrats, liberals and conservatives, to constrain the nuclear acquisitions if not altogether stop them.

It's something that's been highly successful. We only have eight nuclear states, with North Korea knocking on the door, rather than the 15, 20, or 25 that many feared, but if we fail here, if we fail in Iran, if we fail in North Korea, if the U.S. continues to give signals that nuclear weapons are vital to a nation's national security, then I'm afraid we could see the collapse of this regime and the emergence of many new nuclear weapons states.

I think I've hit most of the points I wanted to make on this. I do have two things to say. One, you've got to talk about missile defense. You've got to talk about missile defense, particularly with the – I agree with the recommendation in here. I believe the missile defense system has to be depoliticized and fundamentally restructured.

Folks, we've got ourselves one big, fat, frozen turkey up there in Alaska. I mean, I think this is going to go down as Bush's Folly. I really do. When Secretary of State Seward purchased Alaska in 1867 for $7.2 million, that deal looked better and better as it went along. This is looking worse and worse. We are now pumping into missile defense five times the amount that Seward paid for Alaska and we're doing it every day – every day – and we have a very, very low return on our investment.

I believe that this system is going to collapse of its own weight. To be quite honest, I don't think we're going to stop it. I think the military is going to stop it and it's going to happen pretty much the way it played out with the Safeguard system. As defense budgets flatten out and perhaps shrink because of increased budgetary pressure, that $11 billion honey-pot just looks sweeter and sweeter to military officials looking for funds for their truly important military needs and I think you're going to start to see pressure inside the military to reduce the military – the anti-missile system budgets. The performance of those systems just doesn't justify the high investment that's being poured into them.

Finally, there's just a couple of small disagreements I have with this report. One is on page six where he talks about the Russian response to the U.S. and Putin's claim that he has launched a new – fundamentally new weapon, what you refer to as a space cruise missile. I just don't buy that. I don't believe it. I think Putin's remarks were just puffing up existing capabilities trying to impress the military leaders that he was talking to that he, Putin, was providing them with the best weapons possible. This is a syndrome that we're all well familiar with. I believe what he's talking about is just the existing SS-27, the Topol missile, with a maneuvering warhead. Nothing new or particularly frightening about this system.

I would say the Russians are concerned – that the overall point is correct. We just had a conference with Russian officials at Carnegie yesterday and your point about how other countries view our development of new nuclear weapons is very true. The Russians believe that our earth-penetrators are aimed at them. They believe – and Alexei Arbatov told us, as other Russian officials at Carnegie said, it's the universal belief that the reason we're developing them is to get at the Russian underground sites – to get at the Russian silos; that that's what we're after. And so this is a clear demonstration of how U.S.

nuclear policy decisions do affect other countries' policy decisions. You often hear this; that the proliferation of nuclear weapons has nothing to do with our nuclear posture. Nonsense. Nonsense. Things that we say, things that we do have real-world impact. That's why we say them. That's why we do them. They just don't often have the impact we intend and the Russian case is a clear example of that.

There's a couple of other minor quibbles, but I'll give them to you as asides after the session. Thank you very much.

MR. KORB: Okay, Joe.

Secretary McNamara?

ROBERT MCNAMARA: I also want to thank Larry and Joe for their comments and all of you for attending this morning. I don't have much to add to what they've said. At the risk of appearing simplistic and provocative, I would characterize the U.S. nuclear force structure and war plans today as immoral, illegal, militarily unnecessary, very, very dangerous – in terms I'll mention in a moment – and destructive of the nonproliferation regime. And if you disagree with that – I realize it's a damning indictment and if you disagree with it, we can – I hope will – discuss the disagreements during the question and answer period.

There are two particular recommendations I would make in addition to supporting those that Joe and Larry have made. The first is to remove the 2,000 weapons we have on hair-trigger alert from alert. It's insane and very, very dangerous for reasons that they have alluded to. Lee Butler, a longtime commander of the Strategic Air Command, strongly recommends removal from alert. And we don't have time, I suspect, to really go through the procedures that are in existence today for launch of those alert weapons, but they would scare you. They scare me and they would scare you. They scare Lee Butler and we ought to remove those from alert. That's one point. It would not be difficult. The military wouldn't oppose it.

The second point: this whole discussion is wasted here. You're not the people we ought to be talking to. There's never been – if anybody in the audience believes otherwise, please correct me. You cannot find a congressional hearing on this subject that in any way illuminates the points that have been made here this morning. There's never been a thoughtful congressional hearing.

A former chief of our disarmament agency and I went – along with a four-star retired officer went to five NATO countries and urged them not to change NATO policy, but to raise the issue of NATO policy for discussion in NATO. Not a single country was willing to do it because the U.S. put immense pressure on them. One of the prime ministers said to me, "Bob, you don't seem to recognize reality." He said, "Where do you think our exports go?" implying that the U.S. would put up barriers to their exports if they even pushed for discussion – not for change, but for a discussion.

It's never been properly discussed in NATO. It's never been properly discussed in the Congress. That's the most important single thing. If we could raise this to public awareness it would make a tremendous amount of difference.

There are tremendous risks here for no military purpose. Today, our military – our nuclear weapons have no military utility other than to deter an opponent from their use. If the opponent had none, we don't need any. That's very clear. We should discuss that if you disagree. But there's a tremendous cost to our present position, apart from the financial cost. I've long thought that we could afford anything we need; I don't care whether it's a missile defense, which I am totally opposed to, which is going to be very, very expensive, but we can afford whatever we need for defense. There's no question in my mind about that, but we should not accept risks that are unnecessary, and that's what we're doing.

