Demographic categories

Throughout this report, a wide variety of demographic categories are used to group and track subpopulations within the United States from 1974 to 2060. Below is a short primer on these breakdowns.

Populations

- **Whole**: This refers to the entire U.S. population.
- **Child**: This refers to the portion of the population between ages 0 and 17.
- **Voting-age population**: This refers to the portion of the population that is ages 18 and older.
- **Eligible voters**: This refers to the portion of the population that is ages 18 and older and is also a citizen of the United States.
- **Actual voters**: This refers to the portion of the population that voted in a given year’s federal elections. Also referred to as “voters” in the report.

Races

- **White**: Individuals identifying as both non-Hispanic and white.
- **Black**: Individuals identifying as non-Hispanic and black or African American.
- **Hispanic**: Individuals identifying as Hispanic.
- **Asian/Other**: Individuals identifying as non-Hispanic as well as Asian, Hawaiian, Pacific Islander, American Indian, Alaskan Native, or multiracial. The racial and ethnic questions asked by the Current Population Survey have changed radically over the past 40 years, and this combination category is an attempt to standardize these disparate data points.

Generations

- **Lost**: Individuals born from 1883 to 1900.
- **Greatest**: Individuals born from 1901 to 1927.
- **Silent**: Individuals born from 1928 to 1945.
• **Baby Boomer**: Individuals born from 1946 to 1964.
• **Generation X**: Individuals born from 1965 to 1980.
• **Millennial**: Individuals born from 1981 to 2000.
• **Post-Millennial 1**: Individuals born from 2001 to 2020.
• **Post-Millennial 2**: Individuals born from 2021 to 2040.
• **Post-Millennial 3**: Individuals born from 2041 to 2060.

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**Education**

• **College**: This refers to individuals who have a four-year college degree or a graduate degree.
• **Noncollege**: This refers to individuals who have an education level that is less than a four-year college degree.

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**Regions**

• **Melting Pot**: California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, and Texas.
• **New Sun Belt-East**: Delaware, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia.
• **Heartland Midwest and Rust Belt**: Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.
• **Heartland New England**: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
• **Heartland South**: Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, and West Virginia.
• **Heartland Great Plains**: Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and South Dakota.

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**Other terms**

This report also uses terminology that is particular to the discussion of demographics and change. Below is a short primer on these terms.

• **Majority-minority**: This refers to a population where less than half of the individuals are identified as non-Hispanic whites.
• **White working class**: This refers to non-Hispanic whites whose education level is below a four-year college degree.
• **Seniors**: This refers to individuals who are 65 years old and older.
Introduction and summary

10 big trends that are transforming America

The States of Change: Demographics and Democracy project is a collaboration supported by The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation that brings together the Center for American Progress, the American Enterprise Institute, and demographer William H. Frey of the Brookings Institution. The project’s goals are:

• To document and analyze the challenges to democracy posed by the rapid demographic evolution from the 1970s to 2060

• To project the race-ethnic composition of every state to 2060, which has not been done for 20 years

• To promote a wide-ranging and bipartisan discussion of America’s demographic future and what it portends for the nation’s political parties and policy

This report presents the first tranche of findings from this project—including detailed analyses on the nation as a whole and on every state—which we hope will both inform and provoke discussion. We outline 10 broad trends from our findings that together suggest the scale of the transformation our country is living through and the scope of the challenges it will face in the future.

These changes admit to a wide variety of interpretations, and as with any report as extensive as this one, it should not be surprising that there are some differences in interpretation among the participating institutions. We believe, however, that differing interpretations are to be welcomed and that they will be useful in stimulating discussion both within and outside our project on the implications of demographic change.
Trend 1: The rise of majority-minority and near-majority-minority states

The scale of race-ethnic transformation in the United States is stunning.

In 1980, the population of the United States was 80 percent white. Today, that proportion has fallen to 63 percent, and by 2060, it is projected to be less than 44 percent. Hispanics were 6 percent in 1980, are 17 percent today, and should be 29 percent by 2060. Asians/Others were just 2 percent in 1980, are 8 percent today, and should be 15 percent by 2060. Blacks, however, should be stable at 12 percent to 13 percent over the time period.

Nothing captures the magnitude of these shifts better than the rise of majority-minority states. Right now, there are only four majority-minority states: California, Hawaii, New Mexico, and Texas. But with the ongoing demographic transformation of the country, our States of Change projections find that this will become more and more common. A table of when we expect these newly minted, majority-minority states to emerge is displayed on the following page. Note that since minorities are not monolithic in their policy or political preferences and because, in any case, those preferences may change over time, any assumption that majority-minority states will adopt a unified policy or political orientation would be unwise.

The next two majority-minority states, Maryland and Nevada, should arrive in the next five years. After that, there should be four more in the 2020s: Arizona, Florida, Georgia, and New Jersey. In the 2030s, these states should be joined by Alaska, Louisiana, and New York, and in the 2040s, these states should be joined by Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Virginia. The 2050s should round out the list by adding Colorado, North Carolina, and Washington. By 2060, that should bring the number of majority-minority states to 22, including seven of the currently largest states and 11 of the top 15. Together, these 22 states account for about two-thirds of the country’s population.
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Authors' calculations are based on data from the Current Population Survey, the American Community Survey, the Census’ 2014 National Population Projections, and their own States of Change projections.
Just as interesting are the many states that are projected to be near majority-minority by 2060. The following 10 states should be more than 40 percent minority by 2060, including some seemingly unlikely ones: Alabama, Arkansas, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Utah. Data for each state can be seen in the table below, which provides the percent minority for every state for four years: 1980, 2014, 2040, and 2060.

### TABLE A.2
**Diversification of whole and eligible populations**
Percent minority, 1980, 2014, 2040, and 2060

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Trend 2: The diversification of eligible voters

If we are interested in how demographic change has affected, and should continue to affect, the American electorate and therefore the climate for public policy, we have to look beyond trends in the overall population and toward a subset of the population: eligible voters, or EVs, those of voting age who are also citizens. The population of EVs tends to be whiter than the overall population because: (a) children tend to be more diverse than older age groups but are not included, of course, in the EV population; and (b) new minorities tend to have high rates of noncitizen adults, who are not eligible to vote. This disjuncture between the overall population and EVs has increased since 1980.

In 1980, 16 percent of EVs were minorities, 4 percentage points lower than the minority share of the overall population. Today, that figure has nearly doubled to 30 percent of EVs, but it is now 7 points lower than the minority share of the overall population. Thus, both the population and EVs have diversified substantially, the latter more slowly than the former.
However, the overall population-EV gap should narrow significantly in the future, as more of the growth in Hispanics and Asians comes from fertility—children of immigrants are citizens and therefore EVs once they reach age 18—rather than immigration. By 2060, the EV population is projected to be 54 percent minority, only a little more than 2 points lower than the minority share of the overall population. We should note that assumptions about future immigration are a particularly difficult part of the projections process. If the assumptions we have made here are off, the gaps could differ significantly from what we have estimated.

![FIGURE A.3](image)

Diversification of EVs lags behind that of the whole population, but gap will close

Minority percentage of whole and eligible populations, 1980–2060

Of course, this trend is likely to vary by state. In fast-growing states such as Texas, Arizona, Nevada, and Florida, the gap-narrowing pattern should be very strong. But in slow-growing, more static states such as Ohio, North Dakota, and Maine, the gap may even widen slightly over time. The minority levels of EVs in each state for 1980, 2014, 2040, and 2060 are shown in the table on page 4.

Sources: Authors' calculations are based on data from the Current Population Survey, the American Community Survey, and the Census' 2014 National Population Projections.
Trend 3: The lagged diversification of actual voters

Actual voters, or AVs, relative to EVs have historically underrepresented minorities. In 1976, for example, 15 percent of EVs were minorities compared with 12 percent among AVs. We would have expected this 3-point gap to widen since 1976, since almost all of the increase in minority EVs has come from Hispanic and Asian minorities, whose turnout tends to be particularly low. Interestingly, however, this has not been the case, at least in presidential elections. In 2012, 29 percent of EVs were minorities, compared with 26 percent of AVs—an identical 3-point gap.

A clue to this mysterious stability may be found in the turnout rates by race in the 2012 election. Looking at race, turnout of white EVs in 2012 was 64 percent, and turnout of black EVs was 67 percent, the first time reported turnout among blacks was higher than among whites. In contrast, turnout among Hispanics was just 48 percent, and turnout among Asians was 47 percent. The high turnout figure for blacks is the key here. In fact, there has been steadily rising black presidential election turnout since 1996: 53 percent in 1996, going up to 67 percent in 2012. This rising turnout among blacks—which has turned underrepresentation of blacks in presidential elections into slight overrepresentation—has offset the increasing proportions of Hispanics and Asians, who have relatively low turnout, to help keep the gap between minority EVs and minority AVs stable.

However, congressional elections are a different matter. Turnout in congressional elections has been remarkably stable among all minorities, including blacks. This has increased the turnout drop-off among minorities between presidential and congressional elections. Turnout drop-off among minorities was 9 points from 1976 to 1978 and a modestly larger 11 points between 1996 and 1998, but it rose steadily after that, to 19 points by the 2010–2012 period.*

These patterns have affected the extent to which minorities are underrepresented in congressional elections. The congressional elections of 2002, 2006, and 2010 have seen the highest post-1974 differences between the minority share of voters and the minority share of EVs, ranging from 4.5 percentage points to 5.9 percentage points.

* Throughout this report, year ranges are inclusive of their first and last years whether they are referred to as, for example, “from 1976 to 1978,” “between 1976 and 1978,” or “the 1976–1978 period.”
Trend 4: The rise of post-Baby Boom generations

The generational makeup of the U.S. population has changed and will continue to change steadily throughout the 1980–2060 period via the process of generational replacement. In 1980, 23 percent of the population came from the Greatest and Lost Generations, born before 1928; 20 percent came from the Silent Generation, born from 1928 to 1945; 33 percent came from the Baby Boom Generation, born from 1946 to 1964; and 25 percent came from Generation X, born from 1965 to 1980. Today, the Greatest Generation is down to around 1 percent, the Silent Generation is at 9 percent, Baby Boomers are at 24 percent, and Gen Xers are at 21 percent. They are joined by two generations that were not present in 1980: the Millennials—born from 1981 to 2000—and the Post-Millennials—born from 2001 to 2020. The former are 27 percent of today’s population—the largest single generation—and the latter are 18 percent.

By 2060, the Greatest, Silent, and Baby Boom generations will no longer be on the scene. Gen Xers will be down to 8 percent of the population, Millennials will be at 21 percent, Post-Millennials and Post Millennials 2—born from 2021 to 2040—will be at 24 percent each, and Post-Millennials 3—born from 2041 to 2060—will be at around 22 percent.

Reflecting these shifts, the generational makeup of the eligible electorate has changed and will continue to change dramatically over time, though it will considerably lag behind the changes in the overall population. This is because members of a given generation do not enter the eligible electorate until they are 18 years old; therefore, a generation’s impact among EVs does not begin until 18 years after the first birth year of the cohort and is not fully felt until 18 years after the last birth year of the cohort. At that time, the generation’s weight among EVs peaks and will be at a level significantly above its overall population weight.

Keeping this in mind, the 1980 eligible electorate still contained a large contingent—32 percent—from the Greatest and Lost—born before 1928—generations, along with 28 percent from the Silent Generation and a dominant 41 percent from the Baby Boom Generation. Today, it is a different world: The Greatest Generation has all but vanished, and the Silent Generation is down to 13 percent of EVs. The Baby Boomers are still a substantial presence at 32 percent of EVs, though down substantially from their peak of 45 percent in 1982. But the newest generations now dominate the electorate: Generation X at 26 percent of EVs and the Millennial Generation at 28 percent form the majority.
By 2060, the picture will switch dramatically again. The Silent and Baby Boom generations will no longer be on the scene. Gen Xers will be down to 9 percent of EVs, though Millennials will still be at 27 percent. The dominant generations will be Post-Millennials at 31 percent and Post Millennials 2 at 30 percent; Post-Millennials 3 will just be entering the electorate with 3 percent.

Trend 5: The superdiversification of America’s children

Rising diversity strongly interacts with generational change. Each succeeding generation has been, and will be, more diverse than the generations that came before it. Back in 1980, the two newest generations in the population, the Baby Boomers and the Gen Xers, were, respectively, 21 percent and 26 percent minority. Looking at the two newest generations today, the Millennials and the Post-Millennials, the corresponding figures are 44 percent and 49 percent minority. Looking ahead to 2040, the Post-Millennial 2 Generation is projected to be 57 percent minority. In 2060, the Post-Millennial 3 Generation should be 64 percent minority.
As a direct result of this generational succession, every age group in the country will diversify substantially over time. Nothing shows this more dramatically than the superdiversification of America’s children. In 1980, children were 25 percent minority; today, they are 46 percent minority. And diversification will not stop in the future: In 2040, children are projected to be 57 percent minority, and in 2060, children should be 65 percent minority.

![Diversification of children](image)

Of course, some states will better exemplify this trend than others. At one extreme, children in a state such as Arizona are 60 percent minority today, and they should be 74 percent and 81 percent minority in 2040 and 2060, respectively. At the other end of the spectrum, children in a state such as Iowa are just 11 percent minority today and should only reach 21 percent and 27 percent minority in 2040 and 2060, respectively.
Trend 6: The graying of America

The age structure of the U.S. population has changed significantly over time, shifting toward an older age structure. This is in large part due to the Baby Boom Generation, which—while not the largest generation in terms of absolute size, as Millennials are about the same size—was the largest generation in relation to population size when it emerged. Since then, fertility declines have cut down on generation sizes relative to population size.

Back in 1980, 49 percent of the population was under age 30—27 percent was under age 18, and 22 percent was ages 18 to 29. Fifteen percent was ages 30 to 39, 10 percent was ages 40 to 49, 14 percent was ages 50 to 64, and just 11 percent was over age 65. Today, 40 percent are under age 30—with 24 percent under age 18 and 16 percent ages 18 to 29. Fourteen percent are, respectively, ages 30 to 39 and ages 40 to 49. Seniors are now up to 15 percent, and the 50- to 64-year-old age group adds 17 percent, for a total of 33 percent who are ages 50 and older. This compares with 26 percent in 1980.

The aging of the population will continue in the future. By 2060, those ages 65 and older are projected to outnumber those under age 18 by 23 percent to 20 percent. Those ages 50 to 64 should be 18 percent, for a total of 42 percent ages 50 and older. Eighteen- to 29-year-olds should be 14 percent, and 30- to 39-year-olds and 40- to 49-year-olds should be 12 percent each.

**FIGURE A.6**
Graying of the American electorate

Percentage of each age group among EVs, 1974–2060

Sources: Authors’ calculations are based on data from the Current Population Survey, the American Community Survey, and the Census’ 2014 National Population Projections.
These shifts have had—and will have—an even more dramatic effect on the age distribution of EVs. In 1980, 29 percent of EVs were ages 18 to 29, 21 percent were ages 50 to 64, and 16 percent were ages 65 and older. Today, 18- to 29-year-old EVs are down to 21 percent, 50- to 64-year-olds are up to 23 percent, and seniors are up to 21 percent. By 2060, those ages 65 and older are projected to be 29 percent and those ages 50 to 64 should be 23 percent, for a total of 52 percent ages 50 and older. Eighteen- to 29-year-olds are expected to be 17 percent and 30- to 39-year-olds should be 15 percent, for a total of 33 percent under age 40. Note that the 2060 projections almost exactly reverse the 1980 figures on 18- to 29-year-olds and seniors. Twenty-nine percent of 18- to 29-year-old EVs in 1980 becomes 17 percent in 2060; 16 percent senior EVs in 1980 becomes 29 percent in 2060.

Trend 7: The diversification of the gray

There is no doubt that diversification has been proceeding faster with younger age groups, particularly children, than with seniors. However, diversification through generational replacement is having, and will have, strong effects on seniors as well. In 1980, seniors were only 11 percent minority. Today, seniors are 22 percent minority. And in 2060, minorities are projected to be close to half—45 percent—of seniors. Thus, the future “seniorization” of the EV population described in trend 6 should not be confused with a “white seniorization” of EVs. In fact, three-quarters of the growth in the senior share of EVs to 2040—when the level of white

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**FIGURE A.7**

**Diversification of seniors**

Racial composition of EVs ages 65 and older, 1974–2060

Sources: Authors’ calculations are based on data from the Current Population Survey, the American Community Survey, and the Census’ 2014 National Population Projections.
seniors will peak—is projected to be from minority seniors, and over the entire span to 2060, minorities should be responsible for all of the growth in the senior share of EVs. In short, one cannot fully understand the graying of America without also understanding the diversification of the gray.

There is naturally some state variation in this, though most states—especially faster-growing, more dynamic states—follow the pattern just described. These include Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Nevada, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, and many more. The relatively few exceptions, where growth in white seniors dominates the growth in senior EVs, tend to be heavily white, slow-growing states—such as North Dakota, Ohio, and West Virginia, as well as the upper New England states of Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont.

**Trend 8: The decline of the white working class**

One of the more striking demographic changes in the past 40 years has been the decline of the white working class, or noncollege—lacking a four-year degree—population. The first reason for this is obvious: the decline of the white population overall. The second reason is the dramatic shifts in educational attainment over the past several decades. In 1974, about one-third of EVs were high school dropouts, and only 14 percent had a four-year degree or more. By 2014, just 10 percent were high school dropouts, and 30 percent had a four-year degree or more.

Together, these trends have produced a very sharp decline in the white working-class share of EVs. In 1974, 73 percent of all EVs were white working class. Over the next 40 years, that figure dropped 27 points to 46 percent today. The drop was actually a bit sharper, by a couple of percentage points, among AVs from the white working class over comparable time periods.

Every state has been affected by this ongoing decline in the white working class. Some states even experienced declines of 30 points or more in white working-class EVs over this time period, including California, Nevada, Arizona, Colorado, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and several others. Many more are in the 20s, and almost all are at least in double digits.
We could not incorporate education into our projections, so we cannot provide any estimates of long-term change in this demographic. However, judging from the continuing rise in educational attainment among young—ages 25 to 29—whites since 2000, as well as the continuing decline in the white population overall, we should expect to see white working-class EVs decline in the short term at about their rate since 2000—approximately 3 points every four-year presidential election cycle. This is very similar to the rate before 2000.

**Trend 9: The rise of white college graduates**

The story with white college graduates is very different. Despite the ongoing decline in the white share of the population, educational upgrading has been strong enough for white college graduates to actually increase their share of EVs over time. In 1974, just 13 percent of EVs were college-educated whites. Today, that figure has risen to 23 percent. The increase in white college-graduate EVs was larger by a couple of percentage points among AVs over comparable time periods.

Again, every state has been affected by the ongoing rise in white college graduates. The increase has been largest in high-education states such as Colorado—18 points—and Massachusetts—22 points—but many others are in double digits as well, including Kansas, Nebraska, South Dakota, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
As with the white working class, we cannot provide long-range projections for this demographic. But recent educational attainment trends, combined with ongoing race-ethnic shifts, suggest we should see short-term increases of about 1 percentage point every four-year presidential cycle.

