The Price of Prevention

Getting Ahead of Global Crises

By Gayle E. Smith, David Sullivan and Andrew Sweet

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The Sustainable Security Series from the Center for American Progress

Our increasingly integrated and rapidly changing world demands that we modernize our approach to national security in order to protect and defend American interests but also to enable America’s renewed global leadership. The papers in this Series provide analyses of and practical recommendations for our “sustainable security,” a new approach that combines national security, human security, and collective security. Papers in the Series include:

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Cover image: Police officers patrol Kibera slum in Nairobi, Kenya, Thursday, Jan. 17, 2008. (Credit: AP Photo/Darko Bandic)
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The next president will face an unprecedented array of foreign policy demands upon taking office in January. The urgent national security challenges are the most visible among them, with Iraq and Afghanistan topping the list. But Pakistan, the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflagration, Iran, North Korea, Russia, Sudan, Somalia, and the global financial crisis will also cry out for immediate attention.

Layered on top of these immediate challenges are growing threats that provide the backdrop for new and more complex crises—climate change, resource scarcity, the global food and energy crises, urbanization, and sweeping demographic shifts. These trends are placing enormous pressure on the ability of individuals, families, and communities to save, plan, and in some cases survive. Combined, they threaten to spawn sweeping insecurity that could further undermine global stability.

The next administration will also be compelled to manage a host of transnational threats that transcend borders and undermine our collective global security, including terrorism, global pandemics, money laundering, illicit trade, and crime and drug syndicates. Taken together, global trends and transnational threats serve as force multipliers that expand poverty and fuel conflicts.
The challenges facing the United States are so many and so diverse that the only way the next president can avoid leaping from crisis to crisis is to position America to get ahead of the curve. The next president can enhance our standing in the world, sustain our security, and protect our investments by implementing robust prevention strategies to complement the foreign policies that are, due to necessity, geared toward immediate crises. By failing to do so, the next president would ensure that our sustainable security remains elusive.

Merely reacting to global crises is a costly strategy in terms of both human lives and direct financial costs. In order to get out ahead and prepare itself to face the challenges of the 21st century, the United States should:

1. Fully integrate prevention into the national strategies that guide foreign policy formulation and implementation.
2. Build an integrated, interagency mechanism for long-range strategic planning that is tied directly to the allocation of resources.
3. Organize the government to support prevention and ensure coherence across the executive branch.
4. Invest intelligence, diplomatic, and economic resources in the most vulnerable areas and regions.
5. Re-engage with the international community, and improve and then support international treaties and norms.
6. Develop new tools and capabilities for crisis management.
7. Address the resource and staff shortages of civilian agencies, particularly the State Department and the United States Agency for International Development.

“an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure”

– Benjamin Franklin
THE COSTS OF PREVENTION

Few would challenge the cost benefits of prevention, and policymakers of all political persuasions would agree that Benjamin Franklin’s adage that “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure” is as relevant to foreign policy as it is to personal health and well-being. The fact that U.S. foreign policy does not include a clear focus on prevention is not due to a collective failure to recognize its merits. It is the consequence of politics, pressures, and processes.

The 24-hour news cycle and elections every two, four, and six years compel politicians to seek results that can be demonstrated to viewers and voters in real time. Policies designed to yield benefits for 10 or 20 years hence are seen as less palatable to the media and voting public than visible and quick successes. Meanwhile, successful prevention efforts require proving that a given policy approach prevented a specific crisis, which is difficult in any case, but near impossible in a national debate driven by sound bites.

Policymakers also face enormous pressure to focus on managing real time threats and challenges that consume all of the foreign policy oxygen. Iraq, Afghanistan, and the “global war on terror” have dominated foreign policy during the Bush administration and have often served to complicate other recognized priorities—Russia, China, and the Middle East peace process to name a few. Neither has the Bush administration focused on other pending crises—the ravages borne of climate change, the potential collapse of weak and failing states, or the looming threat of crimes against humanity. Even if the next president desires to right this imbalance, he will find himself plagued by so many ongoing crises that it will be difficult, at best, to focus on prevention.

What’s more, our government systems and policy infrastructure are not set up to focus on prevention as a core function of foreign policy. A one-year federal budget cycle drives short-term responses. Within the executive branch, there is no interagency mechanism to drive long-term strategic planning. Some of the most powerful tools that we can deploy toward structural prevention—overseas development aid, for example—are underfunded and constrained by an outdated system. The level of foreign aid spending has spiked since September 11th, but our foreign aid programs are spread across as many as 25 government agencies, departments, offices, and initiatives, with no single person or department responsible for defining the purpose(s) of our aid, managing aid programs, or answering for the outcomes.

Prevention also gets short shrift because it doesn’t always work. The U.S. response to a pending or actual crisis is only one of several factors influencing events. This means that there is no guarantee of success, even if our policies and programs are designed to prevent crises from occurring or recurring. An investment in prevention is nonetheless worthwhile, a point that is made very clear by the simple fact that unchecked crises cost more than either our budget or security can afford.
The long-term costs of short-term approaches

Getting ahead of the crisis curve entails more than mounting a response when a crisis erupts. The United States is the world’s leader in reacting to crises, and in most cases provides humanitarian or other assistance more quickly and in greater volume than any other government. But our track record lays bare a tendency to disengage once a crisis subsides, and often without addressing the root causes. A look into the history of U.S. foreign aid, for example, reveals a clear pattern: aid levels spike in reaction to crises, but flat-line shortly thereafter, only to rise again when crises recur.

The United States invested over $10.5 billion in aid to Pakistan between 2002 and 2007. The majority of these funds were focused on short-term security imperatives and not on Pakistan’s “underlying fault lines.” Enormous sums were allocated to finance military and counterterrorism objectives, but less than 2 percent went to development programs that could create jobs for Pakistan’s youth, expand access to secular schools, or tackle the daunting 80 percent illiteracy rate in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The actual story is even worse—the United States invested billions of dollars in Pakistan’s military despite clear and compelling evidence that the military and intelligence services maintained their links to extremists, including Taliban forces operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

During the same time period, civilian deaths from terrorist violence in Pakistan skyrocketed from 189 in 2003 to 648 in 2005 and 3,599 in 2007. A January 2008 poll by the International Republican Institute, meanwhile, found that, just in the past year, 72 percent of Pakistanis believe their personal economic situation has worsened, and 85 percent of Pakistanis feel less secure. With President Musharraf forced out of office, terrorist incidents on the rise, and extremism unchecked, the $10 billion that the United States invested has failed to even maintain the status quo, let alone help to prevent the upheaval that is anticipated in Pakistan’s near-term future.

U.S. Economic Assistance to Pakistan (in millions, historic $US)
1960 to 2006

- Strong U.S./Pakistani relations in the early part of the Cold War.
- Pakistan became a strategic ally throughout the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
- Pakistan re-emerged as a key partner, this time in the War on Terror.

Source: US Overseas Loans & Grants [Greenbook].
The United States has been actively engaged in Sudan since the late 1970s, and for almost 30 years has pursued a policy defined by responding to, rather than preventing, recurrent crises. The United States has been, and remains, the world’s most generous provider of emergency aid to Sudan, but decision makers have lacked the tools, will, and imagination to help Sudan move toward sustainable solutions.

The United States has provided billions of dollars in assistance to Sudan throughout the years—from aid to reward Khartoum’s support for the 1978 Camp David Accords, to massive funding for Operation Lifeline Sudan between 1989 and 1998, to relief aid targeted to meet the emergency needs triggered by an ongoing genocide in Darfur. The United States has provided $3.9 billion in humanitarian assistance to Sudan and eastern Chad just since 2004. But the bulk of our aid was and is to provide food, clothing, and shelter to populations under duress; far less has gone to the development programs that can address Sudan’s underlying contradictions. The United States has also invested significant diplomatic capital, appointing three presidential envoys over the past seven years.