In roughly 45 years of association with nuclear force levels or nuclear war plans I have never seen a piece of paper that shows how at any time during those 45 years, and certainly not today, we could launch a nuclear weapon – initiate the launch of a nuclear weapon against either a nuclear state or a nonnuclear state with benefit to the U.S. – none. I've made that statement before NATO defense ministers, before supreme allied commanders – I remember one meeting in particular chaired by a defense minister, attended by an old friend of mine, a very, very bright, able, four-star officer – the supreme allied commander in Europe – and neither one of them refuted it. It's never been rebutted. You can't rebut it. And yet, we're incurring tremendous risks.

I was at Aspen, Colorado, a few weeks ago – two or three months ago perhaps – on a panel with Sam Nunn and he was discussing – we were discussing this issue and he raised the points that Larry and Joe have, particularly with respect to fissile materials and the lack of control of their production, storage, and distribution, and he said there was inadequate financing. Now, as you know, he was one of the authors of the Nunn-Lugar Bill and now he heads a foundation that is being financed by Ted Turner, a major objective of which is to control the fissile materials across the world.

And if you don't believe it's in need of control, buy Graham Alison's recent book, *Nuclear Terrorism*. It's sort of a how to do. If you were a terrorist and you wanted to know how to get hold of fissile materials, you should buy that book because it tells you where they are and it tells you how to get hold of them and it tells you there've been several attempts already, one or two of which may have succeeded, most of which failed. But it tells you how to overcome the failures. This is a very serious problem and Sam Nunn said that it was inadequately financed – the counter program was inadequately financed, so I said to him, "Well, how much more do you need?" "Well," he said, "I think the U.S. needs to spend $1 billion more per year on that program to control fissile material production, assure control over storage and distribution.

Now, we spend roughly $400 billion a year, a little more perhaps, on our defense budget. It's insane. At the margin I can't think of anything more important than $1 billion more to control these fissile materials. And if you don't believe it's necessary,

ready what Bill Perry, former secretary of defense, a scientist, a very wise individual not given to exaggeration – read what he said in the National Academy of Sciences here in August a few months ago. He said – these are almost the exact words – there's a greater than 50 percent probability of a nuclear detonation on U.S. soil within 10 years. And turn to page 59 of Graham Allison's book on nuclear terrorism. He said on that page essentially the same thing. They're not alarmists. They're realists.

It's insane for us, with no military utility to these weapons, with these huge inventories we have – by the way, there's a new book that's just being published by Tom Graham, the former ambassador in charge of our disarmament program on nuclear issues. He says one bomber today can carry from our 6,000 strategic warheads, enough bombs to have a destructive power greater than was used by both sides in World War Two. That's the situation we're in. It is absolutely insane unless you think you've got a bunch of irresponsible leftists up here in front of you.

Let me read what senior military and political security experts have said. I could go on for 20 minutes. I'll only read four or five excerpts. In December, 1995, the Stimson Center here in Washington published a report of a group, which included I think it was four four-star officers. The group was chaired by Andy Goodpaster, President Eisenhower's military assistant and the former supreme allied commander in Europe. And it recommended elimination of nuclear weapons.

The Canberra Commission in August, 1996, made the same recommendation. The members of the commission included Michel Rocard, the former prime minister of France; Joe Rotblat, one of the original designers of the nuclear bomb who later received the Nobel Peace Prize; Field Marshal Lord Michael Carver, the former chief of the British Defense Staff; Lee Butler, as I said, the former commander of the U.S. Strategic Command; myself and one or two others. The commission's recommendations were unanimous: eliminate nuclear weapons under verifiable conditions. And they said that is possible and they discussed how it could be done.

And in 1997, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences said that the U.S. and Russia could reduce their nuclear forces, which as you hear are something on the order of 10,000 for us, 20,000 for them today, to something the level of 2,000 within a few years. And that they then could go down to 1,000 and ultimately to 300. Now, whether you're talking about elimination in total or moving to reduce the risk of destruction of humanity – and by the way, if you haven't read it, dig up and reread the report of the Catholic Bishops, which was put out in about 1987. It's a damning indictment, on moral and other grounds, of our present policies.

And then by 1982, five of the then seven retired chiefs of the British defense staff stated that under no circumstances would they have recommended or supported the initiation and the use of nuclear weapons.

And Lord Mountbatten – I think it was one year before he was murdered – said, "As a military man, I can see no use for nuclear weapons." And Field Marshall Lord

Carver, who is still alive, says he's totally opposed to NATO ever initiating use of nuclear weapons. And this is something I doubt that many of you in the room know, that Mel Laird, who was Nixon's first secretary of defense, said, quote, "A worldwide zero nuclear option with adequate verification should be our goal. These weapons are useless for military purposes," unquote.

And Helmut Schmidt, who is still alive, the former defense minister of Germany and the former chancellor of Germany, said, quote, "Flexible response" – which is my term for somewhat modification of the bigger bang for a buck theory – "Flexible response" – which was NATO's strategy, calling for use of nuclear weapons in response to a Warsaw Pact non-nuclear attack on Western Europe – "Flexible response," says Schmidt, "is nonsense – not out of date, but nonsense. The Western idea created in the '50s that we should be willing to use nuclear weapons first in order to make up for our so-called conventional deficiency has never convinced me."

Those of us up here are proposing what many think are radical, irresponsible propositions – you are not alone. You will not be alone if you move in this direction.

Thank you.