Trend 10: The rise of the unmarried electorate

Shifts in family structure have been another momentous demographic change in the past 40 years. On the most basic level, we have seen a rapid decline in the married share of the electorate and a concomitant, rapid rise in the ranks of the unmarried electorate. In 1974, 70 percent of EVs were married and 30 percent were unmarried. Of the unmarried, 18 percent were women and 12 percent were men. Today, unmarried EVs are now nearly as large a group as married EVs—48 percent vs. 52 percent—with unmarried women up 8 points to 26 percent and unmarried men up 10 points to 22 percent. The rise in unmarried voters, however, has lagged behind the increase in unmarried EVs by a couple of points over comparable time periods.

This change has affected every state, with relatively little variance in the level of change across states. Almost all states saw an increase in unmarried EVs in the 10-point to 20-point range, with many clustered tightly between 15 points and 20 points.
As with educational attainment, we could not incorporate marital status into our long-range projections. However, trend data on marital status do indicate continuing, albeit slowing, growth in the unmarried population. These data suggest that, in the short term, we can expect unmarried EVs to increase around 1.5 percentage points over a four-year presidential cycle.

Conclusion

Looking at these 10 trends, it seems like there are several things on which reasonable people from different political and ideological perspectives can agree. The first is that, over the long term, public policy must adjust to the needs of a quite different America. Diversity is spreading everywhere: into new generations, into every age group—even seniors—and into every corner of the country—including such unlikely states as Oklahoma, Kansas, and Utah. Policy, both national and state, must become increasingly diversity oriented or be deemed ineffective. There is simply no way around this.

Second, political parties must compete for the votes of a new America. Given the magnitude of the shifts described here, it is simply not viable for either major political party to cede dominance of emerging constituencies to the other side. Over the long run, there is simply no way around this either.

These two points are strongly related. Policies that actually solve social and economic problems, remedy educational and labor-market deficiencies, and provide avenues for upward mobility are the key to long-term political success. In other words, political parties will ultimately be judged by results, not intentions.

These are long-run points. But the changes detailed here are rapid enough to also have significant political effects in the short term, as we are likely to see in the 2016 election. Some of the trends we have described here—especially growing diversity—appear to constitute a demographic thumb on the scales for Democrats in the short term, but Republicans could take that thumb off the scales in several ways. The strategies each party uses could yield a wide variety of outcomes, but over time, both parties will have to respond to the needs of a very different America. There is no predetermined partisan advantage, only a challenge that is common to both parties.
The demographic evolution of the American electorate, 1974–2060

The national story

Although our demographic analysis of the American electorate focuses on the changes that are occurring in all 50 states, it is necessary to first understand what has happened, and then to consider what will happen, in the nation as a whole. The data presented below are a combination of both information we have about the demographic history of the country and predictions about where it is going. These estimates are derived from a demographic model that incorporates information about the migration, immigration, fertility, and mortality rates of different races and age groups and projects those populations into the future. In this chapter, we will explore the societal changes that have shaped the country—and that will continue to shape it over the next 45 years.

The population as a whole, 1980–2060

In 1980,¹ the population of the United States was 80 percent white. Today, that proportion has fallen to 63 percent, and by 2060, we estimate that it will be less than 44 percent. Hispanics were 6 percent of the population in 1980, are 17 percent today, and are expected to be 29 percent in 2060. Asians/Others—a combination of several racial and ethnic categories²—were just 3 percent in 1980, are 7 percent today, and are expected to be 15 percent by 2060. Blacks, however, will be quite stable: They were a little less than 12 percent of the population in 1980, are a little more than 12 percent today, and will be 13 percent in 2060.
Of course, the generational makeup of the U.S. population has changed and will continue to change steadily over the next several decades via the process of generational replacement. In 1980, 23 percent of the population came from the Greatest Generation, born before 1928; 20 percent came from the Silent Generation, born from 1928 to 1945; 33 percent came from the Baby Boom Generation, born from 1946 to 1964; and 25 percent came from Generation X, born from 1965 to 1980. Today, the Greatest Generation is down to around 1 percent, the Silent Generation is at 9 percent, Baby Boomers are at 24 percent, and Gen Xers are at 21 percent. They are joined by two generations that were not present in 1980: the Millennials—born from 1981 to 2000—and the Post-Millennials—born from 2001 to 2020. The former are 27 percent of today’s population—the largest single generation—and the latter are 18 percent.

By 2060, we estimate that the Greatest, Silent, and Baby Boom generations will no longer be on the scene. Gen Xers will be down to 8 percent of the population, Millennials will be 21 percent, Post-Millennials and Post-Millennials 2—born from 2021 to 2040—will be 24 percent each, and Post-Millennials 3—born from 2041 to 2060—will be around 22 percent.
The age structure of the U.S. population has changed significantly over time, shifting toward an older age structure. This is in large part due to the Baby Boom Generation, which, while not the largest generation in terms of absolute size—Millennials are about the same size—was the largest generation in relation to population size. Since then, fertility declines have cut down on generation sizes relative to population size.

Back in 1980, therefore, 49 percent of the population was under age 30—27 percent under age 18 and 22 percent ages 18 to 29. Fifteen percent was ages 30 to 39, 10 percent was ages 40 to 49, 14 percent was ages 50 to 64, and just 11 percent was over age 65. Today, 40 percent is under age 30—24 percent under age 18 and 16 percent ages 18 to 29—and 14 percent is, respectively, ages 30 to 39 and 40 to 49. Seniors are now up to 15 percent, and the 50- to 64-year-old age group adds 17 percent, for a total of 33 percent ages 50 and older. That compares with 26 percent in 1980.

The aging of the population will continue in the future. By 2060, we predict that those ages 65 and older will outnumber those under age 18 by 23 percent to 20 percent. Those ages 50 to 64 will be 18 percent, for a total of 42 percent ages 50 and older. Eighteen- to 29-year-olds will be 14 percent, and 30- to 39-year-olds and 40- to 49-year-olds will be 12 percent each.
Rising diversity interacts with these generational and age-structure changes in important ways. The two demographic engines responsible are the largely white Baby Boom Generation that swelled the ranks of nurseries and grade schools in the two decades following World War II and the children of immigrant waves that started to enter the United States over the past 30 years. Those mostly white Baby Boomers are now becoming seniors, and the now-smaller ranks of white children and young adults have been replaced by Hispanics, Asians, and other racial minorities from later generations. Thus, children and youth have been diversifying faster than those at older ages. As these projections show, however, minorities—like the early Baby Boomers—will progressively make their mark on the middle-aged and senior populations as the decades pass.

The twin demographic engines explain why and how both generations and age groups are diversifying over time. Back in 1980, the two newest generations in the population, the Boomers and the Gen Xers were, respectively, 21 percent and 26 percent minority. Looking at the two newest generations today, the Millennials and the Post-Millennials, the corresponding figures are 44 percent and 49 percent minority. Looking ahead to 2040, we estimate that the Post-Millennial 2 Generation will be 57 percent minority. And in 2060, the Post-Millennial 3 Generation will be 64 percent minority.
Looking at age groups, children were 25 percent minority in 1980, and 18- to 29-year-olds were 21 percent minority. Today, children are 46 percent minority; 18- to 29-year-olds are 43 percent minority. And diversification will not stop in the future: In 2040, we predict that children will be 57 percent minority and that 18- to 29-year-olds will be 55 percent minority; in 2060, we expect that children will be 65 percent minority and that 18- to 29-year-olds will be 62 percent minority.

The same pattern holds for seniors, a fact that is sometimes obscured by the still very dominant share of whites among those ages 65 and older. In 1980, seniors were just 11 percent minority. Today, they are 23 percent minority. By 2040 and 2060, we expect they will be 35 percent and 46 percent minority, respectively. This growth in the minority share of seniors is striking: Indeed, the overwhelming share of the future growth in the senior share of the population will be attributable to the growth of the minority senior population. Today, for example, white seniors are around 12 percent of the population; we predict that this figure will go up 2 percentage points by 2040 but that the corresponding figure for minority seniors will more than double, going up 4 percentage points over the same time period. Over the entire period to 2060, minority seniors are expected to triple, accounting for 90 percent of the growth in the senior share of the population.
Finally, generational change will reshape the nature of race-age groups—most significantly, the composition of the white senior population. In 1980, white seniors were entirely from the Greatest and Lost* generations. Today, 60 percent of them are from the Silent Generation. But the dominance of the Silent Generation will fade quickly. By 2040, Boomers and Gen Xers are expected to be dominant, making up 95 percent of white seniors. In 2060, Millennials will make up 63 percent of this population.

Eligible voters, 1974–2060

Race, generation, and age, 1980–2060

But if we are interested in how demographic change has affected, and will continue to affect, the American electorate and therefore the climate for public policy, we have to dig deeper and look at a subset of the population: eligible voters, those of voting age who are also citizens. The population of EVs tends to be whiter than the overall population because: (a) children tend to be more diverse than older age groups but are not included, of course, in the EV population; and (b) new minorities tend to have high rates of noncitizen adults, who are not eligible to vote. This disjuncture between the overall population and EVs has increased since 1980.

*The Lost Generation is the cohort that came of age during World War I. It refers to those born between 1883 and 1900.
In 1980, 385 percent of EVs were white, 4 percentage points higher than the white share of the overall population. Today, that figure has dropped to 70 percent—with 12 percent black, 12 percent Hispanic, and 6 percent Asian/Other—7 percentage points higher than the white share of the overall population. This widening gap between the overall population and EVs means that the diversification of the latter—a 15 percentage-point drop in the white share since 1980—has proceeded more slowly than the diversification of the former, which has seen a 17 percentage-point drop since 1980.

Interestingly, the overall population-EV gap is expected to narrow in the future, as more of the growth in Hispanics and Asians comes from native fertility rather than immigration; children of immigrants are citizens and therefore EVs once they reach age 18. By 2060, we predict that the EV population will be 46 percent white, 13 percent black, 27 percent Hispanic, and 14 percent Asian/Other. Compared with today, this is a drop of 24 percentage points in white EVs and gains of 15 points and 8 points, respectively, among Hispanics and Asians/Others. In contrast to changes between 1980 and today, this decline in the white share of EVs will actually be larger than the corresponding decline among the overall population—down 19 points between today and 2060.

The generational makeup of the eligible electorate has changed and will continue to change dramatically over time, though these changes will lag behind those taking place in the overall population. This is because members of a given genera-
tion do not enter the eligible electorate until they are 18 years old; therefore, a generation’s impact among EVs does not begin until 18 years after the first birth year of the cohort and is not fully felt until 18 years after the last birth year of the cohort. At that time, the generation’s weight among EVs peaks and will be at a level significantly above its overall population weight.

Keeping this in mind, the 1980 eligible electorate still contained a large contingent—32 percent—from the Greatest and Lost generations, along with 28 percent from the Silent Generation and a dominant 41 percent from the Baby Boom Generation. Today, it is a different world: The Greatest Generation has all but vanished, and the Silent Generation is down to 13 percent of EVs. The Baby Boomers are still a substantial presence at 32 percent of EVs, though they are down substantially from their peak of 45 percent in 1982. But the newest generations now dominate the electorate: Gen Xers at 26 percent of EVs and Millennials at 28 percent form the majority.

By 2060, we estimate that the picture will switch dramatically again. The Silent and Baby Boom generations will no longer be on the scene. Gen Xers will be down to 9 percent of EVs, though Millennials will be 27 percent. The dominant generations will be Post-Millennials at 31 percent and Post-Millennials 2 at 30 percent; Post-Millennials 3 will just be entering the electorate at 3 percent.

**FIGURE 1.7**

Generational replacement among eligible voters

Generational composition of eligible voting population, 1980–2060

Sources: Authors’ calculations are based on data from the Current Population Survey’s November Supplement, the Census’ 2014 National Population Projections, and the American Community Survey.
Reflecting these generational changes, especially the evolution of the Baby Boom Generation, the age distribution of EVs has changed—and will change—significantly over time, shifting toward an older age structure. In 1980, 29 percent of EVs were ages 18 to 29, 21 percent were ages 50 to 64, and 16 percent were ages 65 and older. Today, 18- to 29-year-old EVs are down to 21 percent, 50- to 64-year-olds are up to 23 percent, and seniors are up to 21 percent. By 2060, we expect that those ages 65 and older will be 29 percent and that those ages 50 to 64 will be 23 percent, for a total of 52 percent ages 50 and older. Eighteen- to 29-year-olds will be 17 percent and 30- to 39-year-olds will be 15 percent, for a total of 33 percent under age 40.

Of course, rising diversity means that the composition of these age groups is in a process of continual evolution. In 1980, 18- to 29-year-old EVs were only 19 percent minority; today, they are 39 percent minority. Looking ahead, we predict that they will be 53 percent minority by 2040 and 61 percent minority by 2060. The same pattern applies to senior EVs. In 1980, seniors were only 11 percent minority. Today, seniors are 22 percent minority. In 2060, we estimate that minorities will be close to half—45 percent—of seniors. Thus, the future “seniorization” of the EV population should not be confused with a “white seniorization”
of EVs; in fact, three-quarters of the growth in the senior share of EVs between now and 2040 is expected to come from growth in the minority senior share of EVs. Going out to 2060, we predict that minorities will be responsible for all of the growth in the senior share of EVs.

It is also true that white senior EVs have been undergoing a process of continuous generational transformation. In 1980, white senior EVs were entirely drawn from the Greatest and Lost generations. Today, they are dominated by the Silent Generation at 61 percent. But we expect that the Silent Generation will quickly give way, with Boomers becoming dominant—89 percent of white seniors in 2030—followed by Gen Xers and then Millennials at a collective 64 percent of white seniors in 2060.

**Education and marital status, 1974–2014**

Two other key areas of demographic change that have affected the EV population are education and marital status. Since our projections do not cover these characteristics, we are limited to the period up to the present day. Despite this, the levels of change that have taken place are impressive.

In 1974, EVs were far less educated than they are today. About one-third of EVs—32 percent—were high school dropouts. Thirty-seven percent had just a high school diploma, and 17 percent had some college but not a four-year degree. Only 14 percent had a four-year degree. This is divided between 8 percent with only a four-year degree and 6 percent with postgraduate education.
Given the highly salient political differences that have evolved between college-educated and noncollege-educated—no four-year degree—or working-class, whites, it is worth noting how heavily the white working class dominated the eligible voting electorate in 1974. In that year, 73 percent of all EVs were white working class—split between 40 percent women and 33 percent men—while just 13 percent were white college educated and 14 percent were minority.
Married voters also dominated the eligible electorate in 1974. Among EVs, 70 percent were married and 30 percent were unmarried. Of the unmarried, 18 percent were women and 12 percent were men.

Fast forward to 2014. Now, just 10 percent are high school dropouts; 30 percent have a four-year degree or more. White working-class EVs have dropped 26 percentage points to 47 percent, while white college graduates have risen from 13 percent to 23 percent of EVs. Unmarried EVs are now nearly as large a group as married EVs—48 percent vs. 52 percent—with unmarried women up 8 points to 26 percent and unmarried men up 10 points to 22 percent.

**FIGURE 1.12**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rise in unmarried men and women</th>
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<tr>
<td>Marital and gender composition of the eligible voting population, 1974–2014</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ calculations are based on data from the Current Population Survey’s November Supplement.

**Actual voters, 1976–2012**

Actual voters relative to EVs generally have some overrepresentation of white, married, older, and more educated individuals. However, changes over time among AVs tend to be very similar to changes among EVs. In the 1976 presidential election, for example, 89 percent of AVs were white, 8 percent were black, and 2 percent were Hispanic. By the 2012 presidential election, the percentage of whites among voters had declined by 15 points to 74 percent, with 13 percent black, 8 percent Hispanic, and 5 percent Asian/Other. (We compare 1976 with 2012 to avoid conflating turnout changes between presidential and off-year elections with long-term secular change.) That 15 percentage-point decline among white voters was almost identical to the 14 percentage-point decline among white EVs over the same time period.
Among voters in 2012, just 6 percent were high school dropouts, and 37 percent had a four-year degree or more. The latter figure, an unusually large 8 points higher than this group’s representation among EVs, reflects the well-documented tendency of the highly educated to turn out at higher rates than the less educated. White, working-class AVs have dropped 26 points since 1976 to 44 percent, while white college graduates have risen from 19 percent to 29 percent of voters. Unmarried voters have increased from 26 percent to 41 percent over the same time period, with unmarried women up 8 points to 24 percent and unmarried men up 7 points to 17 percent.
Generationally, the Greatest Generation represented 2 percent of voters in 2012, and the Silent Generation was down to 16 percent of AVs. Baby Boomers were 37 percent of AVs in that election, compared with 44 percent for Gen Xers and Millennials. Individually, these latter groups came in at 21 percent and 23 percent, respectively.
Exit polls, 1976–2012

Exit polls are another source of demographic data on voters, though by definition they provide us with no data on EVs. Exit polls have an advantage over data from the Current Population Survey, or CPS, in that they are based entirely on interviews with voters, rather than self-reports of voting in a more general survey, which can be biased by overreporting. With the rise of mail and early voting, however, this advantage is diminishing, as exit polls increasingly have to incorporate self-reported voters. Moreover, the sampling strategies of the exit polls can in themselves produce biases that are less present in the CPS.

All that being said, trends among voters tend to be very similar between the two data sources on key variables. According to the authors’ analysis of the National Election Pool exit polls for the relevant years, white voters declined from 90 percent in 1976 to 72 percent in 2012, with 13 percent black, 10 percent Hispanic, and 5 percent Asian/Other. The 72 percent level in 2012 is 2 points lower than that measured by the CPS, a difference attributable to measuring Hispanics at 10 percent rather than the CPS’ 8 percent.

According to the exit polls, 4 percent of voters in 2012 were high school dropouts, and 47 percent had a four-year degree or more. The latter compares with just 37 percent in the CPS, a discrepancy that is historically the largest between the exit polls and the CPS. However, the increase in college-educated voters in the exit polls closely tracks that recorded in the CPS: 18 points for the former between 1980 and 2012—there are no data available for 1976—and 16 points over the same time period for the latter.

Similarly, the exit polls had both white working-class and white college-educated voters at 36 percent in 2012, compared with the CPS measurements of 44 percent white working-class and 29 percent white college-educated voters. But the recorded fall in white working-class voters in the exit polls—29 points from 1980 to 2012—was similar to that in the CPS over the same time period, and the increase in white college-educated voters—10 points—was identical.
Representativeness

The CPS data, since they contain data on both EVs and AVs, as well as other parts of the population, allow us to make statements about the representativeness of voters who actually cast ballots and how that has been changing—or not changing—over time. Consider the composition of voters by race.

The first thing to note is how much lower the percentage of EVs among Hispanics and Asians is than among whites and blacks. In 2012, Hispanic EVs were less than half—44 percent—of the overall Hispanic population, while Asians were barely more than half—52 percent. In contrast, 69 percent of the black population was eligible to vote, as were 79 percent of whites. This reflects the fact that the proportion of those who are either children or noncitizen adults is far higher among Hispanics and Asians.