Thirty years into one of the most important bilateral relationships the United States maintains in Africa, Sudan continues down the path of perpetual crisis. The human costs are stunning—the 22-year war between North and South Sudan saw 2 million people die and another 4 million forced from their homes. The genocide in Darfur has led to the deaths of at least 300,000 and the displacement of more than 2.5 million people, with 210,000 persons newly displaced since January 2008. Against this backdrop, some 19 million people—85 percent of Sudan’s rural population—live in extreme poverty while oil revenues line the pockets of Khartoum’s elite. Meanwhile, the Darfur conflict has spilled over into Chad, triggering war-by-proxy between Khartoum and Ndjamena.

It would be a gross overstatement to suggest that the United States alone could have prevented Pakistan’s instability or Sudan’s chaos. But it is equally true that that the United States has a propensity for investing billions of aid dollars in countries that are ruled by undemocratic governments and thus lack the transparency, rule of law, and institutions needed to sustain aid investments over the long term.
It is fair to assert that 30 years of robust yet intermittent engagement without a focus on either prevention or democratization has left the United States with little return on its aid investments and no meaningful progress toward stability in countries such as Pakistan or Sudan. By providing billions of dollars to, for example, the Musharraf government instead of investing in civil society, secular education, or programs implemented by civil society groups, the United States has reinforced the conditions that gave rise to Pakistan’s instability. The same was true of the hundreds of millions of aid dollars provided to Sudanese President Jaafar Nimeri from the late 1970s through the mid-1980s.

The costs of trying to manage crises without also seeking to prevent them are enormous. Billions of tax dollars are invested with little return, while the potential financial benefits of trade are quashed by rampant instability. Other economic costs resonate for generations—crisis-ridden countries see their debts balloon, incur higher military expenditures, suffer the erosion of productive capacity, and sacrifice the potential of younger generations that are either displaced or otherwise denied education and job opportunities.

The stability costs are also significant. Long-running crises spread, destabilizing neighboring countries, spilling refugees across borders, and often upsetting the political balance of an affected region. Countries and regions in crisis, meanwhile, provide fertile ground for illicit trade, extremist networks, arms suppliers, and money launderers, thus undermining regional, as well as international, security. Countries weakened by unchecked crises are unable to participate effectively in global efforts to address our collective security. Countries in crisis cannot maintain the health infrastructure and systems needed to manage HIV/AIDS or avian flu, prepare to adapt to or mitigate the impacts of climate change, or effectively prevent the exploitation of their territory by terrorists or criminals.

There may be no better illustration of the problem than Somalia, where the collapse of the central government in the early 1990s led to conflict that has yet to abate. Somalia now provides a safe haven for terrorist networks and poses a threat to its neighbors. The latest round of this crisis—marked by Ethiopian intervention in support of a weak central government—has seen new levels of violence and rampant attacks on civilians. Most strikingly, Somali pirates rule the vital international shipping lanes along the coast and through the Gulf of Aden, which are now considered the most dangerous in the world. Pirates attacked more than 50 vessels moving through the main shipping route linking Africa, the Middle East, Europe, and Asia in the first nine months of 2008 alone. In September 2008, pirates seized a shipment of 33 T-72 tanks, grenade launchers, and ammunition—worth an estimated $30 million—which prompted the Russians and Americans to deploy warships to the region and the European Union and United Nations to consider establishing a military force to protect commercial shipping.

Perhaps most profound, however, are the human costs. Crises that have not been prevented, contained, or prohibited from recurring have cost millions of lives. Consider, for example, the recurrent and predictable famine in the Horn of Africa, which has killed millions. The ethnic cleansing against Bosnian Muslims resulted in the displacement of 2.2 million and the deaths of more than 100,000 people. The genocide in Rwanda killed more than 800,000; the crisis it triggered in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has seen the deaths of over 5 million more.
There are also moral costs that reverberate in ways that are less quantifiable, but no less potent, than the economic, security, or human costs. The world failed to prevent the genocide in Rwanda, and failed again to prevent or even contain the genocide in Darfur. In Bosnia, complex ancient “enmi-
eties” and the fear of another “Vietnam-
style quagmire” were put forth as reasons for inaction. The world has failed to pre-
vent crimes against humanity in northern Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Rwanda, Chechnya, Bosnia, Kosovo, Sri Lanka, and Burma. The profound
costs to our common humanity and our collective moral integrity are as unaccept-
able as they are incalculable.

From Rwanda to Congo

The long-term effects of failing to prevent genocide

The world’s collective failure to prevent the 1994
genocide in Rwanda is widely viewed as a cata-
trophe of immense but finite proportions. Over
800,000 people were killed in four months. Despite
the presence of U.N. peacekeepers, the world
stood by during the slaughter, and the United
States, burned by the Black Hawk Down incident
in Somalia, actively lobbied against international
intervention.

President Clinton later wrote: “The failure to try to
stop Rwanda’s tragedies became one of the greatest
regrets of my presidency.”10 During his campaign
for election to his first term, President George W.
Bush wrote on the margin of a memo that another
Rwanda would not be permitted “on my watch.”
But another Rwanda is unfolding, much more
slowly, in Sudan’s Darfur region, where the U.S.
Congress, the Bush administration, and the Chief
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court all
agree that the Sudanese government is perpetrating
genocide. Against this backdrop, the repercussions
of the Rwandan genocide continue to reverberate
across Africa’s Great Lakes region.

The consequences of the failure to prevent geno-
cide in Rwanda are much broader and longer last-
ing than most understand. The Rwandan genocide
triggered a war in the Democratic Republic of

Congo that, in human terms, has been seven times
as deadly as was the genocide in Rwanda. But the
cost of conflict in the Great Lakes region goes
beyond the loss of human life.

Security and stability costs

Refugees: Two million Rwandan refugees fled
into eastern Congo in 1994, triggering a massive
humanitarian response that perversely allowed the
genocide’s authors to re-establish themselves under
international protection in refugee camps along
Rwanda’s border. There was no international ap-
petite for mounting military operations to pursue
the genocidaires who accompanied the refugees
and hid in their midst. Within months, they had
destabilized eastern Congo, provided Rwanda and
Uganda with a rationale for intervening in Congo’s
politics and supporting successive invasions there,
and undermined the credibility of humanitarian
agencies such as the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees as impartial providers of
protection and assistance.

Rebel movements: The interlocking conflicts in
Rwanda, Congo, Burundi, and Uganda resulted
in an alphabet soup of rebel movements, militias,
and proxy armies. Rebels such as the Democratic
Liberation Forces of Rwanda, or FDLR, and the
Lord’s Resistance Army now use Congo as a safe haven for attacks on neighboring states while they prey upon the Congolese people.

**Ripple effects:** The Congo conflict involved, at its height, armies from nine foreign countries. These countries’ involvement, motivated in large measure by a desire to profit from Congo’s natural resources, has had ripple effects across the continent. Zimbabwe’s intervention, for example, allowed Robert Mugabe’s government to stay afloat when the state coffers were empty.

**Economic costs**

**Costs to Rwanda:** Rwanda’s GDP loss from 1993 to 1997 averaged 6.3 percent. Although Rwanda rebounded with strong growth during the last decade, the costs persist. Rwanda is now believed to have the highest percentage of orphans in the world.

**Costs to Congolese:** Congo’s GDP decreased by an average of 5.2 percent from 1996 to 2001. Even with consistent economic growth since 2002, GDP would need to grow by 5 percent in real terms for 70 years to return to the level of per capita real income in 1960.