MR. KORB: Thank you, Bob. And we now have about 45 minutes for questions and comments. What I'd ask you to do is, A, wait for the microphone, and then, B, identify yourself and tell us who you want the question directed to.

Stan? Okay, here it comes. Antoine used to run track so –

Q: Stan Crock from Business Week. I have a question about Nunn-Lugar. The Russians do get a vote in how fast this goes, and there have been some problems negotiating U.S. access and things like that. Since you're dealing with a kleptocracy, you want to be careful about whether the money is actually going for the purported purpose. How do you resolve these kinds of issues?

MR. KORB: Joe, do you want to –

MR. CIRINCIONE: Let me start. Just yesterday at Carnegie we had an all-day session with Russians and Americans on Russian and American nuclear cooperation. Rose Gottemoeller organized it for us. Charlie Curtis was there, the second in command, I guess the chief operating officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative. And he said to the administration spokesperson who was there: "I can't believe that these problem could not be resolved if the presidents of the two countries wanted them resolved." And I basically agree with that point of view.

There are serious bureaucratic issues. As you know, Stan, one of the issues is the Russian concern about liability during the cleanup of some of its nuclear sites. These are not insurmountable problems. Russian issues about security: they still don't really trust us, in many ways – not insurmountable issues. If the president of the United States were

to spend a few hours on this issue – if the two presidents were to spend a few hours discussing it together, I believe that they could resolve these issues very quickly and these bureaucratic obstacles could be resolved and the programs could move forward in a much more efficient manner than they are now.

MR. KORB: I want to second. I think if the president made this a priority with President Putin, it could happen. As you all know, having been in any government, that if the top-level people, say, make it happen, it's amazing how quickly you can make things happen.

Bob?

MR. MCNAMARA: What is insurmountable is the present risk. There is, I would say, 100 percent certainty that the indefinite combination of human fallibility and nuclear weapons will lead to their use. This was the unanimous statement of the members of the Canberra Commission. I've believed that for years. I think Bill Perry believes it. That is insurmountable unless we change our policies, and we've got to get that out in front of the public and then it needs to be debated in the Congress.

MR. KORB: Yeah, up here. Okay, go here and then we'll go there. Go back and forth from right to left.

Q: Nick Berry, Foreign Policy Forum. It seems the issue of prestige is very important to the United States, Russia, Britain, France, China. How do you deal with the issue of prestige, that it gives this aura of power and strength?

MR. KORB: Let me say – and Joe made the point here that we cannot say to Iran, you can't have them but, Brazil, you can. I think we have to be clear: it's not the countries, it's the weapons that should really concern you if you want to stop this proliferation. And I think if you can plug the loopholes in the Nonproliferation Treaty and the United States leads by example, I think that will show. In other words, if the United States, the world's preeminent power, says these are not a sign of strength but a sign really of weakness, and we're moving to downplay it, I think that will have a big impact. But I think your point is well taken because we do know that certain countries think, you know, if you get them it gives you the prestige.

The other thing to be careful of is the United States has this aggressive policy of using them. Well, I then want to develop them so you won't use them against me. I mean, I think we see that in the aftermath of what happened with the invasion of Iraq. I mean, people said, we got to get in there quick before Saddam gets a nuclear weapon. Well, if I'm in Iran, I say, well, you know, I'm next on this axis of evil list; I'm going to move in that direction even if it doesn't make any sense for me overall.

MR. CIRINCIONE: Let me add just real quickly, one of the ways you do that is you reward people for not getting nuclear weapons. So, for example, Libya has been rewarded over the last year for giving up its nuclear weapons. It is gaining the kind of

access to Western markets and Western contracts that it wanted. But in a little noted story just last month, Qaddafi was complaining that he wasn't happening – he wasn't getting enough, and his complaints I thought were legitimate. This is a very short-sighted policy. We should be moving more aggressively to turn Omar Qaddafi from the poster boy of a rogue leader to the poster boy for nonproliferation. Show other nations that your country's future is more assured when you give up nuclear options.

One other reward, the UN expert panel just made a very wise decision, I think, in their recommendations of how to enlarge the Security Council. It's no secret that one of India's motivations for going nuclear was its belief that this would enhance its case for acquiring a permanent seat in the Security Council. The expert panel recommended that a number of nations be given permanent seats, including South Africa, which gave up the nuclear option; Japan, which is resisting any pressures to acquire nuclear weapons; Germany, and Brazil, as well as India be given permanent seats. So that's one of the ways that you try to overcome that prestige problem.

MR. KORB: Bob?

MR. MCNAMARA: Well, prestige is still a factor leading nations to do it. In the case of India, it is said that they acquired them to defend themselves against China. I don't believe it a bit. They acquired them primarily because of prestige. They felt they were discriminated against. I was sent out there to negotiate with them to prevent them from going nuclear. Obviously I failed.

But today I don't think prestige is the factor it once was. Today, risk is a very important factor. I'm not saying that prestige doesn't influence it, but risk is a primary factor, and we're not addressing that. Look at North Korea. If I were North Korea I'd be moving toward nuclear weapons. If I were Iran I'd be moving toward nuclear weapons. If I were Israel, I'd have them. We've got to address this issue of risk, and we're not doing it, and the only way to do it in certain circumstances is to provide security guarantees. We say, well, we won't provide a security guarantee to North Korea. We give in to their blackmail.

I was one of those who provided a security guarantee to Cuba to get rid of the Soviet missiles. Why not? We never had an intention of invading Cuba. I don't think we ever had an intention – perhaps the administration would like a regime change in North Korea, but I don't think we ever had any intention of invading North Korea to get a regime change. If we did, we're out our mind.