Over the past several decades, the representativeness of EVs relative to the VAP has been worsening. In 1976, the difference between the percentage of whites among EVs and the percentage of whites in the VAP was only 1.5 percentage points. By 2012, that difference had risen to 4 percentage points. However, our projections indicate that overrepresentation of white EVs relative to the VAP is now going to start going down and should dip under 1 percentage point in the 2050s.
We observe the same pattern in the other direction for Hispanics. In 1976, the percent of Hispanics among EVs was only 1.1 points lower than the Hispanics’ percent among the VAP. By 2012, that difference had risen to 3.4 points. However, just as with whites, we expect representation differences to diminish steadily in the future; underrepresentation of Hispanic EVs relative to the VAP should fall under 1 percentage point by the late 2040s.

It is even possible that the Hispanic EV-VAP gap could diminish faster than we are anticipating. This would occur through enhanced naturalization rates of Hispanic and Asian permanent residents who are eligible to become citizens. Naturalized citizenship rates have increased in recent years, though there is room for further growth. This is especially the case among Mexicans, who comprised more than one-third of the nearly 10 million legal permanent residents in 2011 and have one of the lowest naturalization rates. A survey conducted by the Pew Research Center indicates that among Hispanics, language, administration, and financial barriers are keeping them from naturalizing. These barriers will likely be overcome as more public and nonprofit services become available and start to provide greater assistance.
One of the most important ways to measure representativeness is to look at the relationship between EVs and AVs. This can be done by inspecting patterns of turnout and their effects on the composition of the voting electorate. Unsurprisingly, turnout rates vary widely among the demographic groups considered here.

Looking at race, turnout of white EVs in 2012 was 64 percent, and turnout of black EVs was 67 percent, the first time reported turnout among blacks was higher than among whites. In contrast, turnout among Hispanics was just 48 percent, and turnout among Asians was 47 percent.

Over time, turnout among whites shows no clear pattern, either for presidential or congressional elections. In 1976, white turnout was 63 percent; in 2012, it was 64 percent. Minority turnout, on the other hand, does show a rising pattern since 1996 in presidential turnout. Minority turnout in 1996 was 49 percent; in 2012, it was 56 percent. This can be attributed to steadily rising black turnout over the same time period: 53 percent in 1996 and 67 percent in 2012. Hispanic and Asian/Other turnout also rose over this time period, but far less and not as consistently as among blacks. However, the lower voter turnout rates of Hispanics and Asians may rise as members of these groups—especially those who have recently arrived in new destinations—become more familiar with registration and voting practices with the help of local government and civic organizations.
Turnout in congressional elections, on the other hand, has been remarkably stable among minorities, not moving much in either direction over time. This has meant that recently, with the rising trend in minority presidential turnout, the turnout drop-off among minorities between presidential and congressional elections has increased substantially. Turnout drop-off among minorities was 9 points between 1976 and 1978 and a modestly larger 11 points between 1996 and 1998, but it rose steadily after that, to 19 points in the 2010–2012 period.

These patterns have affected the extent to which whites are overrepresented among voters relative to their weight among EVs. The last three congressional elections for which we have data have seen the highest post-1974 differences between the white share of AVs and the white share of EVs, ranging from 4.5 percent to 5.9 percent. The flip side of this is a steady increase in underrepresentation among Hispanics and Asians—though not blacks—as the most recent election cycles have seen the largest negative differences between these groups’ representation among AVs compared with EVs.

Breaking down whites between college and noncollege educated, turnout differences are strong. In 2012, there was a 22 percentage-point difference between these two groups, with the former at 79 percent and the latter at 57 percent. The turnout difference was similar in 2010. Over time, the extent to which white working-class EVs are underrepresented among voters and the extent to which white college-educated EVs are overrepresented have increased. In 2012, the white working class was underrepresented by 4 points among AVs relative to EVs, while the white college educated were overrepresented by 6 points.
Turnout differences are also strong between married and unmarried EVs. In 2012, 54 percent of unmarried EVs voted, compared with 69 percent of married EVs. Similarly, in 2010, unmarried turnout was 36 percent, and married turnout was 54 percent. These large differences are reflected in the extent to which these groups are overrepresented and underrepresented among AVs compared with EVs. Underrepresentation of unmarried voters is less strong in presidential elections, where it has recently been in the 5-point to 6-point range, slightly lower than it generally was in the 1976–2000 period. In congressional elections, however, the difference between the unmarried shares of EVs and AVs has been growing; starting in 1994, unmarried underrepresentation has been around 10 points for five straight elections. Data on 2014 are not yet available.

Not surprisingly, younger generations, which have the lowest turnout, are underrepresented among voters compared with their strength among EVs. In 2012, Millennials were underrepresented by 6 points; in 2010, they were underrepresented by 10 points.

With the national picture in place, we move on to an examination of the 50 states that make up our nation.

Endnotes

1 All analysis in this report is based on the authors’ locally weighted scatterplot smoothing, or LOWESS, analysis of the 1974–2012 November Current Population Survey Voter Supplement, the May 2014 CPS, the 2013–2060 Census National Population Projections, and their own States of Change state population projections. Data on adults are available from 1974 for some states and from 1978 onward for all states. Data on all children are not available before 1980. See the Methodology section for additional information on LOWESS and data availability.

2 The “Asian/Other” categorization used in this report is a combination of those identifying as both non-Hispanic and Asian, Hawaiian, Pacific Islander, American Indian, Alaskan Native, or multiracial. The racial and ethnic questions asked by the CPS have changed radically over the past 40 years, and this combination category is an attempt to standardize these disparate data points.

3 Our eligible-voter data go back to 1974, but in discussions of race, age, and generation, we use 1980 as a starting point to facilitate comparison with overall population trends, where 1980 is the earliest year available. However, our EV charts for these characteristics do include the earliest data from 1974 where available.

4 This is true today; prior to the passage of the 26th Amendment to the Constitution in 1971, the period would have been 21 years.

5 Since we are only comparing adult populations over time, we start our trend analysis in 1974.


10 These turnout rates are inflated by some overreporting of the vote—that is, some respondents say they voted when they did not. Still, by the standards of survey research, the level of overreporting in the CPS is considered quite modest or, at the very least, does not misrepresent the electorate, given that different populations overreport at roughly the same rate.
The story in the states

The trends identified in our national analysis have also been reshaping the states. Indeed, it is fair to say that these trends have reshaped every state: Each has become more diverse; has seen a decline in the white working class and an increase in the white college-educated population; has seen growth in its unmarried population; and has witnessed the rise of new generations and the decline of the old. Of course, however, the rate of change varies across states, as do the initial demographic makeups of each state. This is particularly true of factors connected to racial composition, where we see the widest variation.

Moreover, the trends identified in our national analysis will continue to reshape the states through 2060, sometimes quite dramatically. Here, we look at the factors of race, age, and generation, thanks to the States of Change projections we have developed for every state. Unfortunately, factors such as education and marital status do not lend themselves to long-range projections,1 so we cannot include them in our discussions of the 2014–2060 period.

On our tour of the 50 states, we divide them up using a schema developed by demographer William Frey, which takes into account the differing initial levels of diversity and rates of change among the states. He divides the states into three broad categories or regions: the Melting Pot, the New Sun Belt, and the Heartland. These three broad regions reflect divisions that have developed due to selective immigration and domestic migration patterns that have evolved over the past three decades.2 They have left their imprint on the racial, population growth, and aging patterns in different parts of the country and are useful for framing this analysis of past and future regional electorate trends.

The Melting Pot states are those that have, going back to the 1980s or before, attracted Hispanics and Asians. These new minorities have been drawn to these regions because of a combination of historical migratory patterns and their status as immigration gateways. These states, representing about two-fifths of the nation’s
population, were the first to feel the effects of the nation’s new diversity to a large degree, and they serve as models of what will occur elsewhere as new racial minorities continue to disperse. Several of them, especially California and Texas, attracted younger domestic migrants—as well as immigrants—in the postwar period, and they thus tend to have more youthful as well as more racially diverse populations than the nation as a whole. These states include California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, and Texas. These states have traditionally had relatively high minority levels and include all four states that are currently majority-minority: California, Hawaii, New Mexico, and Texas.

These New Sun Belt states, comprising about two-fifths of the U.S. population, are the freshly minted growth areas of the country due to recent economic booms in the Southeast and Mountain West and are poised to gain even more in the future. White domestic migrants have dominated their growth, but this trend is tilting toward minority domestic migrants and immigrants. These states should see continuing, rapid diversity shifts, even as they stay younger than the states in the Melting Pot region. In the West, these states include Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. In the East, these states include Delaware, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia.

The Heartland states comprise the remainder of states in New England, the mid-Atlantic, the Deep South, the Midwest, and the Great Plains, where growth from both domestic migration and immigration has been slow—or even, in the case of domestic migration, net negative. These states, comprising about two-fifths of the nation’s population, tend to be whiter and older than both the Melting Pot and New Sun Belt states.

**Melting Pot states**

**California**

California, the most populous state in the union, has experienced some of the most dramatic change over the past four decades—change that, based on our projections, is expected to continue at a high level through 2060. Yet the demographic engines of the Golden State are being altered. For much of the postwar period, California was a magnet for domestic migrants from the rest of the United States, as well as for immigrants. But over the past two decades, its mostly white domestic migration turned negative due to...
to more favorable housing costs and employment opportunities further inland. As a result, the state’s growth rate moderated—the 2010 Census was the first in which California did not gain congressional seats—and the state’s population became dependent on immigration and natural increase, which are both dominated by Hispanics and other minorities.

In 1980, the population of California was 67 percent white. Today, that proportion has fallen to 40 percent, and by 2060, we estimate that it will be less than 23 percent. Hispanics were 18 percent in 1980, are 38 percent today, and will be 48 percent in 2060. Asians/Others were 8 percent in 1980, are 16 percent today, and will be 24 percent by 2060. Blacks, however, will actually decline slightly over time: In 1980, they were 8 percent of California’s population, dropping to 6 percent today and to 5 percent in 2060.

**FIGURE 2.2**  
*Racial composition of California, 1980–2060*

<table>
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Sources: Authors’ calculations are based on data from the Current Population Survey, the American Community Survey, and their own States of Change projections.
As in the country as a whole, the age structure of California has shifted and will continue to shift toward an older age structure over time. However, California’s age structure will remain younger than the country overall. For example, in 2060, children will still outnumber seniors by three percentage points—23 to 20—whereas the exact reverse will be true nationally.

And California’s children are becoming remarkably more diverse. In 1980, children were already 44 percent minority. Today, the state’s children are 70 percent minority. And diversification will not stop in the future, despite the current stratospheric level: In 2040, we predict children will be 79 percent minority; in 2060, California’s children will be 83 percent minority.

Turning to California’s eligible voters, in 1980, this group was 78 percent white. By 2014, that number had dropped to about half—51 percent. In contrast, Hispanics almost tripled—from 10 percent to 28 percent—and Asian/Other EVs almost quadrupled, from 4 percent to 15 percent. By 2060, we expect that California’s EVs will be just 26 percent white, with 46 percent Hispanic and 24 percent Asian/Other.

Note that we estimate the minority share of EVs in the future will actually grow faster than the minority share of the overall population; this will close the gap between the minority share of the population and the minority share of EVs in California. In both 1980 and 2014, the gap was a healthy 11 percentage points, but it will be down to a mere 3 points by 2060.

As is the case nationally, California’s EVs are becoming older over time. Today, they are 22 percent 18- to 29-year-olds and 19 percent ages 65 and older. By 2060, we estimate they will be 20 percent younger than age 30 and 28 percent ages 65 and older. But each age group is rapidly becoming more diverse, and that certainly includes California’s seniors. Today, senior EVs in the state are 38 percent minority, but by 2060, they will be 68 percent minority. The white senior share of all EVs is actually expected to drop going forward, and all of the growth in senior EVs should be due to the burgeoning minority share of that group.
The mix of white EVs by education has also changed dramatically over time. In 1974, 63 percent of California EVs were white working class. In 2014, only 29 percent were, representing a drop of 34 percentage points. Over the same time period, white college-educated EVs actually increased from 17 percent to 20 percent. These shifts changed the mix of white EVs from 79 percent white working class and 21 percent white college educated to 59 percent white working class and 41 percent white college educated. We cannot project the mix by education of white EVs going forward; however, there is every reason to suppose that white EVs in California will continue to tilt more toward being college educated and less toward being working class over time.
In addition, the mix of EVs by marital status went from 67 percent married and 33 percent unmarried to an exact 50-50 split. Unmarried women went from 19 percent to 27 percent of EVs, and unmarried men increased from 15 percent to 23 percent.

Looking at those who actually voted in elections, as distinct from those who were eligible to do so, white voters in California dropped 27 percentage points, from 84 percent to 57 percent between the 1976 and 2012 presidential elections. Hispanic voters quadrupled from 6 percent to 24 percent, while Asian/Other voters more than quadrupled from 3 percent to 13 percent.

White noncollege actual voters fell exactly as much as white noncollege EVs did—34 points—over the 1976–2012 time period. White college voters, overrepresented relative to their weight among EVs, rose from 21 percent to 27 percent of voters.

Interestingly, married voters fell slightly more as a percentage of voters—18 points—than married EVs did as percentage of all EVs over the time period. And unmarried women gained more as a share of voters—10 points—than they did as a share of EVs.
Comparing voters with EVs, overrepresentation of whites and underrepresentation of Hispanics and Asians/Others have generally increased over time. In 2012, whites were overrepresented by 6 percentage points among voters relative to EVs, entirely due to the overrepresentation of white college voters. Hispanics and Asians/Others were underrepresented by 4 points and 2 points, respectively. Unmarried voters were underrepresented by 5 points, and Millennials were underrepresented by 6 points.

**FIGURE 2.5**
Representativeness of California’s voting population

Compositional differences between eligible and voting populations, 1974–2012

- **White**
- **Black**
- **Hispanic**
- **Asian/Other**

Texas

Texas, the nation’s second-most populous state, has also been the site of explosive demographic change, only slightly less than that experienced by California. Texas continues to be a consistent migration magnet, attracting both immigrants and domestic migrants. It is the fastest growing among the nation’s larger states. As a result, it gained four congressional seats after the 2010 Census and is poised to gain more in 2020. Already a majority-minority state with an especially diverse youth population, its electorate will continue to remain more youthful and far more racially diverse than the nation as a whole.
In 1980, the population of Texas was 66 percent white. Today, that proportion has fallen to 44 percent, and we predict that it will continue to fall to less than 25 percent by 2060. Hispanics were 21 percent in 1980; have almost doubled since then, increasing to 39 percent today; and will be 55 percent in 2060. Asians/Others were 1 percent in 1980, going up to 6 percent today and 9 percent by 2060. Blacks will remain steady at 11 percent to 12 percent of the population over the same time period.

**FIGURE 2.6**

**Racial composition of Texas, 1980–2060**

*White* □ *Black* □ *Hispanic* □ *Asian/Other* □

**Whole**

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**Eligible voters**

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*Sources: Authors’ calculations are based on data from the Current Population Survey, the American Community Survey, and their own States of Change projections.*
As in California, Texas’s age structure will remain younger than the country overall. In 2060, children will still outnumber seniors by 5 percentage points, 24 to 19.

Texas’ children, already remarkably diverse, will become more so. In 1980, children were already 45 percent minority; today, they are 66 percent minority. They will be 77 percent and 82 percent minority, respectively, in 2040 and 2060.

Looking at EVs, 73 percent of Texas’ EVs in 1980 were white, dropping to 53 percent by 2014. Hispanics more than doubled—increasing from 15 percent to 31 percent—and Asian/Other EVs went from negligible to 5 percent. By 2060, we expect that only 28 percent of Texas’ EVs will be white, more than half—51 percent—will be Hispanic, and 8 percent will be Asian/Other.

In Texas, the minority share of EVs has grown more slowly in recent decades than the minority share of the overall population, slightly widening the gap between the minority share of the population and the minority share of EVs. The gap in 1980 was 7 percentage points, and the gap today is 9 points. However, we estimate this gap will narrow steadily in the future as Hispanic growth increasingly comes from native fertility, shrinking to a mere 3 points by 2060.

Corresponding to national trends, Texas’ EVs are becoming older over time. While today they are 24 percent 18- to 29-year-olds and 18 percent ages 65 and older, by 2060, they will be 21 percent under age 30 and 25 percent ages 65 and older. Rising diversity, however, will dramatically change the character of the senior EV population. Today, senior EVs in the state are 35 percent minority, but by 2060, they will be 63 percent minority. The white senior share of all EVs will experience no growth to 2040, with senior EV growth driven by minorities; after 2040, white seniors will start declining as a share of EVs, and all of the growth in senior EVs will be driven by the growth in minority seniors.
As in California, there has been a dramatic drop in the share of white working-class EVs in Texas. Over the 1974–2014 time period, their share of EVs plummeted from 62 percent to 33 percent. In contrast, white college-educated EVs increased modestly from 13 percent to 18 percent. Married EVs also declined sharply from 73 percent to 53 percent.

**FIGURE 2.8**

**Educational composition of Texas’ white population, 1974–2014**

Composition of white college-educated and white noncollege-educated EVs and AVs

![Chart showing the educational composition of Texas’ white population from 1974 to 2014.]

Source: Authors’ calculations are based on data from the Current Population Survey.

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FIGURE 2.7

Racial diversity among Texas’ eligible seniors, 1974–2060

Composition of EVs ages 65 and older

![Chart showing the racial diversity among Texas’ eligible seniors from 1980 to 2060.]

Sources: Authors’ calculations are based on data from the Current Population Survey, the American Community Survey, and their own States of Change projections.
In terms of AVs, whites fell from 81 percent to 59 percent between the 1976 and 2012 presidential elections. This 22-point drop is very close to the drop in the share of white EVs over the same time period. Hispanic AVs more than doubled from 10 percent to 21 percent, and Asian/Other AVs increased from essentially 0 percent to 4 percent.

White noncollege-educated voters fell about as much—25 points—as white noncollege-educated EVs did—26 points—over the same time period. White college voters went up slightly, from 22 percent to 25 percent of voters.

Unmarried voters gained less—15 points—than they did as a percentage of all EVs. This was mostly due to unmarried men, who gained only 6 points in voter share over the time period.

Overrepresentation of whites has increased over time, while underrepresentation of Hispanics has gone up. In 2012, whites were overrepresented by 7 points among voters relative to EVs, again due to the white college educated. Hispanics, by contrast, were underrepresented in that election by 8 points, and Millennials were underrepresented by a stunning 11 points.

*FIGURE 2.9*  
Representativeness of Texas’ voting population  
Compositional differences between eligible and voting populations, 1974–2012  

![Figure representing compositional differences between eligible and voting populations](image-url)  

Source: Authors’ calculations are based on data from the Current Population Survey.
Florida

Despite its housing bubble and economic shortfall during the latter part of the 2000–2010 decade, Florida seems to be returning to a growth trajectory, recently overtaking New York as the third-most populous state. Long known as a magnet for retirees and immigrants from Latin America, migration to the Sunshine State has broadened to include younger and more racially diverse migration streams than the rest of the United States.