**Benefits for predators:** Ordinary Africans have borne the brunt of conflict in the Great Lakes region, while warlords, arms dealers, and smugglers that exploited the crisis have accrued huge sums of wealth and made the conflict more deadly and the world more dangerous. Victor Bout, an arms dealer known worldwide as the “Merchant of Death,” sold arms to parties on all sides of the war, and according to intelligence reports, Hezbollah in the late 1990s used the conflict in the Congo as a cover to exploit the illicit diamond trade there.

**Cost of U.S. reaction:** Almost 15 years after the Rwandan genocide, the United States still foots one-quarter of the bill for MONUC, the U.N. Mission in Congo, which costs more than $1 billion per year. In 2006-2007, U.S. funding for the DRC totaled almost $400 million.
Human costs

Mortality: The International Rescue Committee has documented that 5.4 million people died in Congo from war-related causes between 1998 and 2007. The majority of these deaths occurred from preventable and treatable conditions such as malaria and malnutrition, which become deadly due to Congo’s collapsed health infrastructure.

Sexual violence: The use of rape as a deliberate tactic was one of the most horrifying aspects of the Rwandan genocide—one that migrated across the border into eastern Congo and has metastasized into an epidemic of sexual violence. Human rights groups have documented the systematic use of sexual violence against women in eastern Congo, which is considered the most dangerous place in the world to be a woman or a girl.

Moral costs

U.S. loss of moral high ground: The United States’ decision not to intervene in Rwanda was based upon a narrow calculation: without national interests at stake, the costs of intervention were deemed too high. But permitting genocide to proceed unchecked undermined the moral credibility of the United States, as well as the rest of the international community.

Damage to U.N. reputation: The international response to the Congo crisis has continued to erode the moral authority of U.N. peacekeeping in particular; MONUC has been plagued with scandals, especially around the issue of sexual exploitation of Congolese women and girls by U.N. peacekeepers.

The world’s arguments against intervention in Rwanda in 1994 were based on a calculation of costs—the dangers to an intervention force, the expenditure of political capital, the dollars required to mount a mission, and the risk of intervening in a part of the world that few consider strategic. But today, the decision not to intervene in Rwanda or in pursuit of Hutu militias that fled to neighboring Congo looks to have been far more expensive than the alternative.
WHY SUSTAINABLE SECURITY MATTERS

Positioning America to lead in a 21st-century world will take more than extending a hand to our allies, fixing a long list of misdirected policies, and crafting a new national security strategy that is tough as well as smart. Globalization provides an immutable backdrop to our foreign policy. America is today competing on a global playing field that is more complex, dynamic, and interdependent and thus far less certain than in the past.

Leading in this new world will require a fundamental shift away from our outdated notion of national security to a more modern concept of sustainable security—that is, our security as defined by the contours of a world gone global and shaped by our common humanity. Sustainable security combines three approaches:

- **National security**: the safety of the United States
- **Human security**: the well-being and safety of people
- **Collective security**: the shared interests of the entire world

Sustainable security, in short, can shape our continued ability to simultaneously prevent or defend the United States from real-time threats, reduce sweeping human insecurity around the world, and manage long-term threats to our collective, global security. This new approach takes into account the many (and ongoing) changes that have swept our planet since the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union.

Understanding the efficacy of this new sustainable security doctrine requires a quick look at this new global landscape.

GETTING BACK TO PREVENTION

It was the mid-1990s. The Cold War had ended, and the “war on terror” had not yet begun. For a brief moment, the world’s powers focused on those other wars—the deadly wars raging not between, but within, states—wars that killed millions, undermined peace and security, and triggered unchecked crimes against humanity.

The collective failure to stop genocide and crimes against humanity in Rwanda and the Balkans triggered the collective consciousness, and for a moment in time caused some of the world’s best thinkers and doers to join forces behind the cause of prevention. The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict released a major report in 1997 that asserted the simple truth that it is possible to prevent deadly conflicts.

With a nod to the future, the commission’s report also described global trends and conditions, including the proliferation of small arms, state weakness, environmental degradation, and poverty as force multipliers able to increase the scope and incidence of deadly crises. These recommendations were offered by a high-powered commission advised by influential thinkers including George Schultz, Lee Hamilton, Lawrence Eagleburger, Desmond Tutu, Elie Wiesel, and Condoleezza Rice, and for a time they gained some traction, shaping a new understanding of human security and laying the ground for the responsibility to protect doctrine.

This effort was part of a broader movement focused on crisis response that was taking hold in non-governmental and international circles. Senior former diplomats and aid officials frustrated by the failure to prevent Rwanda and Bosnia formed the International Crisis Group in 1995, an indepen-
dent organization that combined the field expertise needed to signal early warning with the political clout necessary to advocate preventive solutions.

Recognizing the dangers and opportunities arising in post-crisis situations, the Clinton administration created the Office of Transition Initiatives within the U.S. Agency for International Development. Equipped with expertise and flexible funding, OTI quickly established both the need for and capacity to quickly undertake programs designed to consolidate stability over the longer term.

Concurrent efforts at the United Nations also connected the dots between the failures of the 1990s and the pressing need for a preventive strategy. The 1990s saw the failure of several peacekeeping missions, but it also witnessed successes in second-round interventions in Bosnia, Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Kosovo. These missions made clear the fundamental ingredients for success: a clear lead nation and command authority vested in the hands of a country able to draw on resources and professional expertise; a mandate and array of partnerships that allow for an effective military response to spoilers; strong political support from among the world’s major powers; the participation of regional governments; and a clear political settlement or peace agreement.

U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who as head of U.N. peacekeeping was personally implicated in the failure to stop genocide in Rwanda, commissioned a series of in-depth investigations into U.N. failure in Rwanda and Srebrenica. These investigations triggered broad overhauls of U.N. peacekeeping doctrine. Annan “pledged to move the United Nations from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention” and oversaw far-reaching efforts to align the diverse capabilities of the U.N. Secretariat and its many related funds, programs, and departments toward a preventive strategy. Before leaving office, Annan noted substantial progress toward his goal, but recognized that, “a considerable gap remains, however, between rhetoric and reality.”

The World Bank also promoted the idea that more needed to be done to prevent conflict and its deadly consequences. The bank’s 1997 World Development Report, “The State in a Changing World” noted the following: “The high human and financial cost of wars—and of associated relief and rehabilitation efforts—is well known, but existing mechanisms have had little success in preventing conflicts or in resolving them before they become large-scale human tragedies.”

The concept of prevention was also at the center of the debate about “humanitarian intervention” that Annan brought before the General Assembly in 2000. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, established by the Canadian government in response to Annan’s exhortations, reformulated the challenge as “The Responsibility to Protect”—the concept that state sovereignty entails a range of responsibilities to protect vulnerable communities whose governments cannot or will not protect them. This report, embraced by the U.N. World Summit in 2005 and endorsed through Security Council Resolution 1674, underscored that, “the responsibility to protect implies an accompanying responsibility to prevent,” placing prevention at the center of this emerging international norm.

Perhaps most critically, some decision makers and analysts began to recognize that legitimate national security concerns were at stake in places previously considered to be of marginal strategic importance. On issues ranging from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to international terrorism, weak states mattered.
The Bush Administration Takes a Step Backward

Tragically, the turn of the century marked a step backward. One of the drivers was ideological. By 2000, and despite the successes of missions in East Timor and Kosovo, American political opinion was shifting against humanitarian intervention. Conservatives in Congress condemned the Clinton administration’s proclivity for assuming the role of the “world’s policeman,” while public opinion questioned the value of deploying U.S. forces in far corners of the globe. Opposition peaked when the Bush administration took office. The mindset of the foreign policy thinkers that accompanied the new president disparaged and disregarded the lessons learned from the 1990s and the concept of “nation building.” As a Bush campaign advisor, Condoleezza Rice famously said, “We don’t need to have the 82nd Airborne escorting kids to kindergarten.”