So we've got to address this question of risk. It's at least as important as prestige.

MR. KORB: Okay, over here.

Q: Greg Kilman (ph), a former State Department official. I guess this question could be addressed to anyone here.

I noticed – perhaps first to Larry since we're reacting to his report. I noticed that there was no specific call for negotiating a strategic offensive arms reduction treaty, and what I'm wondering is why we all keep pretending that there is a treaty. I think particularly from this center, the word should go forth that any time SORT is mentioned, it should be preceded by "the sham" Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty. This was a treaty negotiated in 2002 by Undersecretary Bolton, someone who is hostile to all treaties and said that this will be the last one.

He negotiated a treaty with no verification mechanism, a treaty which on the day, on the minute, on the second it goes into force it will go out of force, a treaty that blew away our chance for the START II elimination of the SS-18 missile that Joe made reference to, which I guess is something that President Bush – he must have looked into the SS-18 Satan silo soul and found out that he liked it because he is the one that is making possible extending the life of these aging missiles, and missiles which were – it used to be conventional wisdom – inherently destabilizing.

So it seems to me that rather than beating around the bush we should stop pretending that there is an arms control agreement here and say that it should be a very high priority to negotiate one, and not, unlike the last one, to choose a level that was agreed to already by Clinton and Yeltsin in 1997, and freezes at that level for the year 2012 for one second, but rather to at least take a level that is half of that, that the Russians have consistently expressed a willingness to accept, and negotiate accordingly.

MR. KORB: Yeah, I agree with you. I guess I didn't make that explicit enough when I talked about the flaws that you pointed out in the treaty. I guess I should have said then you really ought to follow it with another one.

One of the things I point out in there – you know, it doesn't demand any compliance before that date; it has no inspections or verification, as you said. And I also make the point, which I didn't make in my opening remarks because of time, it doesn't cover the tactical weapons in the U.S. arsenal, about 500 of which are deployed in six countries in Europe. The United States is the only country in the world that deploys nuclear weapons outside its own borders.

And I don't know if you –

MR. CIRINCIONE: No, I complexly agree and I know the Russians would welcome a chance to negotiate a treaty that had a schedule, that had verification mechanisms, that went down to much lower levels. As you know, President Putin wanted to go down to about 1,000 strategic warheads.

This is in our national security interest to reduce the Russian arsenal to the lowest possible number while we have the chance to do so, and if the price for that is to reduce our arsenal down to the lowest possible numbers, that's a benefit as far as I could see, not a cost.

MR. MCNAMARA: I totally agree with that, and I agree we should negotiate a treaty, but there is a treaty: Article VI of the Nonproliferation Treaty, which is law. We're bound by that law. The treaty was ratified by the Senate. Article VI says the five declared powers – nuclear powers, including the U.S. – will negotiate in good faith toward the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. So I don't think any president, any chairman of the Joint Chiefs, any secretary ever intended to do that, but that is the law.

Now, we need a new treaty, I very much agree, but we should start by recognizing we're bound and we're not adhering to the treaty we already have.

MR. KORB: Okay, over here.

Q: Hi, I'm Tom Collina with 20/20 Vision and I take to heart your call to start a public debate on these issues. That's one of the things my organization is trying to do. But we have some competition out there and it's in the form of the Iraq war. It's hard to compete with that in terms of trying to get the public concerned about security issues. Nor do I think we should. I think we should, in a sense, try to see the Iraq war as an opportunity to engage the public on a broader set of security issues.

So I guess my question to you is, how can we use the Iraq war as an opportunity to try to engage, educate the American public on these related issues, but issues that if we try to keep them separate I'm afraid will always be under the radar screen?

Thanks.

MR. KORB: Well, I guess one of the things is that in the presidential debates both candidates admitted that a nuclear weapon falling in the hands of a terrorist group like al Qaeda – and this is supposedly one of the reasons we invaded Iraq. The other is you went after Iraq because you said they had nuclear weapons. Remember, the president made – and I think you can say, well, okay, if it's that dangerous, then what are we doing about it and how can we take the lead in lessening the danger?

I think the point that Bob and Joe made, and we try to make in here, is the public isn't aware of that. And, you know, I don't know if the American people will read Graham's book but if the terrorists read it then we've got a big problem here.

But, I mean, I think that's the way to do it. I mean, I've seen some references to Graham's book, talking about – and I think George Will has written about it, so there is something out there that you can use, I think, as a hook to get people involved and say, and, oh, by the way, did you know you're also in danger from an accidental launch? Are you aware of the fact that we really don't have an arms control – you know, a real treaty. I think if you can use that as a hook – do you want to comment?

MR. CIRINCIONE: Just a couple of things. I happened to be in Chicago talking to a local peace group there, about 300 people, the day after Congressman Hobson

succeeded in eliminating funding for the new nuclear weapons in the budget. And when I announced that to the group, this mighty roar went up. You know, people are aware of these issues; they're engaged in these issues; they have identified stopping new nukes as one of their goals, and we just won a remarkable victory, thanks to the courage and wisdom of a conservative Republican congressman from the Midwest – from Ohio. That battle may not be over, although, frankly, I bet – see if I'm right – I bet the administration does not submit funding for those weapons in the new budget. I think they'll take a pass on this issue. They understand that Hobson has the votes to stop them again.