In 1980, the population of Florida was 75 percent white. That has fallen to 57 percent today. By 2028, Florida should become majority-minority, and by 2060, whites are expected to be down to just 35 percent of Florida’s population. Hispanics were 8 percent in 1980 and have almost tripled since then, reaching 23 percent today and a projected 40 percent in 2060. Asians/Others were 1 percent in 1980, are 4 percent today, and will double to 8 percent by 2060. Blacks will remain steady at 16 percent to 17 percent over the same time period.
In contrast to California and Texas, Florida’s age structure is now older than the nation as a whole. In the future, however, the age structure is projected to converge toward the national average.

As that happens, Florida’s children will become rapidly more diverse. In 1980, the state’s children were 35 percent minority. That has risen to 54 percent minority today. Florida’s children will be 69 percent and 76 percent minority, respectively, in 2040 and 2060.
Turning to EVs, in 1980, 81 percent of Florida’s EVs were white. That figure has dropped to 66 percent today. Hispanics, less than 5 percent in 1974, have more than tripled to 17 percent today, while Asian/Other EVs have risen from just above 0 percent to 3 percent. By 2060, we predict that Florida’s white EVs will be down to 41 percent, Hispanic EVs will double to 35 percent, and 8 percent will be Asian/Other.

As in Texas, the minority share of EVs in Florida has increased more slowly in recent decades than the minority share of the overall population. This has widened the gap between the minority share of the population and the minority share of EVs. In 1980, the gap was 6 percentage points; today, the gap is 9 percentage points. But the gap is projected to shrink back down to 6 points by 2060.

Florida’s EVs have become older over time, a trend that will continue in the future. Seniors were 23 percent of EVs in 1980, are 26 percent of Florida’s EVs today, and we project they will be 32 percent by 2060. But as we saw in California and Texas, rising diversity will transform the character of the senior EV population. Florida’s senior EVs are still overwhelmingly white today—just 24 percent are minority. But by 2060, the minority share of senior EVs will have doubled to 48 percent. Just as in Texas, the white senior share of all EVs will experience no growth to 2040, with senior EV growth driven by minorities. And after 2040, white seniors will start declining as a share of EVs, with all the growth in senior EVs coming from minority seniors.

**FIGURE 2.11**
Racial diversity among Florida’s eligible seniors, 1974–2060

Composition of EVs ages 65 and older

Sources: Authors’ calculations are based on data from the Current Population Survey, the American Community Survey, and their own States of Change projections.
Between 1974 and 2014, noncollege-educated white EVs in Florida dropped sharply by 27 points, from 71 percent to 44 percent. But white college-educated EVs have more than doubled, going from 10 percent to 21 percent. Over the same time period, unmarried EVs increased from 28 percent to 47 percent.

**FIGURE 2.12**

**Educational composition of Florida’s whites, 1974–2014**

Composition of white college-educated and white noncollege-educated EVs and AVs

In terms of AVs, whites fell from 84 percent to 67 percent between the 1976 and 2012 presidential elections. Here, the drop in the white voting electorate is actually larger than the drop in white EVs—15 points over the same time period. On the growth side, Hispanic AVs went up by a factor of more than four—from 4 percent to 17 percent—and Asian/Other voters went from barely registering to 3 percent.

With a decrease of 29 percentage points, white noncollege-educated voters fell more as a share of voters than white noncollege-educated EVs did as a share of EVs—decreasing by 24 points over the same time period. In contrast, white college voters rose sharply from 15 percent to 25 percent of voters.

Unmarried voters rose by 16 points over the time period, from 26 percent to 42 percent. The increase was split about equally between unmarried women and men.
Overrepresentation of whites has been moderating in recent years, while underrepresentation of minorities has been decreasing. In 2012, whites were only overrepresented by 1.2 points, while Hispanics were actually overrepresented by four-tenths of a point. And blacks were only underrepresented by eight-tenths of a point—the smallest difference ever recorded by the Current Population Survey in a presidential election for this group in Florida. Millennials, however, were underrepresented by 5 points in that election.

![Figure 2.13](image.png)

**Representativeness of Florida’s voting population**

Compositional differences between eligible and voting populations, 1974–2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Hispanic</th>
<th>Asian/Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ calculations are based on data from the Current Population Survey.

**Other Melting Pot states**

The other Melting Pot states include the other two majority-minority states, Hawaii and New Mexico, which are, respectively, the states with the highest Asian and Hispanic concentrations, respectively, in the country. While less racially diverse, the remaining Melting Pot states—New York, Illinois, and New Jersey—are northern counterparts to California in the sense that they house large populations and have long been settlement areas for immigrant minorities—containing New York City, Chicago, and the suburbs of New York and Philadelphia, respectively. And as with California, all of their population growth now stems from mostly minority immigration and natural increase as they lose white domestic migrants to other states. But unlike California, their populations are older than the United States as a whole.
Hawaii, with 68 percent Asian/Other\(^4\) in its population, far outstrips any other states today. Hawaii’s level of Asian/Other population, as the chart shows, has changed very little from 1980 to today, and we expect that it will rise very modestly to 69 percent in the future. Other states, though they have far lower levels, have changed more over time: Illinois, New Jersey, and New York have seen their shares of the Asian/Other population rise from 2 percent to 6 percent in Illinois and to 10 percent in New Jersey and New York. In addition, New Mexico’s share of the Asian/Other population rose from 9 percent to 13 percent. Note, however, that in contrast to other states, the increase there was attributable to growth among Native Americans, not Asians. By 2060, our projections indicate that the share of the Asian/Other population will reach between 13 percent at the low end—Illinois—and 20 percent at the high end—New Jersey—in these four states.
FIGURE 2.14
Racial composition of the whole, child, eligible, and actual voter populations, 1980–2060
Hawaii, Illinois, New Jersey, New Mexico, and New York

Sources: Authors’ calculations are based on data from the Current Population Survey, the American Community Survey, and their own States of Change projections.
New Mexico’s Hispanic population level in 2014 was 47 percent, again a great deal higher than any other states. That 47 percent was a 15-point increase over the 1980s level of 32 percent. Other states, even Hawaii, also saw significant Hispanic increases. New Jersey saw the sharpest increase over the time period, tripling from 6 percent to 18 percent. New York almost doubled from 10 percent to 18 percent, and Hawaii went up from 2 percent to 12 percent. By 2060, New Mexico’s Hispanic population is projected to hit 61 percent. New Jersey will be at 33 percent, New York will be at 31 percent, Illinois will be at 29 percent, and Hawaii will be at 16 percent.
Reflecting the trends above, all five states experienced declines in their levels of white populations over the time period, with further decreases expected in the future. Hawaii—with the highest, but most stable, minority population—experienced the least change, seeing whites decline by 13 percentage points—from 30 percent to 17 percent. New Jersey saw the sharpest decline, 23 points, from 81 percent to 58 percent. New York and New Mexico both saw their white populations drop 18 points from 1980 to today, and Illinois experienced a 16-point drop over the time period. In the future, Illinois, New Jersey, and New York will join Hawaii and New Mexico as majority-minority states. The former three states will hit this milestone at around 2044, 2028, and 2032, respectively. By 2060, we predict that the white population will be down to 43 percent in Illinois, 38 percent in New York, 34 percent in New Jersey, 18 percent in New Mexico, and a mere 14 percent in Hawaii.

Hawaii has 66 percent Asian/Other EVs today, a level that has changed little since 1980. Illinois, New Jersey, and New York have seen their shares of Asian/Other EVs rise from 1 percent or less in 1980 to 5 percent to 8 percent today. We project that Illinois’ Asian/Other EVs will rise to 12 percent by 2060 and that New Jersey and New York will see these EVs rise to 17 percent to 18 percent by 2060. New Mexico’s share of Asian/Other EVs doubled from 6 percent to 12 percent between 1980 and 2014 and will rise to 19 percent by 2060. Hawaii’s Asian/Other EVs will rise only a couple of points to 68 percent by 2060.

New Mexico’s level of Hispanic EVs in 2014 was 41 percent, up 11 points since 1980. By 2060, we estimate that Hispanics will be 59 percent of New Mexico’s EVs. Today, Illinois, New Jersey, and New York have 11 percent to 14 percent Hispanic EVs, and this will rise to 26 percent to 30 percent by 2060. Hawaii has 9 percent Hispanic EVs today, rising to a comparatively modest 16 percent by 2060.

Hawaii has the least decline in white EVs, down 9 points from 1980 and 2014 and projected to decline another 9 points by 2060. New Jersey has seen the sharpest decline in white EVs—20 points—and is projected to decline another 27 points to 39 percent by 2060. New York and New Mexico each declined 17 points between 1980 and 2014 and will decline another 22 points to 23 points by 2060. At that point, the latter state will have a white share of EVs of a mere 21 percent. Illinois’ white EV share will decline less than these two states but will still fall by 37 points over the 1980–2060 time period.
In all five of these states between 1980 and 2014, minority EVs increased more slowly than the minority share of the overall population, slightly widening the gap between the minority share of EVs and the minority share overall. But in all five of these states, the projections indicate that this gap will narrow in the future as minority EVs grow faster than the minority share of the population.

Four of these Melting Pot states—with the exception, once again, of Hawaii—experienced very rapid declines in their shares of white working-class EVs. Noncollege-educated whites fell by 28 percentage points to 33 points in Illinois, New York, and New Jersey between 1974 and 2014. In New Mexico, the data start in 1978, showing a decline of 22 points by 2014. In contrast, three of these states saw double-digit increases in their shares of white college-educated EVs: Illinois with 14 points, New Jersey with 13 points, and New York with 11 points.

Married EVs declined fairly rapidly across these five states, between 15 points and 25 points from the 1970s to 2014.
In terms of the voting electorate, the decline of white voters from 1976 to 2012 in Illinois, New Jersey, and New York was substantial and closely paralleled the decline in white EVs in these states. But in Hawaii and New Mexico from 1980 to 2012, white voters declined noticeably slower and significantly less than white EVs over the same time period. In Hawaii, white voters declined just 3 percentage points between the 1980 and 2012 presidential elections, and in New Mexico, they declined only 5 percentage points.

In Illinois, New Jersey, and New York, Hispanic and particularly Asian/Other growth in voters lagged behind these groups’ increases in shares of EVs. But the overall minority vote grew in tandem with the growth in minority EVs, thanks to rises in the black share of AVs in these states that exceeded the very modest growth in black EVs. For example, in New York, the black share of voters rose 8 points from 1976 to 2012, while blacks only grew 3 points as a share of EVs.

In New Mexico, growth in the Hispanic share of voters severely lagged behind the growth of Hispanic EVs from 1980 to 2012—representing a difference of 2 points vs. 12 points. And in Hawaii, Asian/Other voters actually declined as a share of voters between 1980 and 2012, while that population’s share of EVs continued to grow at least modestly over that period.

In Illinois, New Jersey, and New York, white working-class voters declined slightly faster than the white working-class share of EVs. In New Jersey, for example, the white working-class share of voters declined by 33 points between 1976 and 2012, while white working-class EVs declined by 31 points. In New Mexico, on the other hand, white working-class voters decreased less—and white college-educated voters increased more—than their shares of EVs.

Across these states, married voters generally declined more slowly than did their share of EVs, though the differences were typically modest.
FIGURE 2.16
Representativeness of voting population, 1978–2012

Source: Authors’ calculations are based on data from the Current Population Survey.
In all of these states, whites are overrepresented among AVs relative to their share of EVs. However, in Illinois, New Jersey, and New York, overrepresentation of whites has declined lately, chiefly due to a decline in underrepresentation among blacks. Hispanics and Asians are generally more underrepresented than blacks. Millennials in these states are underrepresented by 5 points to 8 points.

Endnotes

1 While characteristics such as race or age are locked in when a person enters the population, educational attainment and marital status are fluid behaviors that are more subject to economic and societal forces.


3 The “Asian/Other” categorization used in this report is a combination of those identifying as both non-Hispanic and Asian, Hawaiian, Pacific Islander, American Indian, Alaskan Native, or multiracial. The racial and ethnic questions asked by the Current Population Survey have changed radically over the past 40 years, and this combination category is an attempt to standardize these disparate data points.

4 The “Asian” category, here as elsewhere, includes those who indicated Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander on the Census’ race question. In Hawaii, these individuals are a substantial group, but in other states, their numbers are fractional.
New Sun Belt states in the West

As domestic migrants and immigrants spill inward from largely coastal Melting Pot states, the rapidly growing New Sun Belt states can be thought of as America’s new frontier. It nonetheless makes sense to separate the discussion of states in the West from those in the Southeast because of the somewhat separate sources of their population growth, which have unique effects on their inhabitants. The New Sun Belt-West states include the nation’s four fastest-growing states from 2000 to 2010—Nevada, Arizona, Utah, and Idaho—and each of the remaining states—Colorado, Washington, Wyoming, Alaska, and Oregon—rank among the top 18. The primary source of minority growth for these states is new minorities—Hispanics and Asians—who, in many cases, are landing directly as immigrants or spilling out from Melting Pot states such as California and Texas.

Colorado

Colorado’s demographic history is one of boom and bust, and while its growth during the 2000–2010 period was more modest than in the 1990s, the state is still a magnet for largely white domestic migrants from other states—especially California and Texas—and has continued to attract Hispanics, the largest of its minority populations. Moreover, Colorado is also a magnet for college graduates and ranks high among states in the educational attainment of its population.

In 1980, the population of Colorado was 86 percent white. Today, the state is down to 69 percent white. We estimate that it will reach majority-minority status by 2050 and will become 45 percent white by 2060. The Hispanic population jumped from 9 percent to 22 percent between 1980 and 2014 and will rise to 40 percent by 2060. Asians/Others were 2 percent in 1980, are 6 percent today, and will reach 11 percent by 2060. Blacks will remain 3 percent to 4 percent of Colorado’s population over the entire time period.
As with California and Texas, Colorado’s age structure is currently younger than the nation as a whole. It is projected to stay that way through 2060, when children will still outnumber seniors by 23 percent to 19 percent.

These children will become much more diverse over time. In 1980, the state’s children were just 19 percent minority. Today, they are 41 percent minority, and they will be 64 percent minority by 2060.
Turning to eligible voters, in 1980, 88 percent of Colorado’s EVs were white, a number that decreased to 76 percent in 2014—a drop of 12 percentage points. Hispanic EVs doubled from 8 percent to 16 percent, and Asian/Other EVs went from fractional to 4 percent. By 2060, we predict that white EVs will be just below 50 percent, Hispanic EVs will be up to 37 percent, and Asian/Other EVs will be 10 percent.

In the past few decades, the minority share of Colorado’s EVs has grown much more slowly than the minority share of the overall population. This has widened the gap between the minority share of the population and the minority share of EVs from 2 points in 1980 to 7 points today. The gap is predicted to shrink slightly in the future to 5 points in 2060.

Colorado’s EVs have also become older over time, a trend that will continue in the future. Seniors were just 12 percent of EVs in 1980, are 17 percent of EVs today, and will be almost 26 percent of EVs by 2060. But this change in the level of senior EVs is mostly about the increase in minority senior EVs; we estimate that white senior EVs will rise only a single point over the 2014–2060 time period, compared with more than 7 points for minority senior EVs. Even over the 2014–2040 time period—where white senior EV levels peak around 2040—white senior EVs will still only be responsible for about one-quarter of the growth in senior EVs.

**FIGURE 3.3**
Racial diversity among Colorado’s eligible seniors, 1978–2060

Composition of EVs ages 65 and older

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Minority, ages 65 and older</th>
</tr>
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<td>2010</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>11%</td>
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<td>16%</td>
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<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2060</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Authors’ calculations are based on data from the Current Population Survey, the American Community Survey, and their own States of Change projections.
In terms of white working-class EVs, they declined sharply by 29 percentage points from 1978 to 2014. White college EVs, on the other hand, have more than doubled, going from 17 percent to 35 percent over the same time period.

Unmarried EVs increased from 32 percent to 44 percent from 1978 to 2014, a modest increase compared with other states over the same time period.

Whites fell from 92 percent to 84 percent of actual voters between the 1980 and 2012 presidential elections, less than the 11-point decline in white EVs over the same time period. Hispanic AVs doubled from 5 percent to 10 percent, and Asian/Other AVs increased from 1 percent to 3 percent.

White noncollege voters fell from 64 percent to 45 percent over the time period, a smaller decline than among white noncollege EVs. White college voters rose from 28 percent to 40 percent, also less than the increase among white college EVs. Unmarried voters increased relatively modestly from 28 percent to 41 percent between 1980 and 2012.
There has been no clear trend over time in the levels of overrepresentation among whites or underrepresentation among minorities. In 2012, whites were overrepresented by 5 points among voters relative to EVs, and Hispanics were underrepresented in the same election by 4 points. These figures are very close to the corresponding figures in 1980. Millennials were underrepresented by a modest 5 points in 2012.

**Figure 3.5**

Representativeness of Colorado’s voting population

Compositional differences between eligible and voting populations, 1978–2012

Source: Authors’ calculations are based on data from the Current Population Survey.

Nevada

Despite dipping somewhat since the recession, Nevada has historically had a very high population growth rate, ranking first in the nation between 2000 and 2010. This rapid growth first came from domestic migration from the rest of the United States and is now increasingly being supplemented by immigrants from abroad. Overall, Nevada’s draw of migrants has become more and more racially diverse, a phenomenon which was heightened by the state’s economic surge and housing boom in the mid-2000–2010 decade, which prompted a migrant spillover of whites and racial minorities from California.

In 1980, the population of Nevada was 83 percent white. This figure has plummeted to 54 percent today, and by 2019, our projections indicate that the state should be majority-minority. By 2060, Nevada should be just 27 percent white. Hispanics
have jumped from 6 percent in 1980 to 27 percent today and will be a stunning 44 percent in 2060. Asians/Others have risen from 2 percent to 11 percent and will be 19 percent by 2060. Blacks have been stable at around 8 percent from 1980 to 2014 but are expected to grow slightly to 10 percent by 2060.

Nevada’s age structure is notably younger than the nation as a whole. It is projected to stay that way through 2060, when those under age 30 will still be 40 percent of the population, compared with 34 percent nationwide. Nevada’s children will become remarkably diverse: From 1980 to 2014, the minority share of the state’s children rose from 20 percent to 58 percent. This share will rise to 82 percent by 2060.
Looking at EVs, in 1980, 89 percent of Nevada’s EVs were white, but that number fell to 63 percent in 2014, and we estimate that it will dip all the way to 31 percent by 2060. The Hispanic population more than tripled—from 5 percent to 17 percent—between 1980 and 2014 and will reach 40 percent by 2060. Asian/Other EVs have shot up from 1 percent to 10 percent and will be pushing 20 percent by 2060. And, unusual for this area of the country, blacks have increased their share of EVs from 6 percent to 8 percent and should reach close to 10 percent by 2060.

In Nevada, the minority share of the overall population has grown faster since 1980 than the minority share of EVs. This has widened the gap between the minority share of the population and the minority share of EVs to around 9 points. In the future, however, this gap is projected to shrink back down to around 4 points by 2060.