In “Promoting the National Interest,” Rice’s early 2000 Foreign Affairs article, the soon-to-be national security advisor castigated the Clinton administration for refusing to set foreign policy priorities and went on to define national interests purely in terms of U.S. relations with major powers—Russia and China—and rogue states—Iraq, North Korea, and Iran. President Bush notably said in a presidential debate in 2000 that the situation in Rwanda in 1994 should not have triggered U.S. intervention—and subsequently offered up a stark climb down from traditional U.S. treaty and other obligations to thwart genocide.

The Bush administration’s rejection of the lessons learned in the 1990s has been nowhere more evident than in the case of Iraq. A tremendous amount of progress was made in developing effective personnel and techniques for rebuilding post-conflict states during the 1990s, yet almost all of these innovations and best practices were ignored by the Bush administration in Iraq. The most notable example of this tendency was the decision to hastily disband the Iraqi army without an effective disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program in place. The Bush administration relied heavily on personnel and political cronies with little post-conflict experience to assist Iraqi reconstruction while alienating a wide range of international experts and partners who would have made a difference on the ground.

The adaptations to failure and the policy shifts that have emerged in the wake of the “global war on terror” suggest a belated recognition of the importance of prevention and sustainable security. As the failures of Iraq and Afghanistan grew more evident, the proliferation of new tools and techniques began.
Proliferation of a different kind

The Bush administration’s new security initiatives

The Bush administration turned an eye to crisis management in the aftermath of the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, in part because it realized that despite its earlier opposition, the wars could not be won without some nation building. The administration’s failure to consolidate meaningful gains in stability operations in both countries and its experience in the “global war on terror” led to the creation of a number of new initiatives designed to support a broadly defined nation-building agenda. Important as these new initiatives may be, there are two problems. First, most are defined more by the administration’s experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the global “war on terror,” than by the challenges we will face in the future. Second, these new tools are spread across government agencies and departments without benefit of leadership or coordination. The range of new initiatives includes:

State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization

The mission of S/CRS is to “institutionalize U.S. government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife.” President Bush’s National Security Presidential Directive 44 tasks the secretary of state and S/CRS coordinator with leading the inter-agency process of reconstruction, stabilization, and prevention. Created in July 2004, S/CRS’s broad mandate includes addressing the security challenges posed by failing and failed states. One of the core functions of S/CRS is to identify and assess these states and develop detailed contingency plans to avert and, where necessary, respond to crises.

The concept of S/CRS is compelling, but it remains understaffed and underfunded, and lacks the mandate to coordinate across agencies.

Civilian Stabilization Initiative

The Civilian Stabilization Initiative is a proposed program of S/CRS and will, if initiated, train and equip civilians to rapidly deploy to conflict or post-conflict countries. There will be an Active Response Corps of around 250 people within CSI who will be ready to deploy to a crisis with as little as 48 hours notice. Roughly 40 percent of the corps would come from the State Department, another 40 percent from USAID, and the remaining 20 percent from the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Justice, and Treasury. A Standby Response Corps of 2,000 and a Standby Reserve Corps of a similar number will complement the Active Response Corps. These individuals will have the skills and capabilities needed to help bring stability to conflict and post-conflict areas. The Response Corps will come from the eight departments and agencies noted above and will be deployable within 30 days for up to 180 days. The Reserve Corps will be comprised of officials from the private sector and state and local government. The fiscal year 2009 budget request included $248.6 million to organize, train, equip, and deploy CSI.

There is a greater need for civilian capabilities and expertise, but CSI’s design is based more on the United States’ experience in Iraq and Afghanistan than on the crises we may face in the future. There is also no clarity regarding what role CSI would play vis-à-vis USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance or Office of Transition Initiatives, which have potentially similar mandates.

**Department of Defense Directive 3000.05**

Issued in November 2005, 3000.05 states that, “[s]tability operations are a core U.S. military mission” and “shall be given priority comparable to combat operations.” The Defense Department has traditionally played a key role in global stability operations, but 3000.05 looks to fill the capacity gap created by weakened civilian institutions. DOD’s new and increased focus on stability operations is intended to reduce both the human and financial costs incurred by combat operations. Stability operations, as laid out in the directive, include rebuilding indigenous judicial systems, developing local governance structures, and promoting bottom-up economic activity. As a follow-up to the directive, the Army released its Stability Operations Manual in October 2008—a 200-page document that provides doctrinal and operational guidance for commanders and trainers.

**Phase Zero**

Phase Zero is the stage of engagement defined by the Defense Department as conflict prevention. Deputy Commander of the U.S. European Command General Charles Wald writes that the goal of Phase Zero is to, “invest fewer resources in a pre-crisis situation to avoid an exponentially larger expenditure later.” Phase Zero activities aim to shape a particular environment by promoting peace and stability operations. These activities are non-kinetic in nature and include humanitarian and development programs as well as training and equipping foreign militaries to improve regional security dynamics.

The “Phase Zero” analysis accurately reflects the world we live in, but the promotion of peace and stability should be led by civilian agencies, and the concept itself is shaped almost exclusively by DOD’s unique experience in counterterrorism operations rather than by the kinds of operations that will be necessary in the future.

**1206 funds**

Section 1206 of the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act allows the Defense Department to spend up to $200 million of its own funds to train and equip foreign militaries on stability and counterterrorism operations. The 2007 National Defense Authorization Act increased these annual funds to $300 million and extended them throughout fiscal year 2008. The secretary of defense must have the “concurrence” of the secretary of state for 1206 funds to be approved. Examples of 1206-funded projects include improving counterterrorism strike capabilities in Pakistan, countering threats to U.S. energy security in the Gulf of Guinea, and securing trans-Saharan Africa against terrorists.

There are legitimate concerns that this further weakens the State Department as it is not funded through its foreign affairs budget. This resource-rich DOD counterterrorism and stability pipeline could undermine the authority of the secretary of state and further complicate the coherence of U.S. foreign policy. 1206 funds are a stop-gap measure and not geared toward long-term solutions.

**1207 funds**

1207 funds were first authorized in the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act and allowed for the transfer of up to $100 million in defense articles, services, and training from the Defense Department to the State Department. The motivation for 1207 funds stemmed from the need to “jump start” S/CRS and support reconstruction, stabilization, and security activities abroad. These funds may also go to organizations that are coordinated by S/CRS. 1206 and 1207 funds are meant to be
complementary. 1207 funds tend to be reactionary in nature and, as Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte testified in July 2008, “allow the State Department to respond to needs until more formal programs can be planned.” For example, $10 million of these funds was transferred from the Defense Department to the State Department in reaction to the crisis in Lebanon in 2006. Five million dollars went toward clearing unexploded ordnance, while the remaining funds went to train and outfit the Lebanese Internal Security Forces as its army sought to enforce the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah.

DOD has requested $200 million in transfer authority for fiscal year 2009 to help stand up the Civilian Stabilization Initiative and transfer funds to other partner departments and agencies. Rather than providing funds to DOD that can be transferred to the State Department, it would be far more efficient and effective to make those funds directly available to the Department of State.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams

Provincial Reconstruction Teams are civil-military units that help provincial and local governments improve security and reconstruction efforts. PRTs were first established in Afghanistan in 2002 and were extended to Iraq in 2005. These PRTs operate in semi-permissive environments that may still be too hostile for many non-governmental and United Nations relief agencies. The teams are a mix of roughly 80-100 soldiers and civilians with varying levels of expertise in development and diplomacy. The military component provides protection for civilian agencies that would otherwise be unable to operate in such environments. PRTs are at the heart of the U.S. strategy to help stabilize and reconstruct Iraq and Afghanistan. In Iraq alone, PRTs received over $1 billion in FY2006 and FY2007 Economic Support Funds.