And if that happens, we should point that out. We should keep these issues alive among our constituency. There are victories to be won – some of them in opposition with the administration, some of them with the administration. We have to keep that positive vision out there for those of us, like 20/20 Vision, who engage in this kind of grassroots work.

MR. KORB: We did invite Congressman Hobson today. Unfortunately he's back in the district.

Bob, did you want to comment?

MR. MCNAMARA: Well, I wouldn't use Iraq as a foundation on which to address these nuclear issues. I'd use terrorism. And read the degree of lack of control, particularly over the Russian, but over some of our own storage of fissile materials.

There's once instance of a worker in the Russian storages sites making patties about three inches in diameter, half an inch thick, of fissile materials and putting them in his pocket and taking them out. It's easy. That's the problem. And it's probably already been done to the point where terrorists have some degree of access to fissile materials. I think that underlies Bill Perry's estimate and Graham Allison's estimate.

MR. KORB: The 9/11 Commission pointed out that Bin Laden thought he had bought some. He paid a million and a half dollars. He was conned, but the fact is that they are trying to do it.

A question on this side? Yes, sir.

Q: Thank you. My name is Takuya Nishimura, Hokkaido Shimbun, a Japanese newspaper. I would like to ask you about missile defense in the aspect of strategy. The missile defense is said to be very dangerous because it increases their possibility or motivation of first strike. So do you think the technology will be improved enough that it will solve question about first strike?

MR. KORB: You're our expert on this.

MR. CIRINCIONE: Well, I'd say Secretary McNamara is more of an expert on this than I am, but first strike – I'm not sure it increases the risk for first strike. Maybe

you're right about that. What it does increase is the – if an opponent believes that we actually have a missile defense system that works, even if in fact we don't – if they believe that it works, they will take the logical step, the same step that countries have always taken. They will increase the number and sophistication of their offensive forces in order to overwhelm or otherwise defeat that missile defense. So that's the great risk you have with missile defense, and it creates this kind of instability.

I honestly don't believe that this particular defensive system – and Alaska actually poses that risk. I think that's why you see China having a relatively relaxed attitude towards this, and Russia, they're not buying it yet. They don't believe that this really impacts their offensive forces yet, but if they believe that the U.S. is actually going to move on, that this is the beginning of a 10, 20 year effort, then undoubtedly you will see them expanding and adapting their forces. President Putin's remarks on the tests this year of maneuvering warheads are just part of that. They will make sure that any system that they deploy can evade our defenses, and the CIA has pointed out for years that any country capable of developing a long-range ballistic missile is capable of putting countermeasures on that missile that could defeat any known ballistic missile anti-missile system.

MR. KORB: When I was at the Council on Foreign Relations, one of my colleagues was Dick Garwin, the man who Teller credits with developing the equations for the hydrogen bomb. He was on the Rumsfeld commission as well and he's absolutely convinced that we cannot overcome the problem that Joe's talking about – decoys. He said boost phase might work but that's a whole other issue. But we just can't, given where we are with the technology, overcome that, and if anybody can develop a missile that can hit you, certainly they can develop decoys, and when you're in outer space you can't tell the difference between the decoy and the real thing.

Bob?

MR. MCNAMARA: Well, it's dangerous, I agree. It isn't worth a damn. But that doesn't mean it isn't dangerous because the Taiwans and the South Koreas, if they were to deploy those things, might be much more aggressive in relation to China and North Korea, and that's a danger.

MR. KORB: Over here.

Q: (Off mike.) None of comments mention the word "deterrent." I'd like you to maybe comment on that in the sense that I think there are many members of Congress who are (off mike) and take it as gospel. So how do you go about (off mike) with that notion that deterrence is what this is all about?

MR. KORB: Well, I think I – has he got the mike working now? (Chuckles.) All right, do you want to try it again?

Q: Hi. How do you go about disabusing people of the notion that strategic deterrence is a bankrupt doctrine?

MR. KORB: Well, I try to mention in the report that in fact the administration has said that in this new age, deterrence does not work, and so – traditional deterrence – and that's why they want to develop these smaller nuclear weapons and I disagree with that. I mean, deterrence works against established states, the so-called rogue states, because they want to remain in power. We now know that Saddam in fact was deterred all of these years. When you're dealing with these other threats I try and mention in here, you can deal with them conventionally. Certainly in terms of using the weapons the conventional weapons are just as effective. There's a RAND study and the Defense Science Board study: these things are just as effective. And we're not talking about – we're moving toward the elimination of these weapons, but the United States is not going to get rid of them all. We'll still have, under the current arrangement, 5,000 strategic weapons by the end of this decade, and were it not for Congressman Hobson we might have new nuclear weapons.

MR. MCNAMARA: Well, assuming for the minute that we can't deter with the threat of conventional forces, which I believe we can deter. But assuming we can't, how many nuclear weapons do we need to deter who? Who are we talking about? Figure it out. I was in the room on Sunday, October 21st, the Oval room in the family quarters of the White House. It was the day that Kennedy was going to decide whether to move toward an attack on Cuba or initiating pressure through a quarantine. Max Taylor, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs was designated to present the argument in favor of the attack; I was designated to present the arguments against it. We did. There were about 17 people in the room, including Dean Acheson and some others, civilian and military. Kennedy went around the room. The vote was nine to eight in favor of the attack.

Among those present was General Sweeney, the commander of the U.S. Fighter Command at the time and the designated commander of the attack on Cuba. So Kennedy said to Sweeney, now, General, can you guarantee me that if we attack, we can destroy all those missiles? We thought they had 17 or something like that. And Sweeney said – I could have kissed him – he said, "Mr. President, we have the finest Air Force in the world. Nobody can do what we can do. We've practiced this. We know we can do it. But can I tell you there won't be one, two or five left? No."