In 1980, seniors were just 10 percent of EVs, but that doubled to 20 percent by 2014. By 2060, we expect that seniors should be almost 26 percent of Nevada’s EVs. As the senior share of the state’s EVs is growing, so is the minority share of these EVs. The minority share of senior EVs was a mere 6 percent in 1980, has reached 27 percent today, and will be 57 percent by 2060. Over the 2014–2060 time period, growth in Nevada’s minority EVs will be completely responsible for the growth in its senior EVs.

**FIGURE 3.7**

**Racial diversity among Nevada’s eligible seniors, 1978–2060**

**Composition of EVs ages 65 and older**

Sources: Authors’ calculations are based on data from the Current Population Survey, the American Community Survey, and their own States of Change projections.
The sharp drop in white EVs is due to the declining population of the white working class. These EVs dropped 30 percentage points over the 1978–2014 time period, while white college-educated EVs have barely changed, rising only 3 points. Unmarried EVs have risen 19 points to 54 percent, making up more than half of Nevada’s EVs.

**FIGURE 3.8**
Educational composition of Nevada’s whites, 1978–2014
Composition of white college and white noncollege EVs and AVs

As a share of AVs, whites fell from 91 percent to 67 percent between the 1980 and 2012 presidential elections. Black AVs increased from 6 percent to 9 percent, Hispanic AVs quintupled from 3 percent to 15 percent, and Asian/Other AVs leaped from 1 percent to 9 percent over the same time period.

White noncollege voters fell about as much as white noncollege EVs between the 1980 and 2012 presidential elections at 27 percent. White college voters went up very modestly from 20 percent to 24 percent. And unmarried AVs gained slightly more than they did as a percentage of all EVs at 17 percent.

Overrepresentation of whites has generally increased over time, particularly in congressional elections. In 2010, whites were overrepresented by 8 points among voters relative to EVs, while in 2012, overrepresentation was a much more modest 3 points. Consistent with this pattern, Hispanics were underrepresented by 5 points in 2010 compared with 2 points in 2012. Millennials were underrepresented by 6 points in 2012.
Arizona

As the nation’s second-fastest-growing state between 2000 and 2010, Arizona shares some of the same demographic dynamics as Nevada: a spillover of migration from California and immigration from across the Mexican border. But more so than Nevada, it has a long record of attracting white seniors, so it is somewhat older and whiter than Nevada but still at the nexus of powerful demographic currents.

In 1980, the population of Arizona was 83 percent white. This figure has fallen to 55 percent today. By 2022, the state should be majority-minority, and by 2060, Arizona should be just 31 percent white. Hispanics were 13 percent in 1980; are 33 percent today; and will be almost half, at 48 percent, in 2060. Asians/Others have risen from 3 percent to 9 percent and will be 16 percent by 2060. Blacks have doubled from 2 percent to 4 percent since 1980, a level that should be stable to 2060.
Arizona's age structure is notably younger than the nation as a whole; we estimate that children will continue to outnumber seniors through 2060. And Arizona's children will become substantially more diverse over time. Just 25 percent minority in 1980, children are now 60 percent minority, and they will be 81 percent minority by 2060.

Turning to EVs, from 1980 to 2014, Arizona’s white EVs dropped from 86 percent to 65 percent. By 2060, our projections indicate that Arizona’s white EVs will be down to 36 percent. The Hispanic population increased roughly two-and-a-half times—from 10 percent to 24 percent—between 1980 and 2014 and will reach 45 percent by 2060. Asian/Other EVs have risen from 2 percent to 7 percent today and will more than double to 15 percent by 2060.
In Arizona, the minority share of the overall population has increased more slowly since 1980 than the minority share of EVs. This has widened the gap between the minority share of the population and the minority share of EVs from 4 points to 10 points. That gap is expected to narrow in the future, however, coming back down to about 5 points by 2060.

The senior share of EVs has risen modestly since 1980 from 17 percent to 21 percent. It will continue rising in the future, reaching almost 27 percent of Arizona’s EVs by 2060. The rise in the senior share of the state’s EVs will be driven completely by the rising numbers of minority seniors. We predict that the white senior share of EVs will make essentially no gains to 2040 and will then start declining to under 15 percent by 2060. At that point, the share of white seniors among EVs will be lower than it was in 1980.

![Figure 3.11: Racial diversity among Arizona’s eligible seniors, 1978–2060](image)

From 1978 to 2014, the drop in white working-class EVs in Arizona has been particularly sharp, down 31 points, from 69 percent to 38 percent. In contrast, white college-educated EVs rose from 15 percent to 22 percent. Unmarried EVs increased from 31 percent to just under half of Arizona’s EVs at 49 percent.
In terms of AVs, whites fell from 90 percent to 72 percent between the 1980 and 2012 presidential elections, slightly less than the decline of white EVs over the same time period. Black AVs increased from 1 percent to 4 percent, Hispanic AVs more than doubled from 8 percent to 17 percent, and Asian/Other AVs increased sharply from 1 percent to 8 percent.

White noncollege AVs fell 22 points from 63 percent to 41 percent, significantly less than their decline in EVs over the time period. White college voters went up, but only from 28 percent to 31 percent.

Unmarried AVs only went up 8 points from 1980 to 2012. This is only half of their gain in EVs over those years, an unusually large trend disjuncture. Almost all of the gain among voters was from unmarried men; unmarried women only went up a single point.

White overrepresentation has increased over time in both presidential and congressional elections. This has been almost entirely driven by increased underrepresentation of Hispanics. Interestingly, white overrepresentation and Hispanic underrepresentation have both been larger in recent presidential elections than in congressional elections, the reverse of the usual pattern. In 2010, for example, whites were overrepresented by 5 points among voters relative to EVs, while in 2012, their overrepresentation was a larger 8 points. Similarly, Hispanics were underrepresented in 2010 by 5 points, compared with 6 points in 2012. Millennials were underrepresented by 8 points in 2012.
Among the rest of the New Sun Belt-West states, one can make a distinction between those on the coast—Washington, Oregon, and Alaska—and those in the interior—Idaho, Wyoming, and Utah. Washington and Oregon have commonalities with California as long-term destinations of mostly white domestic migrants and, more recently, immigrants—particularly Asians. But they have also experienced population growth as a result of spillover from California, especially with regard to Hispanics. Washington, Oregon, and Alaska are whiter states overall than California, Nevada, or Arizona, but their patterns are shifting. Alaska, while still primarily white, stands out because of its large Alaska Native population, as well as its sizable Asian population, which, along with its small Hispanic population, has been growing.

The three interior states of Idaho, Wyoming, and Utah—the whitest states in the New Sun Belt-West—are at the edge of the diversity dispersion frontier with smaller but rapidly growing Hispanic populations. Utah is also notable because of its high fertility and younger population structure, with the lowest median age of all U.S. states at 29.2 in 2010, compared with 37 for the United States.
The decline in the white population in these six states between 1980 and 2014 ranged from a low of 11 points in Wyoming to a high of 19 points in Washington. The level of the white population in 2014 was 72 percent in Washington and 83 percent in Wyoming. By 2060, however, we estimate that white population levels will sink much further, including in states such as Idaho, Wyoming, and Utah, where levels will be 66 percent, 62 percent, and 58 percent, respectively. Alaska and Washington will actually join the ranks of majority-minority states as well—Alaska around 2030 and Washington in about 2056.

**FIGURE 3.14**
**Racial composition of whole, child, eligible, and actual voter populations, 1980–2060**
Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming

Sources: Authors’ calculations are based on data from the Current Population Survey, the American Community Survey, and their own States of Change projections.
The three coastal states—Oregon, Washington, and Alaska—had by far the greatest increases in the Asian/Other population from 1980 to 2014. In Washington, the Asian/Other population increased by 10 points, from 4 percent to 14 percent; in Oregon, Asian/Other EVs increased by 6 points, from 3 percent to 9 percent; and in Alaska, Asians/Others increased by 8 points, from 16 percent to 24 percent. By 2060, Asians/Others should be 17 percent in Oregon, 26 percent in Washington, and a stunning 53 percent in Alaska.
Among these states, the largest increases in the Hispanic population between 1980 and 2014 were in Oregon at 11 points; Washington at 10 points; and, interestingly, Utah at 10 points. By 2060, Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Wyoming, and Utah will all be at least 20 percent Hispanic. Utah will be the highest at 29 percent.

The decline in white EVs between 1980 and 2014 was largest in Washington at 15 points and in Oregon at 12 points and was lowest in Wyoming at 7 points. By 2060, we expect white EVs will be down to 53 percent in Washington and 35 percent in Alaska but still more than 70 percent in Wyoming and Idaho.

In all these states, the growth of the minority population between 1980 and 2014 was slower than the growth in minority EVs, widening the gap between the minority share of EVs and the minority share of the population. Washington and Oregon will see a slight diminution of this gap in the future, but Idaho and Utah will see little change. Wyoming, contrary to the experience of most other states, is expected to see the gap widen, increasing from 5 points in 2014 to 10 points by 2060.

The three coastal states of Oregon, Washington, and Alaska had the largest increases in Asian/Other EVs between 1980 and 2014, led by Washington, where Asian/Other EVs rose from 3 percent to 11 percent. By 2060, we estimate that Washington will have 24 percent Asian/Other EVs and that Alaska will have 52 percent.

The largest increases in Hispanic EVs from 1980 to 2014 were in Washington, Oregon, and Utah at 6 points each. By 2060, these three states are projected to have 20 percent or more Hispanic EVs, with Utah topping the list at 26 percent.

The largest declines in white working-class EVs across the time period were in Washington and Oregon, down 26 points and 20 points, respectively, between 1978 and 2014. These two states, along with Idaho and Utah, also saw double-digit increases in white college-educated EVs.
Married EVs declined at relatively modest rates across the six states, ranging from a high of 14 points in Oregon to a low of 9 points in Utah.

The decline of white voters in Washington, Oregon, and Alaska was close to the decline in white EVs between 1980 and 2012 in those same states. In all three states, strong increases in Asian/Other voters drove the declines: 10 points in Washington, 9 points in Alaska, and 6 points in Oregon.

In the other states, the decline in white voters noticeably lagged behind the decline in white EVs. Since these states had only quite modest declines in white EVs to begin with, the resulting decline in white voters was very slow. At the extreme, Wyoming’s voting electorate in 2012 was only 2 points less white than it was in 1980, decreasing from 97 percent to 95 percent.
Between the 1980 and 2012 presidential elections, white noncollege voters declined the most in Washington at 25 points and in Idaho at 24 points. White college voters increased the most in Idaho at an astonishing 19 points—9 points greater than the increase in white college EVs over the same period—and in Washington and Utah at 13 points each.

In Oregon, the decline in married voters matched the decline in married EVs over this time period. In the other states, the decline in married voters lagged behind the decline in married EVs by 3 points to 5 points.

In all these states, whites are overrepresented among voters relative to their share of EVs. And in all states—except Idaho, where overrepresentation has been fairly stable—levels of white overrepresentation have been generally increasing over time. Conversely, underrepresentation of new minorities has also been increasing, particularly that of Asian/Others in Washington, Oregon, and Alaska and that of Hispanics in Utah.
FIGURE 3.16
Representativeness of voting population, 1978–2012

Source: Authors’ calculations are based on data from the Current Population Survey.
In 2012, Millennials were underrepresented in Washington and Oregon by 5 points to 6 points each. In the other states, Millennial underrepresentation was 7 points to 9 points.

Endnotes

1 About two-thirds of Arizona’s Asian/Other EVs are Native Americans or multiracial. So growth in this category reflects growth among Native Americans and multiracial individuals, as well as Asians. Indeed, growth of the Native American/multiracial population has been stronger than growth of the Asian population and has been the primary driver of Arizona’s growth in Asian/Other EVs, a pattern that should continue into the future.

2 Note that in Alaska, most of the Asian/Other EVs are Alaska Natives or multiracial rather than Asian. It is the Alaska Native/multiracial component of the group that is primarily responsible for the rise in the Asian/Other population from 1980 to 2014, a pattern that should continue into the future.
New Sun Belt states in the East

The New Sun Belt states in the East include Delaware, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. The New Sun Belt-East states, like their counterparts in the West, are rapidly growing states where migration from other parts of the United States has led the way, with immigration providing a more recent addition. Each of these six states is located in the Census Bureau-designated South region. As such, blacks account for sizable shares of their populations and represent their largest racial minorities. Furthermore, for most—but especially for Georgia—blacks represent a sizable part of their population growth. In addition to gaining blacks, each state is gaining varying degrees of Hispanics and Asians in their increasing shifts toward diverse populations.

Georgia

Of these six states, Georgia has seen the most substantial demographic change in recent decades. In some ways, Georgia might be considered the capital of the New Sun Belt-South, as it has the largest population and contains the largest metropolitan area—Atlanta—among these states. Georgia ranked seventh nationally in population growth between 2000 and 2010 and has gained four seats in congressional reapportionment since 1980. It also leads these states in black population gains, gains that outnumber its sizable gains in Hispanics. Among these states, therefore, Georgia stands closest to achieving a minority white population.

In 1980, the population of Georgia was 72 percent white. This is down to 55 percent today. By 2025, the state should be majority-minority. By 2060, Georgia should be only 31 percent white. Hispanics were 1 percent in 1980, are 9 percent today, and will be 17 percent by 2060. Asians/Others were negligible in 1980 but are 5 percent today; by 2060, they will be 10 percent. Reflecting reverse migration of blacks into Georgia, the state is now 32 percent black, up from 27 percent in 1980, and this will continue to rise, reaching 38 percent by 2060.
Georgia’s age structure is somewhat younger than the nation as a whole, with children continuing to outnumber seniors through 2060. Georgia’s children are already majority-minority today—53 percent—and are expected to be 72 percent minority by 2060.

In 1980, 76 percent of Georgia’s eligible voters were white, a number that dropped by 16 percentage points to 60 percent by 2014. By 2060, we estimate that Georgia’s white EVs will fall to 40 percent. Strikingly, black reverse migration from the North, which is heavily adult in character, has increased the black share of EVs by 8 points since 1980, significantly more than the increase in the black population share. By 2060, black EVs will be up to 38 percent of the total, only a couple of points behind whites. Hispanic EVs and Asian/Other EVs went from fractional in 1980 to 5 percent and 4 percent, respectively, in 2014. By 2060, Hispanic EVs will be 14 percent, and Asian/Other EVs will be 9 percent.
In Georgia, the minority share of EVs has grown a bit more slowly since 1980 than the minority share of the overall population. This has slightly widened the gap between the minority share of the population and the minority share of EVs from 4 points to 5 points—a gap that we expect to narrow back down to less than 4 points by 2060.

The senior share of EVs has risen since 1980 from 14 percent to 17 percent and will continue rising to 26 percent of Georgia's EVs by 2060. Senior EVs over the 2014–2060 time period will become majority-minority, and the rise in minority senior EVs will be responsible for 93 percent of the gains in the group.

The drop in white EVs in Georgia has been accompanied by a very sharp drop in white working-class EVs, from 69 percent to 41 percent over the 1978–2014 period. White college-educated EVs trended in the opposite direction, rising from 12 percent to 21 percent over the same time period. Unmarried EVs went up 14 points to 47 percent of Georgia's EVs.
As a share of actual voters, whites declined even faster than they did as a share of EVs, falling by 22 points between the 1980 and 2012 presidential elections. This was chiefly due to black voters rising faster as a share of AVs—up 16 points—than they did as a share of EVs. Hispanic and Asian/Other AVs both went up from fractional to 3 percent over the same time period.

Noncollege whites as a share of voters fell slightly more—27 percentage points—than they did as a share of EVs between these two presidential elections. White college AVs also went up more slowly than white college EVs. Unmarried voters went up slightly faster—17 percentage points—than they did as a percentage of all EVs.

Overrepresentation of whites has fluctuated quite a bit over the years, but recently, the clear trend has been toward the elimination of white overrepresentation among Georgia voters. Dropping from overrepresentation of more than 4 points in 2006, the difference between the white share of voters and the white share of EVs has been very close to zero in the elections of 2008, 2010, and 2012. The elimination of white overrepresentation is chiefly due to a rise in black representation to around 2 points overrepresentation in these three elections.
Virginia

Virginia’s population ranked 16th nationally in growth but still shows quite a bit of churning due to gains from other states and immigration. Some of the immigrants include those moving to the suburbs of Northern Virginia that lie within metropolitan Washington, D.C. While blacks continue to be the largest minority in the state, Virginia has gained more Asian and Hispanic migrants than blacks in recent years.

In 1980, the population of Virginia was 80 percent white. This is down to 64 percent today; by 2046, we predict that the state should be majority-minority, and by 2060, it should be just 44 percent white. Hispanics were 1 percent in 1980, are 8 percent today, and will be 17 percent by 2060. Asians/Others have a trajectory identical to that of Hispanics: 1 percent of Virginia's population in 1980, rising to 8 percent today, and hitting 17 percent by 2060. Blacks have risen slightly from 19 percent to 20 percent of the population today and will rise to around 21 percent by 2060.
Virginia has a slightly older age structure than Georgia today but is projected to have virtually the same age distribution of Georgia by 2060. Virginia’s children were around one-quarter minority in 1980, are 44 percent minority today, and will continue diversifying to 63 percent minority by 2060.

In 1980, 82 percent of Virginia’s EVs were white, a figure that had dropped by 12 percentage points to 70 percent by 2014. By 2060, we estimate that Virginia’s EVs will be down to 49 percent white. Asian/Other and Hispanic EVs rose from fractional to 6 percent and 5 percent, respectively, over the 1980–2014 time period and will be 16 percent and 15 percent, respectively, in 2060. Virginia’s black EVs rose modestly from 18 percent to 20 percent by 2014 and will rise another 2 points by 2060.
In Virginia, as in Georgia, the minority share of EVs has grown more slowly since 1980 than the minority share of the overall population. This has widened the gap between the minority share of the population and the minority share of EVs from 2 points to 5 points. This gap will narrow only slightly in the future.

Virginia’s senior EVs have risen since 1980 from 14 percent to 20 percent and are expected to be 27 percent of its EVs by 2060. Growth in senior EVs from 2014 to 2040 will be almost three-quarters—72 percent—from minority senior EVs. Over the entire 2014–2060 time period, growth will be 90 percent from minority senior EVs.

Virginia’s white working-class EVs dropped 21 points, from 65 percent to 44 percent, between 1978 and 2014. In contrast, white college-educated EVs rose 10 points to 26 percent. Unmarried EVs also increased, gaining 12 points and reaching 44 percent of the state’s EVs.
Whites declined at the identical rate as a share of AVs as they did as a share of EVs, dropping 12 points between the 1980 and 2012 presidential elections. Black voters actually increased their share of voters faster than their share of EVs—5 points vs. 2 points. Hispanic AVs increased from 1 percent to 3 percent over the same time period, while Asian/Other EVs grew from fractional to 5 percent.

Noncollege whites as a share of voters declined faster than they did as a share of EVs between the two presidential elections—21 points vs. 19 points. White college voters also went up more slowly than white college EVs—9 points vs. 10 points. Unmarried voters went up significantly faster than they did as a percentage of all EVs—16 points vs. 11 points—primarily due to fast growth among unmarried women voters.