PRTs are potentially effective in non-permissive environments, but prolonged deployment risks clouding the distinction between military and civilian operations and fueling the perception that non-governmental organizations are engaged in military operations.

Commanders’ Emergency Response Program

The Commanders’ Emergency Response Program allows U.S. military commanders in the field to use appropriated operation and maintenance funds to help meet urgent humanitarian and reconstruction needs. Initialized by a June 2003 memo from Coalition Provision Authority Administrator L. Paul Bremer, CERP emerged as a stabilizing tool in Iraq, with funds allocated to help reconstruct and build upon Iraq’s social and material infrastructure, including health care, transportation, the rule of law, and food production and distribution. Three months after Bremer’s memo, CERP funds had been used to complete over 11,000 projects. Since 2003, nearly $3.5 billion in CERP funds has been made available for Iraq. There is merit in providing some funding to commanders in Iraq and now Afghanistan, but CERP currently provides huge sums of money to an arm of the government that lacks development expertise.

Building Global Partnerships Act

The Bush administration submitted the Building Global Partnerships Act to Congress in the spring of 2007. The BGPA looks to provide the Department of Defense with increased and permanent authority over non-traditional security assistance. If ratified, the BGPA would expand and institutionalize the use of two recent security and stability funding mechanisms: the Commanders Emergency Response Program and Section 1206 funds. Section 1541 of the BGPA would allow commanders to use CERP funds to meet urgent humanitarian and
reconstruction needs where U.S. forces are operational. The act also requested an increase in 1206 funds, from $300 million in FY07 to $750 million for FY08. With the concurrence of the secretary of state, this increase in 1206 funds would allow DOD to further train, equip, and partner with a wide array of security forces, including border police, counterterrorist forces, and paramilitaries. Any leftover funds could be carried across fiscal years.

The BGPA is a key legislative mechanism through which Directive 3000.05 would be implemented. Yet rendering either 1206 or CERP permanent—without reorganizing foreign assistance across the whole of the executive branch—risks setting a precedent for establishing the military as the lead in training and development programs.

The F process

The Bush administration began its attempt at foreign assistance reform, referred to as the F process, in January 2006. This reform process created an Office of Foreign Assistance within the State Department. The office is headed by a director of foreign assistance who is given the rank of deputy secretary of state, and they also serve as administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, or USAID. The director is charged with transforming the U.S. government’s approach to foreign assistance and, as part of this vision, seeks to ensure a more strategic approach to conflict prevention and response. The F process is limited to foreign assistance controlled by USAID and part of the assistance controlled by the State Department.

The director of foreign assistance has only limited jurisdiction over U.S. foreign aid, and no authority over major programs, including the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, and those managed by the Defense Department. The director therefore has little more authority than the USAID administrator did before the F process was undertaken.

AFRICOM and regional combatant commands

President Bush announced his plan for a new Unified Combatant Command for Africa in February 2007. Africa was previously divided among three regional commands. AFRICOM became operational this October and includes all African countries except Egypt, which remains part of the Central Command. AFRICOM’s mission is to strengthen stability and security throughout the continent and help professionalize Africa’s militaries. AFRICOM is geared toward a preventative security approach and non-kinetic operations. It is under the command of a four-star general and supported by two deputy commanders—one for
civil military affairs, the other for military operations—and a number of both military and civilian personnel. Since AFRICOM was created, other combatant commands have adopted similar relief and development mandates—and triggered a range of questions about the appropriate division of labor between the military and civilian agencies in the field.

The President’s Emergency Program for AIDS Relief and the Millennium Challenge Corporation

The Bush administration does deserve credit for two major foreign assistance initiatives—the President’s Emergency Program for AIDS Relief, or PEPFAR, and the Millenial Challenge Corporation, both of which generated strong bipartisan support from Capitol Hill. President Bush announced plans for PEPFAR in his 2003 State of the Union address, and it was authorized in May of that year. PEPFAR now targets 15 countries seriously affected by the HIV/AIDS pandemic, providing assistance for education, AIDS prevention, and treatment. The program includes the provision of antiretroviral drugs for over 1.6 million people infected by the virus, and care for AIDS victims, particularly orphans. The creation and funding of PEPFAR set the United States apart as the world’s leader in responding to the crisis.

PEPFAR is laudable for its aims and effectiveness on the ground, but it consumes the lion’s share of civilian foreign aid funding. Unless other accounts are increased, it risks “crowding out” other critical development programs. And although the AIDS pandemic is global, PEPFAR operates in only 15 countries.

The Millennium Challenge Corporation was created by an act of Congress in 2004 and provides substantial funding—far in excess of that provided worldwide by USAID—to countries that govern well and rule justly. MCC is governed by a board of directors headed by the secretary of state and is managed as an independent entity designed to both reward and help consolidate economic and political progress. Its aid compacts are rewarded only to countries meeting a strict set of criteria, and it provides other, but less, assistance to “threshold countries” that do not meet the criteria, but could with assistance. The MCC had awarded major grants to 18 countries worth nearly $4.5 billion as of 2008. The MCC aims to consolidate progress by investing in countries that are performing well, and some evidence shows that it is providing an incentive for reform in those countries that fall short of qualification. Yet it does not address the challenge of weak and failing states and like PEPFAR, it operates only in a few countries.
Using Policy Innovations More Effectively

Each of the Bush administration’s new strategies and tools has merit, but their proliferation is fraught with problems.

First, and taken collectively, their focus is overwhelmingly on crisis response over and above prevention. Effective crisis response can prevent crises from spreading or recurring, yet there is an imbalance between investments made in structural prevention versus tools deployed to manage crises once they occur. Many new aid programs are also selective. PEPFAR provides assistance to 15 countries, while the MCC signs compacts only with countries that are “out of the woods,” which limits their reach.

Second, the analyses behind most of these new resources and capabilities are derived from the United States’ experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, and in the “global war on terror.” As such, they are shaped to respond to those challenges, but not to the full range of other threats that we will face in the future.

Third, the creation of new funding streams, offices, and mandates adds to the already problematic proliferation of instruments across the executive branch. Managing all of these tools effectively is made more difficult by the fact that no one is in charge, since no single agency or official within the Executive Office of the President is mandated to take the lead in crisis prevention, response, or management.

Fourth, the concentration of new resources and capabilities in the Defense Department has led to a significant imbalance between civilian and military capabilities. As Defense Secretary Robert Gates highlighted in a July 2008 speech, “It has become clear that America’s civilian institutions of diplomacy and development have been chronically undermanned and under-funded for far too long—relative to what we traditionally spend on the military, and more important, relative to the responsibilities and challenges our nation has around the world.”

The administration that takes office in January 2009 can build the framework and strategy for a sustainable security approach with prevention at its core. The good news is that an enormous body of knowledge has been developed on this topic. The bad news is that there are significant political and budgetary impediments to focusing on prevention. Although there has been a substantial increase in foreign assistance during the Bush administration, the major increases fall into three categories: new initiatives that focus on a limited number of countries such as PEPFAR and the MCC; new Defense Department programs; and Iraq reconstruction. The foreign aid funding available to address global poverty, weak and failing states, conflict, and development has actually decreased. Meanwhile, even though aid numbers are higher than ever, the entire U.S. economic assistance budget totaled $26.9 billion in 2006—or just over two and a half months of spending in Iraq.