Now, what president would expose his people to one, two, or five nuclear weapons? You don't need 6,000 strategic weapons deployed with 2,000 on hair-trigger alert. It's insane. So why don't we not argue initially about getting rid of them all but argue initially about getting down to what the deterrence advocates believe we need on a realistic basis to deter and talk about particulars.

MR. CIRINCIONE: That's an excellent point, and it underscores how our strategic nuclear posture now is completely disconnected from our actual defensive needs. There used to be a calculation. We've all, I think in various points, participated in

this. We looked at the Russian forces, the Chinese forces, at how many – we did a threat assessment. Every good weapons system used to begin with a threat assessment.

MR. MCNAMARA: Absolutely.

MR. CIRINCIONE: How many did they have? What do we need to overcome that, to counter that? Then your budget flows from that. We don't do that anymore.

MR. MCNAMARA: Exactly.

MR. CIRINCIONE: We don't do that anymore, and we have to get back – if you want to reduce nuclear weapons, we have to get back to that: what do we really need them for?

MR. MCNAMARA: Absolutely.

MR. KORB: We'll cover this side and then we'll come back. We'll get you.

Q: Hi, I'm Amy Woolf from the Congressional Research Service and I was just going to make the point that Joe just made.

MR. CIRINCIONE: Go ahead. Make it again. (Chuckles.) It's a good point. (Laughter, cross talk.)

Q: – Congress a little bit, which I always do.

MR. KORB: Amy, hold it closer. We can't hear.

Q: I write about the two issues you raise in this report all the time, but I never write about them in the same report. I never write about nonproliferation and threat reduction in Russia in the same reports where I write about strategic forces. One question that you don't raise when you write about them together that you need to raise: if we're worried about the threats coming from all these other bad guys getting nuclear materials and nuclear weapons, please tell me, Mr. President, Mr. Secretary of Defense, how my nuclear weapons have anything to do with lessening those threats. And there is no answer to that.

You in your report – others can tell you how my nuclear weapons can make it harder for us to lessen those threats, but where are the scenarios where I would use nuclear weapons against those threats? And I challenge you to find them. I personally can think of a couple, and they don't involve al Qaeda; they involve maybe North Korea and maybe China.

The administration will never tell you why they need nuclear weapons to go after these new threats we're facing. We need to ask that question if you're going to talk about the things in the same report.

The next thing I want to talk about is Congress, and I always take it personally when people say that Congress doesn't get involved in this as if it is somehow my fault. (Laughter.) But I can only answer when they ask. You'd be interested to know the administration is also worried about the lack of congressional involvement in this, that the Pentagon is worried that they haven't sold their story well enough to Congress that they can't get the support they need for the programs. And I'll tell you in this room the same thing I tell them: it's not a lack of support or a presence of support; it's just plain apathy. They don't care about nuclear weapons as a subject. They'll rubber stamp or not – other than Hobson and a few others, no interest whatsoever; somewhat because of the Iraq issue being dominant, but somewhat because they think it's an issue that's been solved.

Anybody have any strategies? Joe, you worked for Congress. How do you get Congress interested?

MR. CIRINCIONE: Actually, apathy might work in our favor here. I'm interested in this. Something is going on over at the U.S. Strategic Command, and other people may know more about this than I do, but there is a change of attitude at the U.S. Strategic Command on the importance of – on their interest – on their interest. Now, this is the command that's in charge of our nuclear weapons. I detect a distinct lack of interest in maintaining a large, robust nuclear arsenal; that they're more interested in information warfare, in controlling information, and in achieving global strategic reach through precision-guided conventional weapons.

For the first time in its history the Strategic Command is headed up by a general officer who did not have any nuclear experience, General Cartwright, a Marine. So, no Navy subs, no Air Force bombers or ICBMs. I'm really looking forward towards his congressional testimony and the attitude that he's conveying – I expect it's going to be a lot different from Admiral Ellis, from – was it General Neese (sp) before?

I'd be interested if others are detecting this same trend. And that may help us convince Congress, convince others in the administration that we can take some new, drastic cuts in our strategic forces and, by the way, deal with the issue that's just on the horizon that's going to be coming up. And Stan Norris may know more about this. At some point we're going to have to start talking about serious money to fund the recommendations in the last nuclear posture review for a new generation of ICBMs and subs and bombers. This is going to be a $200 billion-plus decision: are we really going to do this? Because our existing forces are getting to the point where their operational lives are within sight and we're going to have to start preparing for the next generation. That's going to be a key nuclear decision.

MR. KORB: I had this paper vetted with General Habiger. He liked it. He would love – he couldn't make it today. I guess he wanted to stay in the sunny South, but the temperature down in Athens, Georgia, is not much warmer than it is here. But the only comment he had was about the national missile defense not being deployed, because

when I first wrote it I thought it would be operational. But he liked the paper. And we also got a copy of this to General Cartwright. I haven't heard his reaction but I was assured that if I went through certain channels he would get to see it.

MR. MCNAMARA: Well, you can correct me if I'm wrong. My recollection is that the Nuclear Policy Review, issued by this administration, lays out a program of new launch platforms –

MR. KORB: Yes.

MR. MCNAMARA: – for the next three decades.

MR. KORB: Yes, it does.

MR. MCNAMARA: And that will be hundreds of billions of dollars.