Overrepresentation of whites has mostly gone up over time in Virginia, especially in congressional elections: In 2010, the white share of voters exceeded the white share of EVs by 7 points. But recent presidential elections have seen white overrepresentation decline substantially. In both 2008 and 2012, white overrepresentation was less than 1 point. This reflects the essential elimination of black underrepresentation in those two elections. Asian/Other and Hispanic underrepresentation has been modest in recent elections, with the exception of 2010.
North Carolina

North Carolina was the sixth-fastest-growing U.S. state over the 2000–2010 period and is the second-largest state—after Georgia—in the New Sun Belt-East. Like Georgia and Virginia, it is becoming more racially diverse, with large Hispanic and black population gains; however, its white population share is dropping less quickly. It remains a destination for students, high-technology workers, and retirees, and it holds attractions that promise continued dynamic change.

In 1980, the population of North Carolina was 77 percent white. This is down to 64 percent today. By 2050, our projections indicate that the state should be majority-minority, and by 2060, it should be down to 46 percent white. Hispanics were 1 percent in 1980, are 9 percent today, and will be 18 percent by 2060. Asians/Others were 1 percent in 1980 but are 6 percent today; by 2060, they will be 10 percent. The black population has been stable at 22 percent from 1980 to 2014 but will rise to 26 percent by 2060.
North Carolina’s age structure, contrary to Georgia’s and Virginia’s, is as old as the nation as a whole today, and in the future, it will actually become somewhat older than the national average: In 2060, we predict that seniors will outnumber children by 25 percent to 20 percent. North Carolina’s children are currently 44 percent minority today and will be 59 percent minority by 2060.

Over the 1980–2014 period, North Carolina’s white EVs dropped 9 percentage points, from 78 percent to 69 percent, and they will further drop to 49 percent by 2060. Black EVs have gone up 2 percentage points over the past 34 years and will rise another 6 points to 28 percent by 2060. Hispanics have gone from negligible to 4 percent and will reach 14 percent by 2060; Asian/Other EVs have followed the same trajectory as Hispanics in the past but will rise to only 9 percent in the future.
In North Carolina, the minority share of EVs has grown more slowly since 1980 than the minority share of the overall population, widening the gap between the minority share of the population and the minority share of EVs to 5 points. In the future, however, minority EVs are projected to grow faster than the minority population, cutting that gap in half by 2060.

The senior share of EVs has risen since 1980 from 14 percent to 21 percent and will continue rising to an unusually high 32 percent of North Carolina’s EVs by 2060. However, as in other states, this large increase is powered by the rise in minority senior EVs, not white senior EVs. Indeed, we estimate that the rise in minority senior EVs will be responsible for 80 percent of the gains in senior EVs to 2040 and 93 percent of these gains over the entire 2014–2060 time period.

![FIGURE 4.11](image)

**Racial diversity among North Carolina’s eligible seniors, 1974–2060**

Composition of EVs ages 65 and older

- White, ages 65 and older
- Minority, ages 65 and older

Sources: Authors’ calculations are based on data from the Current Population Survey, the American Community Survey, and their own States of Change projections.

White working-class EVs in North Carolina dropped 19 points from 68 percent to 47 percent over the 1974–2014 time period, while white college-educated EVs rose 12 points to 22 percent. North Carolina also saw a particularly sharp increase in unmarried EVs—19 points—with unmarried women gaining 11 of these points.
As in Georgia, whites declined faster as a share of voters than they did as a share of EVs. In North Carolina, however, this disjuncture was more spectacular. The Current Population Survey data show whites dropping only 8 points as a share of EVs between the 1976 and 2012 presidential elections but by a whopping 16 points as a share of AVs. Again, this was due to black voters increasing their share of voters faster than their share of EVs—in this case, 12 points for the former and only 2 points for the latter. A good chunk of this black gain in the vote share was in the 2012 election; however, the majority of the vote-share increase was attained gradually over many election cycles prior to 2012. Hispanic and Asian/Other AVs increased by 2 points each over the time period.

Noncollege whites as a share of voters declined quite a bit faster than they did as a share of EVs—23 points vs. 17 points. White college voters made slower gains as a share of voters—7 points compared with 11 points among EVs. Unmarried voters, however, went up faster as a share of voters. They gained 22 points—13 among unmarried women—compared with 17 points among EVs.

Overrepresentation of whites has generally been declining over time in North Carolina. Again, this is overwhelmingly due to declining underrepresentation among blacks. Indeed, in the 2012 election, the CPS data show whites being underrepresented by 3 points and blacks being overrepresented by 4 points. Hispanic and particularly Asian/Other representation has also been improving in recent elections.
Other New Sun Belt states in the East

The remaining three states in the New Sun Belt-East are smaller versions of those just discussed in size but not in demographic vitality. South Carolina, Delaware, and Tennessee ranked 10th, 11th, and 19th, respectively, in population growth. Like their larger cousins, they are drawing migrants from different states. In Delaware, blacks and Hispanics dominate whites in contributing to total population gains, leading to a rapid decline in the white population share. This is not the case in South Carolina and Tennessee, where—as in North Carolina—whites account for more absolute population gains than other racial groups, producing a relatively slow decline in the white population share. Yet in both states, there are substantial contributions of blacks and Hispanics. Consistent with the general pattern for the New Sun Belt-East, all three of these states are building on their historically black-white population bases by attracting more of those groups as well as new minorities.

The decline in the white population share between 1980 and 2014 was 17 points in Delaware, compared with 8 points in Tennessee and close to 0 points in South Carolina. But racial change will speed up in South Carolina in the future, bringing it very close to majority-minority status by 2060. Our projections indicate that Delaware will become majority-minority around 2044 and that the white population will be down to 43 percent by 2060.
The greatest changes in the Asian/Other population are in Delaware, where the group rose from 1 percent to 5 percent by 2014 and is predicted to hit 9 percent by 2040. Delaware is also the locus of the most change in the Hispanic population: from 1 percent to 9 percent between 1980 and 2014 and reaching 22 percent by 2060. Note, however, that South Carolina and Tennessee will also have double-digit Hispanic populations by then.
Black population trends vary greatly between the three states. Delaware is seeing, and will see, substantial growth in its black population. Blacks have risen 5 points to 21 percent in that state and are projected to rise another 5 points to 26 percent by 2060. In Tennessee, blacks have been fairly stable in recent decades but are expected to increase their population share by 4 points to 21 percent by 2060. But in South Carolina, blacks have actually been declining in the 1980–2014 period—down from 35 percent to 28 percent. The 2014–2060 period will see some growth in South Carolina’s black population, but only 1 percentage point.

In Delaware, the decline in white EVs between 1980 and 2014 was 15 points, compared with 5 points in Tennessee and a mere 2 points in South Carolina. By 2060, we expect white EVs will be down to 49 percent in Delaware, 55 percent in South Carolina, and 65 percent in Tennessee.

In Delaware and Tennessee, the increase in the minority population between 1980 and 2014 was slightly faster than the increase in minority EVs, widening the gap between the minority share of EVs and the minority share of the population to 6 points and 4 points, respectively. In South Carolina, however, this gap actually narrowed slightly over the time period from 6 points to 4 points. After 2014, the gaps in all three states are projected to remain approximately stable.

Blacks in Delaware increased their share of EVs by a substantial 7 points, from 13 percent to 21 percent, between 1980 and 2014. This number will continue rising to 26 percent by 2060. In South Carolina, however, black EVs actually went down 3 points through 2014 but will recover 2 points of that loss going forward. Gains among Hispanic and Asian/Other EVs were also largest in Delaware in 2014—5 points for the former and 3 points for the latter. By 2060, we predict that Hispanic EVs in the state will hit 18 percent and that Asians/Others will reach 7 percent.

The largest decline in white working-class EVs was in Delaware: 22 points between 1978 and 2014. However, Delaware’s gain in white college EVs—7 points—was less than in the other two states—10 points in Tennessee and 11 points in South Carolina. The gain in unmarried EVs was highest in South Carolina—up 20 points, including 11 points among unmarried women.
In all three of these states, the decline of white voters between 1980 and 2012 was slightly more than the change in EVs over the same time period. This was due to blacks in those states improving their share of AVs slightly more than their share of EVs. Gains among Hispanic and Asian/Other voters were generally 2 points or less.

In Delaware and Tennessee, the decline among white noncollege AVs was faster than that among white noncollege EVs. The increase in white college voters was also faster than among corresponding EVs in these states. In South Carolina, the reverse was true: Change among AVs lagged behind change among EVs.

In Delaware and Tennessee, the decline in married voters was quite close to the decline in married EVs over the same time period. But in South Carolina, married voters declined 20 points, compared with 17 points among married EVs.

In all these states, white overrepresentation has been declining over time. And in all these states, this is due to declines in black underrepresentation. In Delaware, black underrepresentation, which was as high as 9 points in the 1990 election, was only about 1 point in the 2006 and 2012 elections. In South Carolina, whites were actually underrepresented in the 2006, 2008, and 2012 elections, while blacks were overrepresented by 2 points to 3 points in all four elections between 2006 and 2012. In Tennessee, whites were underrepresented in 2012, while blacks were overrepresented in 2008 and 2012.
In 2012, Millennials were underrepresented in South Carolina by 3 points; in both Delaware and Tennessee, they were underrepresented by 6 points.

Endnotes

1 Although whites were generally overrepresented among the electorate prior to 2008, our data suggest that they were equally represented among eligible and actual voters in 1998 and 2000.

The broad Heartland region sprawls across the middle of the country, both North and South, and even touches some coastal areas in the East. What these 27 states have in common is what they are not. They are not highly diverse places where new minorities—Hispanics and Asians—comprise a plurality of the population, like the Melting Pot states. Nor are they rapidly growing states attracting domestic migrants from other parts of the country, like the New Sun Belt states. They also tend to be modestly growing states with low or negative domestic migration. Yet within this broad spectrum of states, there are different groupings that have geographic or demographic affinities. This is the case with the Midwest and Rust Belt states due to their common geography and industrial history.

The Heartland Midwest and Rust Belt states include Iowa, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. This group of states still includes the heart of America’s industrial core, though that core is less dominant economically and demographically than in the immediate post-World War II era. In 1950, these six states comprised 25 percent of the U.S. population, which politically translated into 125 votes in the Electoral College. Over time, due to the shifts of jobs and population to the South and West, their share of the U.S. population declined to just 18 percent in 2010. Yet these states—led by Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Michigan—still represent a sizable number—91—of Electoral College votes. Their demographic makeup differs from the United States as a whole in that it is older and whiter. And because they contain large cities that have historically attracted large black populations, their black populations are often larger in size than their growing Hispanic populations.
Ohio

Ohio has become an important swing state in recent elections. Its small, Democratic-leaning, mostly black minority population has provided a counterweight to its large and aging Republican-leaning white population. This heavily urban state has lagged behind others in population growth over time—ranking just 47th among the 50 states in the 2000–2010 decade—and has shown only modest gains in minorities and an overall decline in its population under age 18. Still, it is the country’s seventh-largest state and holds 18 Electoral College votes, making it very consequential in political terms.

In 1980, the population of Ohio was 90 percent white. This is down to 80 percent today, and by 2060, Ohio should fall to 65 percent white. Hispanics were 1 percent in 1980, are 4 percent today, and should be 10 percent by 2060. Asians/Others have the identical trajectory from 1 percent to 4 percent to 10 percent over the 1980–2060 time period. Blacks were, are, and should continue to be the largest minority in Ohio: In 1980, they were 9 percent; they have grown to 12 percent today; and they are projected to rise to 16 percent by 2060.
Ohio’s age structure is similar to the nation as a whole at the present time.
Interestingly, despite the state’s image, Ohio is projected to be slightly younger than
the nation as a whole in 2060. However, seniors should still outnumber children in
that year by 22 percent to 21 percent. Ohio’s children should become substantially
more diverse over time: In 1980, they were just 12 percent minority; today, they
are 27 percent minority; and they should be 46 percent minority by 2060.

Over the 1980–2014 period, whites as a share of Ohio’s eligible voters declined 7
percentage points to 84 percent. Black, Hispanic, and Asian/Other EVs each gained
2 points over the same time period. By 2060, whites are projected to fall to 69 percent
of EVs. Black, Hispanic, and Asian/Other EVs should be 15 percent, 8 percent,
and 8 percent, respectively.

Sources: Authors’ calculations are based on data from the Current Population Survey, the American Community Survey, and their own States of Change projections.
In Ohio, there was essentially no gap in 1980 between the minority share of EVs and the minority share of the overall population. But a 3-point gap opened up between 1980 and 2014, a gap that should widen slightly to 4 points by 2060.

Ohio’s senior EVs have risen since 1980 from 13 percent to 19 percent and should be 23 percent of the state’s EVs by 2060. Contrary to most states, growth in senior EVs from 2014 to 2060 is projected to be primarily from growth in white senior EVs—61 percent.

White working-class EVs have fallen more than twice as fast—16 points—as white EVs overall over the 1974–2014 time period. White college-educated EVs trended in the opposite direction, rising from 11 percent to 22 percent over the same time period. This robust rise in the share of white college EVs is characteristic of the Heartland Midwest and Rust Belt states, all of which saw double-digit increases in this group from the 1970s to 2014.
Unmarried EVs went up 19 points to nearly half—49 percent—of Ohio’s EVs. Twenty-six percent of them were unmarried women, and 23 percent were unmarried men.

As a share of actual voters, whites declined about as fast as they did as a share of EVs, falling by 7 points between the 1976 and 2012 presidential elections. Black voters went up 4 points, Hispanics went up 1 point, and Asians/Others went up 2 points as a share of AVs over the same time period.

As a share of AVs, noncollege whites fell by more—16 points—than they did as a share of EVs between these two presidential elections. Gains among white college voters, however, matched their gains among EVs—9 points. Unmarried voters went up at a slightly higher rate—18 points—than they did as a percentage of all EVs.

White overrepresentation in presidential elections, which peaked at about 3 points in 1996, has vanished in the past several presidential elections. In fact, in 2012, the white share of Ohio’s voters was 2 points less than their share of Ohio’s EVs. This is due to the elimination of underrepresentation of blacks in these elections; in the past three presidential elections, blacks have been overrepresented among voters compared with their share of EVs, reaching 2 points in 2012.
Pennsylvania

Although classified here as a Midwest-Rust Belt state, the Keystone State actually straddles the industrial Midwest and eastern seaboard, such that the eastern part of the state benefits from the outer sprawl of the population, both white and minorities, from the greater New York-New Jersey megalopolis as well as from the growth in suburban Philadelphia. The western part of the state, anchored by metropolitan Pittsburgh, along with its more rural interior, is whiter, more rapidly aging, and slow growing. Overall, Pennsylvania ranks 41st of the 50 states on growth in the 2000–2010 period but is the nation’s sixth-largest state, with 20 Electoral College votes.

In 1980, the population of Pennsylvania was 90 percent white. This is down to 79 percent today and should decline to 59 percent by 2060. Hispanics were negligible in 1980, are up to 6 percent today, and should triple to 18 percent by 2060. Asians/Others have risen from 1 percent to 4 percent and are projected to be 10 percent of the population in 2060. Blacks have risen a couple of points since 1980 to 11 percent and should rise another couple of points to 13 percent by 2060.
Pennsylvania’s age structure is currently older than the nation as a whole. By 2060, however, Pennsylvania is projected to be slightly younger than the nation as a whole—though seniors should still outnumber children by 22 percent to 21 percent. Pennsylvania’s children were just 13 percent minority in 1980 but are 29 percent today. By 2060, Pennsylvania’s children should be majority-minority.

Over the 1980–2014 period, Pennsylvania’s white EVs dropped 8 points, from 91 percent to 83 percent. Hispanics EVs went up from fractional to 5 percent, Asian/Other EVs rose from essentially 0 percent to 3 percent, and black EVs increased from 8 percent to 10 percent. By 2060, whites should fall to 64 percent of EVs. Hispanics are projected to be the largest minority group at 15 percent of EVs, blacks should be 13 percent, and Asians/Others should be 8 percent.
In Pennsylvania, there was only a 1-point gap in 1980 between the minority share of EVs and the minority share of the overall population. But a 4-point gap opened up between 1980 and 2014, a gap that should widen slightly to 5 points by 2060.

Pennsylvania’s senior EVs have risen since 1980 from 17 percent to 23 percent and are projected to be 29 percent of Pennsylvania’s EVs by 2060. Contrary to Ohio, growth in senior EVs from 2014 to 2060 should be primarily from growth in minority senior EVs—90 percent.

White working-class EVs dropped a considerable 23 points over the 1974–2014 time period. But white college-educated EVs trended strongly in the other direction, rising 14 points to 25 percent. Pennsylvania’s unmarried EVs went up 17 points, with unmarried men gaining 10 of those points.
White voters declined about as much as white EVs between the 1976 and 2012 elections. Black voters gained 3 points, as did Hispanics, and Asian/Other voters increased 2 points over the same time period.

Over this time period, noncollege whites as a share of voters declined slightly faster than they did as a share of EVs—22 percentage points vs. 20 percentage points. But white college voters grew faster as a share of voters—14 points compared with 13 points among EVs. Unmarried voters went up slightly slower as a share of voters than as a share of EVs—12 points vs. 15 points.

Overrepresentation of whites has had no clear pattern over time. In recent elections, it has been modest: 1 point each in 2008 and 2012 and 2 points in 2010. In 2012, blacks were also overrepresented by about 1 point, and Hispanics were underrepresented by 1 point. However, underrepresentation of Millennials—6 points—was fairly high in that election.
Wisconsin

The Badger State straddles the large urban populations of metropolitan Milwaukee and the northern suburbs of Chicago in the east, with more modest-sized cities and rural areas in the rest of the state. As the former areas have become more racially diverse—first with blacks and now with growing numbers of new minorities—this still mostly white, slow-growing state is beginning to change, albeit tepidly. Wisconsin ranked 32nd among states in 2000–2010 population growth. The country’s 20th-largest state, it holds 10 votes in the Electoral College.

The population of Wisconsin was 95 percent white in 1980. This has fallen to 83 percent today and should decline to 67 percent by 2060. Hispanics have risen from less than 1 percent in 1980, are up to 6 percent today, and should reach 15 percent by 2060. Asians/Others went up from 1 percent to 5 percent in the 1980–2014 period and are projected to double to 10 percent of the population by 2060. Blacks have risen a couple of points since 1980 to 5 percent and should reach 8 percent by 2060.
Wisconsin’s age structure is currently very similar to the nation as whole. By 2060, as in Pennsylvania, Wisconsin is projected to be slightly younger than the nation as a whole—though seniors should still outnumber children by 22 percent to 21 percent. Wisconsin’s children were just 8 percent minority in 1980 but are 26 percent today. By 2060, Wisconsin’s children are projected to be 44 percent minority.

Turning to EVs, over the 1980–2014 period, Wisconsin’s white EVs declined from 96 percent to 87 percent. Black EVs increased from 3 percent to 5 percent, Hispanics EVs rose from 1 percent to 4 percent, and Asian/Other EVs went from negligible to 3 percent. By 2060, whites are projected to decline to 72 percent of EVs. As in Pennsylvania, Hispanics are projected to be the largest minority group at 13 percent of EVs, with blacks and Asians/Others both at 8 percent.
In Wisconsin, there was a negligible gap in 1980 between the minority share of EVs and the minority share of the overall population. But a 4-point gap opened up between 1980 and 2014 that is projected to remain stable through 2060.