The challenge will be to incorporate the many and new policy innovations on conflict response and stabilization into a coherent prevention strategy backed by significant resources. A new strategy must complement these new initiatives with other tools and capabilities that can enhance our effectiveness and cut through the morass of bureaucratic inefficiencies and vested interests that impede effective implementation. Progress will require the complete overhaul of guiding foreign aid legislation, bipartisan engagement, and leadership from the White House.
A SUSTAINABLE APPROACH TO PREVENTION

The next administration must have a clear understanding of the nature of the crises that the United States will face in order to build an effective and comprehensive security strategy. These include state-based crises such as state collapse, deadly conflict, and crimes against humanity, as well as global trend-based crises, such as climate change and the worldwide food crisis. Policies should reflect an understanding of the crisis prevention spectrum, and include a focus on structural prevention, crisis response and management, and preventing recurrence.

Structural prevention: Structural prevention refers to the activities that can prevent crises before they erupt, including building the capacity of states, regions, and organizations to withstand crises; reducing vulnerability to external shocks; and strengthening international regimes and institutions that address human rights, the small arms trade, crimes against humanity, and other factors that can exacerbate crises. Structural prevention is relevant to the management of more than 50 weak or failing states that are unable to secure their borders or meet the needs of their citizens. These states are at risk of further collapse and global threats such as climate change that have predictable consequences.

Crisis response and management: Crisis response and management goes beyond meeting the immediate needs of affected civilians or stabilization and includes preventing the escalation or expansion of a given crisis. Examples include Sudan, where the Darfur crisis has spread across borders into Chad and the Central African Republic and is likely to further destabilize the country’s other neighbors. Another example is the Russia-Georgia crisis, which threatens to ripple across the entire former Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc.

Preventing recurrence: Preventing recurrence occurs after a given crisis has stabilized or the transition to stabilization has been completed. There are myriad...

...even though aid numbers are higher than ever, the entire U.S. economic assistance budget totaled $26.9 billion in 2006—or just over two and a half months of spending in Iraq.
examples from recent history—Liberia, Sudan, Pakistan, and others—where the United States and its international partners have successfully helped to stabilize a situation, but have then reduced engagement only to see crises recur. This is particularly important given that new democracies that emerge out of the crisis have the greatest risk of state failure.

There are several steps the next president can take to enable the United States to balance reactive and proactive approaches in a rapidly changing world.

1. **Codify the Prevention Mandate**

Unless prevention is integrated into the national strategies that guide foreign policy formulation and implementation, it will remain an afterthought—the press of time and range of immediate demands will preclude its inclusion. The next president should take steps to lay the ground for a more deliberate focus on prevention. He should require that crisis prevention be included in the National Security Strategy that the administration is required to produce on an annual basis.

The president should also initiate the production and public release of a National Development Strategy. There currently exists no overarching policy framework or guidance for the multiple foreign assistance funds, accounts, and programs that are distributed across the executive branch. A National Development Strategy would bring greater policy coherence to these and would help to prevent duplication of effort and inefficiencies. A National Development Strategy could also drive an enhanced focus on prevention because development assistance is the most effective tool available for promoting structural prevention.

2. **Ramp Up and Integrate Long-Term Strategic Planning**

The Department of Defense is the most inclined and best-equipped to conduct strategic planning among executive branch foreign affairs agencies. The Pentagon not only engages in regular, annual planning exercises, but it also undertakes gaming and other exercises aimed at preparing for contingencies and ensuring that the department is equipped with the resources needed to address future challenges. The State Department runs an Office of Policy Planning, but this office functions more as a “think tank” for the secretary of state than as a vehicle for strategically mapping diplomatic plans. USAID conducts regular planning exercises tied largely to the determination of budget priorities, and U.S. embassies submit plans to Washington that set out the proposed plans and activities of U.S. agencies in the field.

What is lacking is an integrated, interagency mechanism for long-range planning that is tied directly to the allocation of resources. The next administration should:

- Appoint a deputy national security advisor for strategic planning and budget who would be mandated to coordinate interagency, long-term strategic policy and budget planning. The deputy should not only oversee and coordinate planning exercises and develop attendant budget requests, but he or she should also convene deputies when crisis prevention or response imperatives require high-level decisions. Alternatively, the National Security Council could include a Directorate for Strategic Planning and Budget mandated to carry out these responsibilities.
Integrate issue-specific early warning systems that are now spread across the government through the preparation of a monthly early warning report submitted to the deputy national security advisor and tied to a “trigger mechanism” that would allow the deputy to convene the interagency to take decisions.

Conduct regular, agency-wide gaming and contingency planning exercises designed to enable the executive branch to get out ahead of crises, ensure that sufficient resources are available for crisis response, and prepare for the full range of complex crises that will arise in the future. Initial exercises could include weak and failing states, crimes against humanity, and climate change.

3. Organize for Prevention

Major impediments stand in the way of U.S. effectiveness when it comes to crisis prevention. The executive branch has at its disposal as many as 25 foreign aid tools that allow the United States to improve state capacity, help build institutions, support the rule of law, reduce poverty, and pursue other development goals. Yet they are dispersed across the executive branch, and no single agency or individual is in charge. Republicans and Democrats, along with multiple commissions—including the HELP Commission, which was mandated by Congress to review U.S. foreign aid—agree that U.S. foreign policy must give weight to defense, diplomacy, and development, but development remains the poor stepchild to defense and diplomacy. Finally, the proliferation of new funds and authorities in response to Iraq and Afghanistan has fostered the migration of what were traditionally civilian capabilities to the military.

The next administration should take deliberate steps to elevate development. It should ensure coherence across an executive branch that is availed of myriad funds, authorities, and programs that do not, as now configured, add up to a coherent goal. There are four immediate steps that a new president can take.

First, the next president should appoint a cabinet-level official to represent the development function in policy deliberations, possibly by authorizing the USAID administrator to attend meetings of National Security Council principals. The next administration should also conduct an interagency inventory of the development and crisis response tools spread across the government, lead the coordination of these tools, and lay the ground for the reorganization and reforms that are necessary to achieve policy coherence and the effective utilization of taxpayer resources.

Second, the next administration should empower a joint National Security Council-National Economic Council directorate to coordinate development and crisis response across the executive branch, and include development in the portfolio of a deputy national security advisor. The NSC’s ability to coordinate development policy would ensure greater policy coherence across the government, while the involvement of the NSC and NEC would signal both commitment and leadership from the White House.

Third, the administration should engage immediately with Congress on the need for new legislation to replace the outdated and cumbersome Foreign Assistance Act, which today totals nearly 2,000 pages. This act, which governs foreign aid, was written in 1961 and has since been amended to include 33 goals, 247 directives, and 75 pri-
orities. It was rendered so cumbersome that it now provides neither coherent guidance to the executive branch nor a roadmap for oversight to the legislative branch. In the absence of a policy, strategy, or effective guiding legislation, aid programming is primarily driven by congressional earmarks, presidential directives, and internal bureaucratic requirements.39

Fourth, the administration should engage the Departments of Defense and State in an effort to review the placement, coordination, and staffing of the full range of crisis response programs, authorities, and funds.

4. INVEST INTELLIGENCE, DIPLOMATIC, AND ECONOMIC RESOURCES IN THE MOST VULNERABLE AREAS AND REGIONS

Africa provides one-fifth of our oil, represents the largest untapped market in the world, is the site of the second-largest Al Qaeda attack on the United States, and has witnessed two genocides in less than two decades. Yet the continent is a sideshow when it comes to U.S. foreign policy, and has fewer American diplomats per crisis than any other region. The entire Foreign Service professional staff amounts to just under 6,500 persons—less than half the size of one 15,000-person division in the Army. USAID has dropped in size to only 1,100 persons, smaller than most brigades. In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted that the Pentagon has “a lot more lawyers” than the entire size of the Foreign Service.40

In Africa and some other regions of the world, crises are more likely to erupt and more likely to inflict costly and long-lasting damage. This is in part due to the vulnerability to external and internal shocks that comes with poverty and, in some cases, weak or poor governance. This vulnerability will only increase in the future; experts believe that the world’s poorest countries will suffer the worst effects of climate change, and most countries are already struggling with the growing scarcity of arable land and potable water.