MR. KORB: Yes, that's what I mean. At some point you have to act on that. It hasn't yet come up in the procurement cycle.

MR. MCNAMARA: Well, that's the foundation of the program.

MR. KORB: We're on the edge of those coming up to Congress. I don't know if it will be this year or next year. You'll start to see R&D money.

Do you know, Amy?

AMY WOOLF: But it comes in slowly.

MR. KORB: It comes in slowly.

MS. WOOLF: That's the problem. By the time people notice –

MR. KORB: Yeah.

MR. MCNAMARA: Tiny bits.

MS. WOOLF: Yeah, in study money it's nothing, and that's what happened with our (inaudible) this year. The study money gave way to outyear's real money and people took notice. With an ICBM replacement or an SLBM replacement, the study money in the first few years, and then you've bought into it –

MR. CIRINCIONE: Well, that's why we have to be alert. So will you let us know when that study money shows up? (Laughter.)

MR. KORB: Okay, the gentleman over here in the – we missed him last time – this gentleman there with the white shirt.

Q: Will Amatruda (sp), Catholic University Law School. Could you comment on the implications for the Middle East of a scenario where Israel did not have a nuclear arsenal, and if you think that that would be a positive for stability in the Middle East, how do you get there? What arguments would you use with the Israeli government to convince them that it was to their advantage and what would you offer them in return?

MR. CIRINCIONE: Let me just start. I was encouraged by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's comment after the visit by IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei that Israel would consider engaging in talks again on a Middle East free of all weapons of mass destruction and condition that that this of course – Israel would consider these issues after there was a regional peace. Now, for most Israelis a regional peace is sometime after the Messiah comes, so they feel safe in making those kinds of statements, but there is now an opening; there is a movement going on in the Middle East that gives us, once again, the glimmer of this kind of possibility. It's clear that you cannot permanently convince Iran or any other Arab-Muslim nation in that region, to give up its pursuit, particularly of nuclear and missile technologies as long as Israel has its 100 or so nuclear weapons. It's also clear Israel is never going to give those up as long as it feels threatened, even though nuclear weapons have nothing whatsoever to do with the security threats it actually faces, which is from the Palestinians in its own territory.

Nonetheless, there are deep psychological issues there for the Israeli people, so you have got to have regional peace talks that can resolve these underlying – as Secretary McNamara pointed out, security risks – security concerns, and then I believe there are a number of Israelis who believe that Israel's security is guaranteed – is better served by a Middle East where no one has nuclear weapons and so therefore can't counter their overwhelming conventional superiority than in a Middle East where there are other nations racing to match Israel's capability. I think this is possible. It's one of the great challenges we face.

MR. MCNAMARA: Well, I doubt that many of you in the room know that we have security treaties – you know this – with Japan, with South Korea, God knows with other nations. We have never had a security treaty with Israel – never. We don't have it today, we've never had it in the past. Moreover, what the Israelis know and you don't know is that in the Six-Day War when there was some risk that the Soviets would be drawn in to attack Israel after it knocked the hell out of Egypt and Jordan, we were concerned – the president, Dean Rusk, and I were concerned that if the Soviets were drawn in, they would decimate Israel. So we went up to the Congress – Jack Javits, senior Republican in the Senate, arranged a meeting of the senior Democrats and Republicans in the Senate to ask them if Israel faced a threat from Russia, would the support U.S. military support of Israel. And essentially they said no.

Now, Israel knows that. You don't know it but, Israel does. So there's no way we're going to persuade Israel to give up its nuclear weapons without some acceptable guarantee of security. And how you make that acceptable to them is difficult, but there's

no way they'll give up nuclear weapons until that's done. I think it can be done but it needs to be put on the table and we need to negotiate.

MR. CIRINCIONE: Abner Cohen can probably answer that question more fully, so see him after the meeting.

MR. KORB: I was going to say that, but glad you did.

Right back behind you there, Antoine.

Q: My name is Sara Gray and I'm with the National Academy of Sciences, and my question is specifically to Secretary McNamara because he brought up the issue of morality with nuclear weapons. Particularly, I wanted to know what you would say to those who use the argument of a nuclear peace – and I'm particularly thinking of the recent incident between India and Pakistan and the Kashmir conflict that didn't escalate as it has in the past. I believe it was about two years ago it didn't escalate into a larger war. So how would you respond to people who use that argument?

MR. MCNAMARA: At 88 I'm losing lots of things but among them is my hearing. So interpret for me. (Chuckles.) Related to morality.

MR. KORB: Yes, she was talking about morality but then she brought up the fact that India and Pakistan both have them and neither one would use them against each other. They were able to defuse the conflict.

MR. MCNAMARA: Well, that's very, very dangerous. You're talking about Kargil and some of those places. I've been out there. One of the areas in which they confront each other is the Siachin Glacier. I've been to the base of the Siachin Glacier. It's 17,000 feet. The top is 21,000. You won't believe this: the Indian and Pakistan armies confront each other at 17,000 feet. You know, it's insane – absolutely insane. And mistakes can be made. That's the point.

Now, I think they're beginning to understand that, and I'm very encouraged by what has been happening in the last few months. Manmohan Singh, the new Indian prime minister – he's an old friend of mine and he is beginning to move toward establishing a dialogue. The only way you can deal with this is to build confidence-building measures. You can't suddenly get rid of nuclear weapons out there, nor can you be absolutely sure they won't be used, but what you can do is build confidence-building measures. He's beginning to move in that direction. We should encourage them and we should participate on the sidelines. I hope we will.