Wisconsin’s senior EVs have risen from 15 percent to 21 percent since 1980 and are projected to reach 28 percent by 2060. As in Ohio and contrary to most other states, growth in the level of senior EVs from 2014 to 2060 should be primarily attributable to growth in white senior EVs—53 percent.

![FIGURE 5.11](image)

Racial diversity among Wisconsin’s eligible seniors, 1978–2060

Composition of EVs ages 65 and older

- White, ages 65 and older
- Minority, ages 65 and older

Looking at white-working class EVs, this group declined by 21 percentage points from 1978 to 2014, while white college-educated EVs gained 13 points and rose to 27 percent. Unmarried EVs went up 14 points to almost half—47 percent.
White voters declined slightly less—7 points—than white EVs between the 1980 and 2012 elections. Black and Asian/Other voters rose 3 points over the time period, and Hispanic voters rose 2 points.

Noncollege whites in Wisconsin actually declined faster among AVs—22 points—than they did among EVs—19 percent. College whites, on the other hand, gained more among AVs than they did among EVs—14 points vs. 11 points. Gains among unmarried voters and unmarried EVs over the time period were essentially the same at 13 points.

White overrepresentation, which had gone up in the 1990s and early 2000s, has moderated in recent elections to around 1.5 points in both the 2008 and 2012 elections. At the same time, black underrepresentation has declined recently; indeed, in 2008 and 2012, blacks were slightly overrepresented among AVs relative to EVs. In 2012, Millennials were still underrepresented by 5 points.
Iowa is the most rural and white state of this group, where Hispanics outnumber blacks in its modest minority population. As with most other Heartland Midwest and Rust Belt states, it sustained a loss in its child population between 2000 and 2010, during which time it ranked only 40th among states in overall population growth. The nation’s 30th-largest state, Iowa represents just six Electoral College votes, though as a swing state in a close election these votes can be important.

The population of Iowa was nearly all white in 1980—98 percent. This has fallen to 87 percent today and is projected to fall to 71 percent by 2060. Hispanics have risen from less than 1 percent in 1980 to 6 percent today and should reach 15 percent by 2060. Asians/Others are up from 1 percent to 4 percent in the 1980–2014 time period and should more than double to 9 percent of the population in 2060. Blacks have risen from 1 percent to 3 percent since 1980 and are projected to be 5 percent by 2060.
Iowa’s age structure is currently very similar to the nation as whole and, moreover, is projected to stay that way to 2060. Iowa’s children are diversifying steadily, if relatively slowly. Just 2 percent minority in 1980, they are 19 percent minority today and should double to 38 percent minority by 2060.

Iowa is the only one of our Heartland Midwest and Rust Belt states to still have more than 90 percent white EVs in 2014. Over the 1980–2014 period, whites as a share of Iowa’s EVs declined from almost 99 percent to 91 percent. Hispanic EVs gained 3 points, and Asian/Other and black EVs gained 2 points each. By 2060, whites are projected to decline to 76 percent of EVs. Hispanics are projected to be the largest minority group at 12 percent of EVs, followed by Asians/Others at 7 percent, and blacks at 5 percent.
In Iowa, there was essentially no gap in 1980 between the very low minority share of EVs and the minority share of the overall population. But as in Wisconsin, a 4-point gap opened up between 1980 and 2014, which is projected to remain roughly the same through 2060.

Iowa’s senior EVs have risen from 17 percent to 22 percent since 1980 and are projected to reach almost 30 percent by 2060. White senior EVs should drive most of this growth—61 percent—to 2040, after which minority senior EVs should become increasingly important. Over the entire 2014–2060 interval, minority senior EVs are projected to account for 53 percent of the growth in Iowa’s senior EVs.

Turning to white working-class EVs, they have declined 16 points since 1980. White college-educated EVs, however, gained a healthy 10 points over the same time period. Unmarried EVs rose 14 points to 43 percent. Twenty-three percent of these were unmarried women, and 20 percent were unmarried men.
Whites fell 5 points to 94 percent of voters between the 1980 and 2012 elections, slightly less than white EVs did over the same time period. Hispanic and Asian/Other voters each gained 2 points over the time period, and black EVs gained a single point.

Noncollege white voters declined 14 points from 1980 to 2014, 2 points less than the decline in white working-class EVs over the time period. White college graduates gained almost exactly as much—10 points—among voters as they did among EVs. Unmarried voters similarly matched gains—11 points—among unmarried EVs.

White overrepresentation in Iowa has generally been going up over time, though the level it has attained is only moderate. This is despite a lessening of black underrepresentation in recent elections. But Hispanic and Asian/Other underrepresentation has been getting somewhat worse. In the 2012 election, whites in Iowa were overrepresented by 2 points, and Hispanics and Asians/Others were underrepresented by about 1 point. Millennials, however, were underrepresented by 4 points.
Other Heartland Midwest and Rust Belt states

The other Heartland Midwest and Rust Belt states are Indiana, Michigan, and Minnesota. Of these three states, Michigan stands out both due to its overall size, ranking ninth nationally, and its distinction as an industrial hub that has sustained slow growth since the heyday of the automobile industry. The only state to lose population over the 2000–2010 period, this largely white, older state has a substantial black population concentrated in Detroit and accounts for 16 Electoral College votes.

Indiana, the next largest of this group—ranking 16th in population size—also contains a sizable black population heavily concentrated around its urban areas, Gary and Indianapolis, along with a rising Hispanic population. Although more white than Michigan, Indiana has a higher growth rate, ranking 31st among the 50 states with a population that accounts for 11 Electoral College votes. Minnesota, with its more high-technology, knowledge-based economy, is the fastest growing of all the Heartland Midwest and Rust Belt states, ranking 26th nationally in the 2000–2010 period. While still a largely white state, it has been drawing more minorities in the past two decades, starting with blacks migrating from Illinois and Wisconsin, and more recently Hispanics and Asians. As the nation’s 21st-largest state, it represents 10 Electoral College votes.
In Minnesota, the decline in the white share of the population between 1980 and 2014 was 14 points, dropping from 96 percent to 82 percent. Whites dropped 10 points over the time period in both Michigan and Indiana. Interestingly, all three states are projected to have very similar white population shares by 2060: 61 percent in Indiana and Minnesota and 59 percent in Michigan.

**FIGURE 5.18**

Racial composition of whole, child, eligible, and actual voter populations, 1980–2060

Indiana, Michigan, and Minnesota

Sources: Authors’ calculations are based on data from the Current Population Survey, the American Community Survey, and their own States of Change projections.
Of the three states, Minnesota saw the most change among all minority groups between 1980 and 2014: increases of 3 percentage points among blacks, 5 percentage points among Hispanics, and 6 percentage points among Asians/Others. From 2014 to 2060, the largest projected increase in Hispanics should be in Indiana, up 11 points to 17 percent, the highest level among the three states. Michigan should continue to have the highest level of blacks—17 percent—and Minnesota should have the highest level of Asians/Others at 15 percent.

Looking at EVs, of the three states, Minnesota had the largest decline in white EVs between 1980 and 2014, down 10 points from 98 percent to 88 percent. Indeed, Minnesota was the only one of all the Heartland Midwest and Rust Belt states to have had a double-digit decline in white EVs over the time period. By 2060, Minnesota is projected to have a very similar level of white EVs to Indiana—67 percent vs. 66 percent—a state that has historically been significantly less white. However, Michigan should still have the lowest level of white EVs of the three states—63 percent, as has historically been the case.

Since 1980, Minnesota has gained 3 points among black EVs, 3 points among Hispanic EVs, and 4 points among Asian/Other EVs, the largest gains of the three states. Minnesota should also gain the most among black and Asian/Other EVs to 2060, reaching 9 percent and 13 percent, respectively, among these groups. Indiana, however, should gain the most among Hispanic EVs in the future, going up to 15 percent by 2060.

In all three states, the increase in the minority population between 1980 and 2014 was slightly faster than the increase in minority EVs, widening the gap between the minority share of EVs and the minority share of the population from around 2 points to around 4 points to 5 points. After 2014, the gaps in Minnesota will remain about the same, with the gap widening around 1 point in Indiana and Michigan.

Between 1978 and 2014, the largest decline in white working-class EVs among these three states was in Minnesota: 23 points, compared with 19 points in Michigan and 17 points in Indiana. In addition, Minnesota also had the largest gain in white college graduates—14 points—compared with 11 points in the other two states. The gain in unmarried EVs in these states was 13 points to 14 points over the same time period.
In Michigan, the decline of white voters between 1980 and 2012 was exactly the same as the change in EVs over the same time period. But in Minnesota and Indiana, white voters declined more slowly, running 2 points to 3 points behind the decline in white EVs. Among minority voters, blacks gained the most in Indiana, Hispanics gained the most in Michigan, and Asians/Others gained the most in Minnesota—3 points in each case.

In all three states, the decline in white noncollege voters was significantly faster among voters than among EVs. This difference was particularly sharp in Indiana, where white working-class voters declined by 24 points over the time period, compared with a mere 15 points among EVs. In addition, white college voters in all three states rose faster than EVs did, with Indiana again standing out: White college voters in that state gained 19 points, compared with just 10 points among EVs. Minnesota had the largest decline in married voters over the time period, 11 points, the same as the concomitant drop in married EVs.

In Minnesota, white overrepresentation has generally been going up over time. The other two states have less-clear patterns, though Indiana has seen a declining trend in white overrepresentation in the past several elections. This is chiefly due to the recent decrease in black underrepresentation in Indiana; blacks were actually slightly overrepresented in the 2008 and 2012 elections.
In 2012, Millennials were underrepresented in Indiana by 8 points, in Michigan by 6 points, and in Minnesota by 4 points.
Heartland New England states

The Heartland New England states are Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont, which we further divide into a lower tier—Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island—and an upper tier—Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont. Together, these six states represent 5 percent of the U.S. population and 33 Electoral College votes.

Massachusetts and Connecticut, the nation’s 14th- and 29th-largest states, respectively, overshadow the remaining four states in population size. All six states rank among the nation’s 20 slowest-growing states in the 2000–2010 period, experiencing domestic outmigration for most of the decade. As a subregion, it is far whiter and older than the United States as a whole. Maine, Vermont, and New Hampshire rank as the nation’s first-, second-, and fourth-oldest states by median age, respectively; each has a median age greater than 41. The lower-tier states also rank among the oldest 10 in the country.

Similarly, the upper-tier states are among the top four whitest states, and even the more urbanized states of Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island have larger white shares than the nation as a whole. Yet the latter states are also showing gains in their minority populations, especially among Hispanics. Connecticut, which contains the metropolitan areas of Hartford and New Haven, as well as sprawling commuter towns for neighboring New York City, is the most diverse of these states, with fast-growing Hispanic and Asian populations. Hispanics and Asians are also growing fast in Massachusetts and Rhode Island, states whose populations are dominated by Boston and Providence, respectively. Reflecting these patterns, Hispanics rather than blacks are the largest minorities in these three states. However, unlike many northern Heartland states, each of these states is also showing gains in its black population.
In the lower New England states, the white population dropped by 18 percentage points to 23 percentage points between 1980 and today, bringing these states down to 70 percent to 76 percent white. In the upper New England states, the white population dropped by much less, only 4 points to 8 points, leaving these states more than 90 percent white today. By 2060, the lower New England states should either be very close to majority-minority status—Massachusetts at 51 percent white and Rhode Island at 52 percent white—or have attained that status; Connecticut should become majority-minority around 2046. But the upper New England states are projected to decline only modestly in their white population shares after 2014 and should still be 83 percent to 88 percent white in 2060.

The largest Hispanic gains have come in Connecticut, where Hispanics increased 12 points between 1980 and 2014. That rapid growth is expected to continue to 2060, when Connecticut is projected to be 33 percent Hispanic. Rhode Island should not be far behind, at 28 percent Hispanic. Connecticut also saw its black population double from 5 percent to 10 percent between 1980 and 2014, with a further modest rise to 11 percent projected by 2060.

Massachusetts has seen the largest gains among Asians/Others, up from 1 percent to 8 percent since 1980. By 2060, Massachusetts should have 18 percent Asians/Others, the highest of the six New England states.
FIGURE 6.2
Racial composition of whole, child, eligible, and actual voter populations, 1980–2060
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont

Sources: Authors’ calculations are based on data from the Current Population Survey, the American Community Survey, and their own States of Change projections.
The lower-upper New England divide also extends to age structure. In 2060, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts should all have age structures markedly younger than the nation as a whole. Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont, on the other hand, should be as old or older than the national average. And the children in these two triads should look markedly different. The lower New England states are projected to evolve quickly toward majority-minority children populations, with 68 percent minority children expected in Connecticut.
by 2060 and 59 percent minority children expected in Massachusetts and Rhode Island. Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont, by contrast, should still have only 22 percent to 27 percent minority children by 2060.

Turning to eligible voters, in the lower New England states, white EVs dropped 17 points in Connecticut and 14 points each in Massachusetts and Rhode Island between 1978 and 2014. In the upper New England states, white EVs dropped 5 points in New Hampshire, 4 points in Vermont, and only 3 points in Maine. By 2060, white EVs are expected to drop to 48 percent in Connecticut, 58 percent in Massachusetts, and 59 percent in Rhode Island, while EVs in Vermont, Maine, and New Hampshire remain 87 percent to 91 percent white.

The biggest minority EV gainer over the time period in Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts was Hispanics, who saw gains of 9 points, 8 points, and 6 points, respectively. In addition, Connecticut stands out for having a 4-point increase in black EVs, and Massachusetts saw the largest Asian/Other EV gain at 5 points. By 2060, Connecticut is projected to have 29 percent Hispanic EVs, followed by Rhode Island at 23 percent and Massachusetts at 20 percent. Massachusetts should have the most Asian/Other EVs at 16 percent, with Connecticut and Rhode Island also in double digits.

In all six New England states, the increase in the minority population between 1980 and 2014 was faster than the increase in minority EVs, widening the gap between the minority share of EVs and the minority share of the population. In lower New England, the gap has widened to around 7 points, which should drop slightly to around 6 points by 2060. The upper New England states, on the other hand, should see their minority population-minority EV gaps widen from 1 point to 2 points to around 3 points to 4 points by 2060.

In all six states, the senior share of EVs has risen substantially since 1980 and should continue rising to 2060. The gains moving forward should be greater—6 points to 10 points—in upper New England than in lower New England—2 points to 5 points. In upper New England, the gains in senior EVs should be overwhelmingly driven by gains in white senior EVs, while in lower New England, the gains should be entirely driven by minority senior EVs. Indeed, in lower New England, the white senior share of EVs is projected to be smaller by 2060 in all three states than it is today.
Between 1978 and 2014, the three lower New England states all witnessed very sharp declines in white working-class EVs: 33 points in Massachusetts, 32 points in Rhode Island, and 28 points in Connecticut. Declines among this group were much smaller in the upper New England states. But all the Heartland New England states had healthy double-digit increases in white college-graduate EVs, with the clear leader being Massachusetts, which had a gain of 19 points over the time period. The gains in unmarried EVs in these states were 11 points to 16 points between 1978 and 2014, with the lower New England states pushing close to 50 percent unmarried EVs.

**FIGURE 6.3**
Changes in educational attainment among whites, 1980 and 2012
EVs and AVs in Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont

Source: Authors’ calculations are based on data from the Current Population Survey.
In all these states except Connecticut, the decline in white voters between 1980 and 2012 was very close to the decline in EVs over the same time period. In Connecticut, white voters went down 13 points among voters and 15 points among EVs. In the lower New England states, the share of black voters went up faster than blacks’ share of EVs, while new minorities went up more slowly.

Across the New England states, patterns among white working-class and white college-educated voters compared with EVs were very consistent. Across the six states, white noncollege voters declined faster among voters than among EVs. And white college voters in all six states rose faster than EVs did, generally by about 3 points. The decline in white working-class voters and the rise in white college voters were both largest in Massachusetts—34 points and 21 points, respectively.

In all six states, the decline in married voters was smaller among voters than among EVs. The largest decline in married voters over the time period was in Maine at 12 points.

Across the six states, white overrepresentation has been going up modestly over time. However, black underrepresentation has been going down, chiefly in the lower New England states. The latter trend has been counterbalanced by an increase in underrepresentation of new minorities.

In 2012, Millennials were underrepresented in Vermont by 8 points. In the other five New England states, Millennial underrepresentation was more modest at 5 points to 6 points.
FIGURE 6.4
Representativeness of voting population, 1978–2012

Source: Authors’ calculations are based on data from the Current Population Survey.
Heartland South states

The Heartland South states are Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, and West Virginia. What the Heartland South states have in common is that they are in or on the border of the American South but on the periphery of the faster-growing parts of that region. As with most of the South, all but one of these states—West Virginia—have sizable black populations that outnumber their modestly growing Hispanic and Asian populations. But unlike their counterparts in the New Sun Belt, they are not attracting nearly as many domestic migrants, black or white.

Still, there are distinctions within these states. The eastern, urban state of Maryland has the second-largest population and growth rate of all of them and is closest to having a majority-minority population, with growing black, Hispanic, and Asian populations. Another unique state is the border state of Missouri, the most populous of the group, which—while growing far more modestly than Maryland—is close to becoming a swing state in presidential elections due to its sharp urban-suburban-rural divide and its juxtaposition on the border between the North and South. It also contains the city of St. Louis, called “the Gateway to the West.” Two smaller border states are slow-growing West Virginia—the whitest of these states—and Kentucky—also predominantly white—both of which straddle sections of Appalachia. Finally, there are the four Deep South states, here in order of size: Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Arkansas. These states, especially the first three, have substantial black population shares, and each state shows small but increasing Hispanic populations. Arkansas shows the most rapid population growth of these, and of all, Heartland South states, ranking 22nd in population growth among all U.S. states. The slowest-growing states of this group are Louisiana and West Virginia, ranking 48th and 45th, respectively. As a group, the Heartland South states comprise 11 percent of the U.S. population and represent 62 Electoral College votes.
In Maryland, the white population dropped 22 percentage points between 1980 and 2014, bringing it down to 54 percent. In the Deep South states, the white population has decreased much less—only 6 points to 10 points—with white levels today ranging from 57 percent in Mississippi to 73 percent in Arkansas. In the border states, the white population has decreased by 4 points to 8 points and now stands at 80 percent to 92 percent.

Maryland is projected to become a majority-minority state as early as 2020, and its population should be down to 32 percent white by 2060. The Deep South states of Louisiana and Mississippi are projected to become majority-minority by 2039 and 2043, respectively, with populations at 42 percent and 46 percent white by 2060. Alabama and Arkansas should decline to 55 percent to 57 percent white by that year. As for the border states, Missouri should still be almost two-thirds white by 2060, and Kentucky and West Virginia should still be three-quarters or more white.