State and institutional weakness is also a factor. It was no accident, for example, that Al Qaeda chose the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania as the targets for their first major attacks against the United States. It was possible in these locations to move across national borders, move funds through bank accounts, and avoid detection through immigration or other legal institutions. The 9/11 Commission spoke to this vulnerability, and the Bush administration’s “Transformational Diplomacy” initiative aimed in part to direct greater resources and attention to these regions. But the vulnerability gap is still enormous and should be immediately addressed.

The next administration and Congress should seek to allocate greater intelligence and analytic resources to these regions. The next administration can and should also build on and expand the “Global Repositioning” effort undertaken by the Bush State Department. The program was designed to increase diplomatic coverage and reposition diplomatic positions in the developing world. Some personnel transfers have been made, but few diplomats assigned to the developing world have been provided with the language, cultural, or other training necessary to conduct their jobs effectively.
5. Re-engage with the International Community

The United States cannot prevent crises, effectively respond to them, and manage the full range of them on the global horizon without allies and international institutions. Re-engaging in the multilateral arena and improving and then supporting international treaties and norms will enhance U.S. capabilities and not weaken them, as the Bush administration has argued. Coordinating with other governments will not lessen our influence, but will expand our reach. But after eight years of disengagement, the next administration will have to move swiftly to reinstate effective U.S. leadership on the global stage.

An important first move—though not an easy task given federal budget constraints—will be to cover current U.S. arrears to the United Nations. The United States now owes $2.4 billion in dues. Holding back on these payments does far more than signal Washington’s displeasure—it constrains U.N. operations because the United Nations cannot spend against anticipated member payments. As such, peacekeeping missions and other critical activities go underfunded. The next administration may choose to adopt the course followed by the Clinton administration, which secured congressional support for U.N. arrears by striking a deal with the U.N. secretary general over critical U.N. reforms. It is abundantly clear that continued U.N. reforms are required, but starving the United Nations of operational resources is a poor way to encourage greater institutional effectiveness.

The United States’ hand would be further strengthened by support for critical treaties and regimes that, taken together, can provide the foundation for the international rules of the game. Treaties alone cannot prevent or even resolve crises, but they can affect the conditions that exacerbate crises. Oxfam has reported that 95 percent of the weapons commonly used in African conflicts come from outside the continent, strongly attesting to the importance of developing a small arms trade treaty. Such a treaty would not solve the problem of the illicit flow of arms into conflicts in Africa and around the world, but it would create the possibility of international regulation. In December 2006, 153 nations voted in favor of a U.N. process to develop such a treaty; the United States was the only country in the world to vote against it.

The United States should also seek to coordinate its own integrated early warning systems with those managed by the United Nations, international financial institutions, and other international agencies and governments. More information is better in the case of early warning, and classification impediments can be minimized with an increasing amount of analysis available from open sources. New early warning targets should also be developed. There are early warning systems for conflict, for example, and public and classified “watch lists” for a range of potential crises, but there is no warning system for mass atrocities or crimes against humanity.


Rationalizing and integrating existing tools and capabilities will significantly enhance the United States’ ability to more effectively pursue prevention strategies. But additional tools are needed for maximum effectiveness. Some can be incorporated with relative ease, and others will need more expansive planning and development.
As a first step, the new administration can and should develop a diplomatic surge capability. In times of crisis, USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance deploys Disaster Assistance Response Teams comprised of specialists that have the authority, in consultation with Washington, to conduct on-the-ground assessments and recommendations, call forward assistance, and liaise with key actors. Our diplomatic community, however, has no such capability. The State Department has had to rely on understaffed embassies to manage long-running and complex crises in places such as Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Or they have had to designate special envoys who may have public clout but are constrained in their effectiveness by the fact that they are not integrated into the State Department and have no authority over policy, staff, or resources.

Managing crises, and particularly conflicts, often requires a diplomatic surge capacity that would allow Washington to deploy additional Foreign Service officers to regions of need for specified periods of time. The State Department could position temporary regional diplomatic cells, led by an official of ambassador rank and staffed by skilled career officers. A regional diplomatic cell in East Africa, for example, could enhance the State Department’s capabilities in the crises in Sudan, northern Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Somalia—all of which are now underattended and increasing in complexity. This additional high-level presence could trigger some turf battles between ambassadors on the ground and newly deployed senior Foreign Service officers, so Washington should give the lead to the appropriate authority on the ground.

It is not enough, however, to have more diplomats in the field. The new administration should also give our diplomats additional tools, for example, by creating an official list of perpetrators of crimes against humanity. The official list of state sponsors of terrorism maintained by the State Department has significant impact—it isolates terrorists and terrorist networks and the designation sometimes serves as an incentive for change. No equivalent designation exists for those who commit crimes against humanity, despite the fact that we have seen the perpe-

Given the fact that the United States has not endorsed the International Criminal Court, our punitive tools in cases of crimes against humanity are few and frequently ineffective.
tration of egregious crimes against humanity in Rwanda, the Balkans, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, and other places over the past 15 years.

Given the fact that the United States has not endorsed the International Criminal Court, our punitive tools in cases of crimes against humanity are few and frequently ineffective. An official list should automatically trigger penalties and include a commitment to multilateralize penalties in international fora. This would ensure greater accountability, signal a strong and realizable U.S. stand against crimes against humanity, and begin isolating the perpetrators and potentially informing their calculations. It is likely in a number of cases that those committing terrorist acts, or sponsoring such acts, would also appear on this list.

There is also a critical need to enhance our ability to deploy effective international peacekeeping missions. The number of U.N. peacekeepers has increased seven fold since 1999, as have the number of regional missions—in East Timor, Burundi, Sudan, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, for example—to which the United States has provided support. There has been and will likely continue to be a greater reliance on the African Union, which undertook the initial deployment to Burundi, deployed an observer mission to Darfur in advance of the Security Council’s authorization of the hybrid U.N.-A.U. mission in Darfur force, or UNAMID, and is now deployed in Somalia.

Support for these missions has been more rhetorical than practical. In 2007, fully three years into its mission in Darfur, the A.U. observer mission had limited intelligence capacity, did not have interoperable equipment, and had insufficient resources to pay, house, and feed the troops on the ground. Subject to deadly attacks on a regular basis, the A.U. mission in Sudan could not protect its own forces, much less the civilian population. Even today, the full deployment of UNAMID has been stalled by, among other factors, the need for armored helicopters and other equipment.

The U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, or DPKO, has managed the steep surge in the number of peacekeepers required around the globe, but only up to a point. Whereas the immediate need for 8,000 blue-helmets following the 2006 crisis in Lebanon was handled by reaching out to a new generation of troop-contributing countries such as Turkey, Indonesia, and China, other deployments have been achieved only by “borrowing” from other locales: forces in Liberia moved to Cote d’Ivoire, troops in Burundi moved to Congo, and so forth.

UNAMID, meanwhile, makes clear the dangers of peacekeeping on the cheap. The design of UNAMID ignores the lessons of the 1990s—its mission and mandate are unclear, it lacks a sufficiently powerful command, and it is not supported by an array of partners. Strikingly, UNAMID can neither recruit nor deploy troops absent the approval of the government of Sudan. It has secured less than half of the troops required for its mission and little of the equipment needed, and fundamental design flaws ensure that major troop-contributing countries will continue to hold back because they know that—as the head of the U.N.’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations has himself said—UNAMID is destined for failure.