MR. KORB: Okay. Over here. I'm sorry, this lady.

MR. CIRINCIONE: You know, this is so unfair being on a panel with Secretary McNamara. There's no way you can top this guy's stories, right? (Laughter.)

MR. KORB: I hope when you're 88 you can go to 17,000 feet, Joe. (Laughter.)

Q: My name is Marsha Marks (sp).

MR. KORB: Put the mike on.

Q: Hello?

MR. KORB: Yeah.

Q: My name is Marsha Marks and I'm a member of the general public. And my question is really – I want to say one thing: I don't think the general public has any idea of what you're talking about today – that is the major problem – or they'd be marching in the streets. They would not have voted the way they did.

But my question is, too, what do you think about the United States setting an example by getting rid of our own nuclear energy – 103 nuclear reactors that are producing the plutonium. And those of you who haven't seen this November, 2002, issue, the waste issue that we have in this country – right here in metropolitan Washington I can give you a lot of sites that the terrorists would like to use.

Thank you.

MR. CIRINCIONE: Well, I think part of what we've been trying to say is the United States has got to lead by example if you want to do that. And the other is that because the general public is not aware of this, this is the whole reason for us bringing this up. It's sort of been under the radar – you know, radarscope, and they need to be aware of it because lots of things are happening. I doubt that they would know how many nuclear weapons we have, that they're still on alert. Actually, I came across one reference: we increased the number of targets in Russia this year from 5(00) to 800 for our land-based missiles, you know, at this particular time.

And so that's part of the reason that we did it. And kind of the thrust of this, to sum it up, is the United States has to lead by example. What we're saying to the rest of the world now is, don't do as we do, do as we say, and that simply won't work, and we can all pay for that in the long run.

MR. KORB: All right, over here.

ANTOINE MORRIS: This will be the last question.

MR. KORB: Last question, yes. Okay, if Antoine says it's the last one, then it's the last one. Okay. I know who to take my orders from. (Chuckles.)

Q: Thank you. I'm Diane Pearlman. I'm a political psychologist. And, Secretary McNamara you said, "this is insane," and I agree with that unless you're trying

to create Armageddon, in which case it's completely rational. But there's a lot of focus on dealing with, say, the symptom rather than the cause, and say deterrence is most effective if it's accompanied by drastic tension reduction, and there's a lot of fear, asymmetrical power, domination, humiliation that's associated with the prestige and the risk. And I like to invoke the Heisenberg Principle, that we don't – we're looking at like how Israel affects (inaudible), but we don't look at how U.S. policies provoke – I mean, there's a lot of tension and provocation and it's psychologically untenable just to use carrots and sticks to insist that people don't develop things when we're doing vertical proliferation. So I'd like your thoughts on that.

MR. KORB: Okay, Joe, why don't you take that?

MR. CIRINCIONE: Sure. Let me start. I don't know if it's actually a law of unintended consequences, but it certainly is an effect that's out there. And the one that was brought to my attention, I mentioned at the beginning of the talk, was how the Russians are viewing our deployments. And I don't know if the Russians know that we've increased the targeting on them. I'm just learning this today at this panel, but it certainly will feed into the Russian view that the U.S. has intentions on Mother Russia. They certainly see our new nuclear weapons as aimed at them. Clearly we really do aim our weapons at them.

Even though I believe most of U.S. national nuclear policy is focused on countries other than Russia, they and their reaction may be the most dangerous consequences of our policy because they're the people that have the nuclear weapons. We can't lose sight of this. It's the "Willy Sutton principle." They asked Willie Sutton, that '30s banker why does he rob banks and he says, "That's where the money is." When you're talking about nuclear risk, you have to talk about where the weapons are, and there are almost 20,000 nuclear weapons in Russia, if I remember correctly, and the risks from that existing stockpile are enormous. It would only take one of those, as they say, to ruin your day.

So every policy that we implement, every policy that we're discussing, we have to be calculating what its effect would be on Russia and on those nuclear weapons.

MR. KORB: Yeah, I think – you know, call it American exceptionalism – we tend to think we always act for the good of mankind, but we have to realize that other countries may not perceive that, and if you know from the study of international politics, a lot of wars have been caused by misperception. In fact, Bob Jervis wrote a book about that, you know. And so I think we have to really be very, very, very careful.

Bob, do you want to have the last word?

MR. MCNAMARA: If you were Russia and you were told publicly that the U.S. has 6,000 deployed strategic missiles, each one with a kill capability of whatever, on average 20 times that of the Hiroshima bomb, what would you think? Who in the hell are

we aiming 6,000 weapons at if not Russia? One or two or five would take care of North Korea and Iran, or whatever. So the rest are aimed at Russia.

And by the way, we say we do not target civilians, and in the literal sense that's true, but one time I was told that we had 200 nuclear weapons targeted on Moscow. Now, how in God's name can you detonate 200 nuclear weapons on Moscow without killing civilians? And as far as Russia knows, we still have them. Whom else are we going to target with 6,000 deployed nuclear weapons? If I were they, I'd be scared as hell and I'd be doing more than they're doing, and if I were us I'd be doing far more than we're doing.

MR. KORB: On that happy note let me thank – (laughter) – I thank the panelists, I want to thank Fourth Freedom Forum, my colleagues here at the Center, and I hope that this will be the beginning of a debate and a dialogue, not only among the Congress and the policymakers but among the general public.

Thank you very much for coming.

(Applause.)

MR. MCNAMARA: Larry, thanks. Always good to be with you.

(END)