The largest gains between 1980 and 2014 for blacks, Hispanics, and Asians/Others were all in Maryland: Blacks increased 8 points to 30 percent, Hispanics increased 8 points to 9 percent, and Asians/Others increased 7 points to 8 percent. By 2060, Maryland’s population is projected to be 35 percent black, 18 percent Hispanic, and 16 percent Asian/Other. Of the rest of the states, Louisiana had the biggest gain in blacks at 5 points, Arkansas had the biggest gain in Hispanics at 7 points, and Missouri and Alabama had the largest increases in Asians/Others at 4 points each. By 2060, Arkansas should have the second-highest concentration of Hispanics behind Maryland at 16 percent, Missouri should have the second-highest concentration of Asians/Others at 11 percent, and Mississippi and Louisiana should continue to have the highest levels of blacks at 40 percent and 38 percent, respectively.
FIGURE 7.2
Racial composition of whole, child, eligible, and actual voter populations, 1980–2060
Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, and West Virginia

Sources: Authors' calculations are based on data from the Current Population Survey, the American Community Survey, and their own States of Change projections.
FIGURE 7.2 (continued)
Racial composition of whole, child, eligible, and actual voter populations, 1980–2060
Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, and West Virginia

Sources: Authors’ calculations are based on data from the Current Population Survey, the American Community Survey, and their own States of Change projections.
Of these states, Maryland is projected to have by far the youngest age structure in the future. West Virginia is its polar opposite, with a population considerably older than the nation as a whole today, and it is likely to remain that way through 2060. In that year, West Virginia should have 25 percent seniors vs. 19 percent children. And its children, even by then, should not be particularly diverse: just 28 percent minority. In contrast, Maryland’s children by that date are projected to be three-quarters minority. The Deep South states should all have majority-minority children, ranging from 66 percent minority in Louisiana to 53 percent minority in Alabama. Missouri’s and Kentucky’s children, however, should remain majority white.

Turning to eligible voters, Maryland’s white EVs dropped 19 percentage points between 1980 and 2014. In the Deep South states, the decline was 6 points to 9 points, and it was 3 points to 6 points in the border states. By 2060, white EVs in Maryland are projected to be all the way down to 36 percent. The Deep South states should have from 45 percent to 61 percent white EVs, and the border states should have from 68 percent to 82 percent white EVs.

Among the Heartland South states, Maryland saw the largest gains in black, Hispanic, and Asian/Other EVs from 1980 to 2014. This included a remarkable gain of 9 points in black EVs, from 20 percent to 29 percent. By 2060, the black share of EVs and the white share of EVs are projected to be exactly the same at 36 percent in Maryland; Hispanic and Asian/Other EVs should also be roughly tied at around 14 percent. Of the other states, three—Missouri, Mississippi, and Louisiana—are projected to have double-digit Hispanic EVs by 2060. Missouri should have the largest share of Asian/Other EVs outside of Maryland at 9 percent.

In Maryland, the minority population increased faster between 1980 and 2014 than minority EVs, widening the gap between the minority share of EVs and the minority share of the population from 3 points to 6 points. However, that gap should narrow to 4 points by 2060. A similar pattern holds in the Deep South states—some widening of the gap between the minority share of the population and the minority share of EVs from 1980 to 2014 and some narrowing thereafter. In contrast, the border states continue to show some widening of that gap after 2014.

In all eight states, the senior share of EVs has risen significantly since 1980 and should continue rising to 2060. The greatest gains should be seen in West Virginia, where senior EVs have risen from 16 percent in 1980 to 24 percent in 2014 and are projected to hit 31 percent by 2060. Most of West Virginia’s growth in senior EVs is projected to come from white senior EVs; this is also true of its fellow border
state, Kentucky. The rest of the states in this region should see the majority of their growth in senior EVs come from minority senior EVs—most overwhelmingly so in Maryland, where all of these gains should come from minority seniors.

Between 1978 and 2014, Maryland had a stunning drop of 28 points in its share of white working-class EVs. All of the other states in this region had much smaller but still double-digit declines in this group of EVs, ranging from 17 points in Arkansas to 12 points in Kentucky. West Virginia had the sharpest increase in white college-graduate EVs in this time period, from 6 percent to 19 percent. Other states saw gains in this group ranging from 7 points to 11 points. All of the Heartland South states saw strong increases in unmarried EVs over this time period, with levels in Maryland, Mississippi, and Louisiana rising to around 50 percent and levels in the rest of the states rising to around 45 percent.

FIGURE 7.3
Changes in educational attainment among whites, 1980 and 2012

EVs and AVs in Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, and West Virginia

Source: Authors’ calculations are based on data from the Current Population Survey.
In most of these states, the decline in white voters between 1980 and 2012 was very close to the decline in white EVs over the same time period. In Arkansas and Missouri, white EVs did decrease faster than white voters, but the differences were modest. However, in Mississippi, there was a considerable disjunction: White EVs declined only 6 points over that time period, but white voters fell by more than twice that amount—13 points. Also in Mississippi, blacks made extraordinary gains in their share of voters—12 points—compared with their gains in their share of EVs at 3 points. Maryland, Louisiana, and Alabama also saw gains in black voters outstrip gains in black EVs.

In most states in the region, white working-class voters tended to decline faster than white working-class EVs. In Alabama and West Virginia between 1980 and 2012, for example, noncollege whites declined around 19 points among AVs, compared with 13 points among EVs. Most states also saw white college-graduate AVs expand faster than white college-graduate EVs. Here, West Virginia stood out, gaining 11 points in white college-graduate EVs over the same time period and 17 points among white college-graduate AVs.

In most of these states, the increase in the unmarried population was higher among EVs than among AVs. In Kentucky, for example, unmarried EVs rose 15 points between 1980 and 2012, compared with just 10 points among unmarried AVs. Mississippi, however, bucked the trend, as unmarried voters increased faster—20 points—than unmarried EVs at 16 points.

Except for Arkansas and West Virginia, white overrepresentation in the electorate has generally been going down over time in these states, while black underrepresentation has declined and turned into overrepresentation. In Mississippi in 2012, for example, blacks were overrepresented among voters compared with EVs by almost 4 points, while whites were underrepresented by 2 points.
FIGURE 7.4
Representativeness of voting population, 1978–2012

Alabama

Arkansas

Kentucky

Louisiana

Maryland

Mississippi

Source: Xx
Millennials were underrepresented in every state, with Arkansas and West Virginia showing the biggest deficits between AVs and EVs at 10 points.
Heartland Great Plains states

The Heartland Great Plains states are Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and South Dakota. These six states, spanning some of the nation’s Midwest and West, represent the least industrial part of the Heartland. Together, they represent 3.5 percent of the U.S. population and reflect 27 votes in the Electoral College. They are all relatively small states, ranking in the bottom half with respect to size. The largest of these states are the lower tier of Oklahoma, Kansas, and Nebraska. Montana, South Dakota, and North Dakota—the upper tier—are among the nation’s seven smallest states.

As with other Heartland states, these states are all moderate to slow growing. Montana matched the national growth rate of 9.7 percent in 2010, followed closely by Oklahoma, with all others in this group growing more slowly. As with other non-Heartland South states, each of these states is whiter than the nation as a whole. The most diverse state of this group is Oklahoma, with its sizable Hispanic, American Indian, and black populations, along with a noticeable population that identifies as two or more races. Although whiter than Oklahoma, both Kansas and Nebraska have growing and sizable Hispanic populations that outnumber their existing black populations. Although Montana, North Dakota, and South Dakota are among the 10 whitest states in the United States, the minority populations in each of them are dominated by American Indians, and—as in most states—their small Hispanic populations are growing rapidly.

In the lower-tier states, Oklahoma’s white population dropped 20 percentage points—from 87 percent to 67 percent—between 1980 and 2014, while Kansas and Nebraska have seen their white populations decline 14 points to 15 points over the same time period. In the upper tier, North Dakota’s and South Dakota’s whites have each declined 10 points, while Montana’s whites are down just 7 points. These three states are still 84 percent to 86 percent white today.
Oklahoma is projected to be majority-minority state by 2045 and should be only 43 percent white by 2060. By that date, Kansas should be down to barely more than half white—52 percent. Nebraska, however, will diversify at a slower rate and should still be 64 percent white in 2060. Among the upper-tier states, South Dakota is projected to experience the most change, with its white population declining from 84 percent to 61 percent from 2014 to 2060. Montana and North Dakota should experience smaller declines in their white populations, but they should still drop from the mid-80s to less than 70 percent white by 2060.

These states exhibit quite different patterns in terms of minority growth. Oklahoma has seen and should see very significant growth among both Latinos and the Asian/Other category. In terms of the latter category—which is heavily dominated by Native Americans and multiracial individuals—growth was from 6 percent to 16 percent between 1980 and 2014 and is projected to reach 30 percent by 2060. Oklahoma’s Hispanics grew to 9 percent by 2014 and are expected to hit 21 percent by 2060. By contrast, Kansas’ and Nebraska’s minority growth has been primarily from Hispanics—up 10 points each in 2014—and should reach 25 percent in Kansas and 21 percent in Nebraska by 2060.

The upper-tier states’ minority growth is overwhelmingly driven by the Asian/Other category; again, this category is heavily Native American in these states. By 2014, this category was 10 percent to 12 percent in these states, and by 2060, it is projected to be 33 percent in South Dakota, 29 percent in Montana, and 22 percent in North Dakota.
**FIGURE 8.2**

Racial composition of whole, child, eligible, and actual voter populations, 1980–2060

Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and South Dakota

Sources: Authors’ calculations are based on data from the Current Population Survey, the American Community Survey, and their own States of Change projections.
FIGURE 8.2 (continued)
Racial composition of whole, child, eligible, and actual voter populations, 1980–2060
Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and South Dakota

Sources: Authors' calculations are based on data from the Current Population Survey, the American Community Survey, and their own States of Change projections.
Of these states, Oklahoma is projected to have by far the youngest age structure in the future. The share of children in the state’s population should decline only 1 percentage point by 2060, at which point children should still outnumber seniors 25 percent to 19 percent. Indeed, children are projected to outnumber seniors in three of the other states and are essentially tied with seniors in South Dakota. Only in Nebraska should seniors slightly outnumber children. And even Nebraska’s children at that point will be quite diverse—46 percent minority. The most diverse child populations are projected to be in Oklahoma—71 percent minority in 2060—and Kansas at 61 percent minority.

Looking at eligible voters, Oklahoma’s white EVs dropped 17 points between 1980 and 2014. In Nebraska and Kansas, the decline was around 10 points. And in the upper-tier states, the decrease in white EVs was 6 points to 8 points over the same time period. By 2060, white EVs are projected to decline to 48 percent in Oklahoma and 57 percent in Kansas. The other four states should be between 66 percent and 72 percent white EVs.

The biggest Asian/Other EV gainer between 1980 and 2014 was Oklahoma, up 10 points to 16 percent, the highest level of the six states; the biggest Hispanic EV gainer was Kansas, up 5 points to 7 percent, also the highest level of the six states. By 2060, Oklahoma should be supplanted by South Dakota, which is projected to have the largest share of Asian/Other EVs—29 percent to 27 percent in Oklahoma. North Dakota and Montana also should have Asian/Other EV levels above 20 percent. Kansas should continue to lead in the share of Hispanic EVs, with 22 percent by 2060. Oklahoma and Nebraska should trail at 18 percent each.

In all six states, the minority population increased faster between 1980 and 2014 than minority EVs, widening the gap between the minority share of EVs and the minority share of the population. In the lower-tier states, this gap widened to 5 points to 6 points over this time period and is expected to decline slightly by 2060. In contrast, the upper-tier states had smaller gaps of 3 points to 4 points in 1980 but are projected to see these gaps widen to 5 points to 6 points by 2060.
In all six states, the senior share of EVs has risen since 1980 and is expected to continue rising to 2060. At that point, the senior share of EVs should vary between 25 percent and 29 percent in these states, with Oklahoma on the low end and Montana and North Dakota on the high end. Montana and North Dakota are also the two states where the majority of the growth in senior EVs to 2060 should be attributable to white seniors. In the other four states, minority seniors should be responsible for most of the growth in the senior EV population. Indeed, in Oklahoma, it is projected that minority seniors will account for all of the growth in senior EVs; in Kansas, it should be nearly all—92 percent.

Between 1978 and 2014, all of these states saw sharp 20-plus point declines in their shares of white working-class EVs. Only Montana was under that level, at 15 percent. Montana also had a very modest increase of only 5 points in white college EVs. Interestingly, Oklahoma, a locus of relatively rapid demographic change in this area, saw an even smaller increase in white college-graduate EVs—only 2 points. The other four states saw healthy double-digit increases in this group—13 points to 15 points.
In the upper-tier states, the decline in white voters between 1980 and 2012 was essentially the same as the decline in EVs over the same time period. In the lower-tier states, however, there was variance. In Oklahoma, white voters actually declined faster than white EVs—18 points vs. 15 points; in Kansas and Nebraska, white voters declined more slowly than white EVs—8 points to 10 points vs. 5 points to 6 points. In the latter two states, the growth in Hispanic voters notably lagged behind the growth in Hispanic EVs.

In Oklahoma, Montana, and North Dakota, white working-class voters declined faster than white working-class EVs by 3 points to 4 points. In the other states, the white noncollege decreases were about equal between voters and EVs. White college-graduate voters, however, uniformly went up more than white college EVs across the six states.

With the exception of Nebraska, the rise in unmarried people has been higher among EVs than among actual voters. For example, in Kansas, unmarried EVs rose 15 points between 1980 and 2012, compared with just 8 points among unmarried AVs.

Across the six states, white overrepresentation has generally been going up over time, while Hispanic and Asian/Other underrepresentation has been increasing, leading to fairly large differences in representation by race. For example, in Oklahoma in 2012, whites were overrepresented among AVs compared with EVs by almost 5 points, while Hispanics were underrepresented by 2 points and Asians/Others were underrepresented by 3 points. Whites were also overrepresented by 5 points in 2012 in Kansas and South Dakota. Millennials, by contrast, were underrepresented in every state, with the highest levels of underrepresentation in Oklahoma and South Dakota—11 points each.
FIGURE 8.4
Representativeness of voting population, 1978–2012

Kansas

Montana

Nebraska

North Dakota

Oklahoma

South Dakota

Source: Authors’ calculations are based on data from the Current Population Survey.
Conclusion

This report shows definitively that diversity is coming to every corner of our country. By 2060, new majority-minority states are projected for the Deep South, in Georgia, Louisiana, and Mississippi; the mid-Atlantic, in Maryland, Delaware, New Jersey, and New York; the Great Plains, in Oklahoma; the Midwest, in Illinois; the upper South, in Virginia and North Carolina; New England, in Connecticut; the Southwest, in Arizona and Colorado; and the Pacific Northwest, in Washington. Many other states are projected to be more than 40 percent minority by 2060, including Utah, Kansas, South Carolina, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Oregon. Even states such as Ohio, Indiana, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming, and Montana should be well above 30 percent minority by that year. Interestingly, the most conspicuous holdouts from rising diversity are projected to be the upper New England states of Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont, none of which are projected to crack 20 percent minority in the future.

Our tour of the states has also shown that eligible voters will be swept along by this tide of diversity. Indeed, both overall and in many individual states, we should see the minority share of EVs grow faster than the minority share of the overall population. This does not mean that the minority levels of EVs will quickly equal the minority levels of the whole population, since there is currently a large gap between the two. But that gap should narrow over time, making the eligible electorate in many states look more and more like their overall populations.

Children will be the vanguard of diversity’s spread as ever-more diverse generations are born and raised in every part of the country. Arizona’s children are already majority-minority at 60 percent; by 2060, they should be an astonishing 81 percent minority. By the same year, Florida’s children could be 76 percent minority, and Connecticut’s children could be 69 percent minority. Virginia’s could be 63 percent minority, while Kansas’ could be at 61 percent. Oregon’s could be at 55 percent, and Montana’s at 53 percent. Indeed, only six states in the country are projected to have less than 40 percent minority children by 2060: Iowa, Kentucky, West Virginia, and the upper New England trio of Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont.
As our tour illustrated, America’s seniors are also projected to become much more diverse. Indeed, both overall and in most states, the very significant growth of the senior EV population should be driven mostly by a rapidly growing population of minority seniors, leaving the white senior population at levels not much different than those of today. This diversification of the gray will be one of America’s next great trends.

Other trends have dramatically reshaped America’s EV population in recent decades. As we have seen, all states—most to a significant degree—have seen their electorate reshaped by the decline of the white working class, the increase in white college graduates, and the rise of the unmarried population. While the future of these trends is more difficult to predict than the continuing rise of diversity, it nevertheless seems likely that our electorate will see substantial, ongoing change in these areas for some time.

Political parties and policymakers will confront a bold new world in the coming decades. It is imperative for them to get out in front of the changes and make America work for the newest Americans, as well as for those who have long enjoyed the promise and opportunity America has to offer. In the long run, meeting that challenge is the path to political success for politicians, no matter their party. No outcome is guaranteed except a slide into irrelevance for those who do not take up the challenge.
Methodology

States of Change projections

Our States of Change projections employ a multistate cohort component methodology that begins with the 2010 Census and projects ahead in five-year intervals for race- and age-specific populations for each state to 2060 based on the components of domestic migration, international migration, fertility, and mortality. The projections are based on modeling put forth in Andrei Rogers, Introduction to Multiregional Mathematical Demography (New York: Wiley, 1975).

These projections are performed separately for racial groups wherein the states’ domestic migration flows are projected between the state and the remainder of the four Census regions—Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. International migration to the United States for each interval is allocated to states and regions. In both cases, these migration flows and immigration allocations are based on patterns recorded in the 2007–2012 multiyear American Community Survey. Race-specific fertility and mortality rates for each state assume national rates specific to age and race. These, as well as national immigration levels, are broadly consistent with those used in the Bureau of the Census’ National Population Projections. Authors’ calculations of state rankings are also based on the Census; states are ranked on percent growth in population between 2000 and 2010.

Eligibility projections

Like all of the data presented after 2014, the eligibility rates for the different populations presented in this report are projections. The first step in this process was taking data from multiple years of the American Community Survey and dividing up the American population into groups based on state, race, and age—for example, Hispanics ages 30 to 34 in Colorado. Multilevel statistical models were then used to estimate the unique eligibility rates—the rate of citizenship among a given group—and naturalization rates—the rate at which these groups gained
citizenship over time—for each state, race, and age group. These groups were then tracked forward in time and had those unique naturalization rates applied to them as they moved into older age groups. Additionally, these estimates account for the influx of immigrants into each state, race, and age group and the effect it has on those groups’ overall eligibility rates. The end result is a procedure that is sensitive to the different rates of naturalization experienced by each of these groups, as well as the immigration each state is predicted to experience in the future.

Locally weighted scatterplot smoothing

The estimates presented here for whole, child, voting-age, and eligible populations were produced using LOWESS, a statistical procedure that “smooths” the Current Population Survey and projection data in order to generate more stable and accurate results. As with all surveys, results from the CPS are subject to random sampling error, and any particular year’s estimates are likely to deviate from the true value. Smoothing over these data points for characteristics whose rates of change should be fairly consistent across elections ultimately creates better estimates for any particular year. However, for those characteristics that we expect to be variable from election to election—such as the composition of the actual voting population—the data are not smoothed, as such a procedure would hide meaningful changes in the makeup of the electorate.
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