Security and moral imperatives are at stake in places such as Darfur, and both recent history and projections of the future make clear that there will be a continued and probably growing demand for more and more complex peacekeeping and peace
enforcement interventions. The next administration can take several steps to ensure that these operations are more effective and address the pressing need for troops, capabilities, and resources.

The next administration should first build upon and accelerate the training programs supported by the Clinton and Bush administrations by increasing the funding for and scale of the Global Peace Operations Initiative. The administration should then cover U.S. arrears to the United Nations and plan for, in annual budgeting, the need for assistance to regional missions to address the “hand to mouth” funding practices that cripple both U.N. and regional peacekeeping operations. In particular, the administration and Congress should consider designated line-item funding for the African Union. The administration will also have to work with NATO and other allies to develop standard “capability packages” that would allow for the provision of critical interoperable equipment to regional missions.

The United States needs to do more of what it has proven to do well in recent years by providing lifts to get troops into theater and, as was done by the Bush administration in Liberia in 2003, providing the temporary troop presence required to stand up regional or U.N. operations. The next administration should also act on what may be the most important lesson about the deployment of peacekeeping missions in complex political emergencies: that unless accompanied by robust commitments to peacemaking, the missions are destined to fail.

7. Address resource and staff shortages

The executive branch agencies that are best suited to tackle crisis prevention are today faced with a severe human capital crisis. A “mismatch between resources and requirements” in the State Department has led to the current vacancy of 12 percent of overseas and 33 percent of domestic Foreign Service positions. Iraq and Afghanistan have placed further demands on the Foreign Service. The number of unaccompanied and limited-accompanied Foreign Service positions has increased fourfold in the past seven years to over 900 positions. More than 20 percent of all Foreign Service officers have served in Iraq or Afghanistan.

Unfunded Foreign Service mandates include 325 positions in Iraq; 150 in Afghanistan; more than 100 training positions to increase the number of Arabic speakers; 40 in the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization; and 280 new posts in emerging countries of significance such as India and China. The State Department announced its “Transformational Diplomacy” initiative in 2006. The centerpiece of this initiative is a plan known as the Global Repositioning Program that shifts hundreds of positions to emerging areas in Africa, South Asia, East Asia, the Middle East, and elsewhere. Yet according to a September 2007 State Department inspector general report, the Global Repositioning Program has not received adequate support resources that would allow employees to travel around host countries and execute key “transformational diplomacy” tasks.

On the other side of the civilian spectrum, USAID is suffering from a crippling human capital crisis. Congress and the White House have approved funding to staff the President’s Emergency Program for AIDS Relief and the Millennium Challenge Corporation, USAID’s direct-hire workforce was more than 18,000 in the late 1960s, but fell below 2,000 in the early part of this decade following a decreasing trend.
throughout the 1980s. USAID’s Human Capital Strategic Plan for 2004-2008 found that by 2007, more than half of all Foreign Service officers and one-third of its civil service staff would be eligible for retirement. In June 2004, there were roughly 670 USAID Foreign Service officers overseas for the more than 150 countries where the agency manages programs. New staffing programs in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq place further burdens on USAID’s depleting human capital levels.

Training programs that professionalize civilian agencies have also been chronically underfunded.

- About 19 percent of State Department Foreign Service positions around the globe are staffed by underqualified personnel.

- The American Foreign Service Association estimates that fewer than 20 percent of Foreign Service officers have received training in negotiation.

- Twenty nine percent of diplomats in language-designated positions do not meet language proficiency requirements.

- In the Middle East, 37 percent of diplomats in language-designated positions do not possess the language skills required for their posts.

It is therefore critical that the next administration both move swiftly to fill these debilitating personnel gaps—including by supporting the proposed increase in State Department funding in the fiscal year 2009 budget request. The next administration will also have to position the United States to respond to a diverse range of complex threats and challenges by developing a comprehensive plan to recruit and retain personnel across our foreign affairs agencies. The State Department and USAID have the most urgent need for modernizing and expanding their professional capabilities. They need to include personnel with diverse skill sets and the ability to craft and implement policies that address challenges ranging from climate change to complex political emergencies. Personnel should also possess the ability to negotiate in the Middle East or implement education programs.

These civilian agencies also need greater budget flexibility on par with what is available to the Department of Defense. The Pentagon has a much greater ability to secure funds from Congress than its counterpart civilian agencies. This ability is in part because of the priority given to national defense, but also because the Defense Department achievements are easier to justify than the more qualitative outcomes that accrue to either the State Department or USAID. This imbalance has constrained our civilian capabilities, evidenced by the creation of “1207” funds, which are allocated to the Department of Defense on the understanding that they will be regranted to the Department of State. DOD also has the authority to allocate foreign aid or development funding more quickly and with fewer restrictions than USAID.

This does not lead to cost-effective implementation. In Georgia, the U.S. military has used a C-130 airlift operation to deliver tons of relief supplies at a cost of tens of millions of dollars, despite the ready availability of less expensive private delivery mechanisms. Likewise, the U.S. Navy’s T-AH 19 Mercy Class hospital ships, Mercy and Comfort, provide a high visibility public relations face, but their slow speed puts them weeks behind the curve responding to emergencies. And their drive-by health care services are inherently unsustainable and exceedingly expensive for taxpayers.
Providing to State and USAID the same budgetary flexibility that is granted to the Department of Defense is a long-term proposition, in part because of concerns on Capitol Hill about the ability of our civilian agencies to deliver against specific and concrete outcomes. But one step—the allocation of contingency funds—is urgent, and could lay the ground for longer-term reform. In the absence of contingency funding, responses to new crises or opportunities are either underfunded or require “robbing Peter to pay Paul.” In either case, we undercut ourselves.

Existing budgetary processes reflect the reactive quality of U.S. foreign assistance. Humanitarian expert Steven Hansch estimates that, “the most publicized three or four crises in any one year attract more funds than the next twenty or more combined, regardless of their relative needs.”

Congress’ tendency to fund emergency response through mid-year supplemental appropriations exacerbates this tendency, inhibits the development of a rational approach to budgeting for emergencies, and imposes human costs in the field, where aid agencies scale back life-saving programs because of funding gaps. Cuts to the FY2006 International Disaster and Famine Assistance account, for example, meant that the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance had to divert resources from emergencies in Burundi, Eritrea, and Cote d’Ivoire to the Pakistan earthquake response. It was six months before the FY2006 supplemental budget provided some funding for these programs—a delay with painful consequences for children in need of vaccinations, displaced families without shelter, and women vulnerable to sexual violence.

**Conclusion**

That the world has grown more complex is by now an understatement. There is growing recognition that, as the Central Intelligence Agency’s lead analyst has pointed out, “[i]t’s going to be a whole lot harder to deal with a whole lot more problems that are going to be much more interconnected than ever in our past.”

Untended, the vast and growing array of global challenges facing the United States will eat away at our security and chip away at the moral foundations from which we lead. As more and more complex crises erupt and spread, the United States will find it nearly impossible to manage the world around us.

Prevention is not easy, nor is its success guaranteed. But reaction is costly and ineffective. The United States faces today both the opportunity and the challenge to turn its strategy around, and to shift from managing an ever-expanding list of crisis management imperatives to an approach that allows us to shorten the list by preventing crises from occurring in the first place. The status quo may allow us temporary security, but only a fundamental change can sustain our security over time.
ENDNOTES

11 Economist Intelligence Unit, “‘Rwanda Country Profile’” (1998).

33 Tarnoff, “Iraq” p. 4.

34 Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Integrating 21st Century Development.”


47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.


50 Ibid.


52 Ibid, p.29.

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55 John K. Naland, “Domestic Crisis with Global Implications.”

56 Ibid.


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